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ABSTRACT

There is a tendency in education theory to place the focus on the consequences of racial
hegemony (racism, Eurocentric education, low performance by racial minorities) and ignore that
race is antecedent to these consequences. This dissertation explores the treatment of race within
critical theory in education. I conduct a metaphysical analysis to examine the race concept as it
emerges from the works of various critical theorists in education. This examination shows how
some scholars affirm the scientifically discredited race concept by offering racial essentialist
approaches for emancipatory education. I argue that one of consequences of these approaches is
the further tightening of racial constraints on the student’s personal autonomy. This mandates
that critical theorists gain a deeper understanding of race as a problem, conceptually,
epistemically, ideologically, and existentially. I argue that critical theorists of education draw
from work conducted in the philosophy of race by theorists such as K. Anthony Appiah, Jorge
Gracia, Charles Mills, and Naomi Zack to gain insights on the metaphysics of race to better
inform theory and praxis. I further recommend the creation of a critical philosophy of race in
education to address and combat race as a problem and its consequences. I contend that the
groundwork for philosophy of race in education must entail strategies that encourage and assist
theorists and teachers to move toward the elimination of the race in society, while utilizing race
only as heuristic tool to address its consequences. Additionally, I argue that a philosophy of race
in education must advocate for an education for autonomy as a means to racial liberation for
students.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Before I joined the field of education, I was a graduate student in philosophy.
Being a black person in Western academic philosophy is akin to being an anomaly. You
are the elephant in the room that everybody sees, but that nobody wants to be caught
noticing for fear that you might want to talk about it. The “less black” you can be the
better. When I say “less black,” I do not mean to imply that there is actually a way of
being black nor do I intend to suggest that there are any actual intrinsic properties that
one must have to be black. Rather, I mean “black,” the racial identity typically assigned
by American societal culture and the assumed qualities that accompany its ascription.
Assumptions about this collective racial identity often include conjecture
regarding one’s disposition, character, cognitive capacity, and one’s ideological
allegiance to blacks writ large. It is the latter assumption that proves as troublesome
within the discipline as it does in contemporary American culture. In academic
philosophy, the often-selectively applied normative model of the ideal philosopher is one
who can operate as somewhat of a disembodied mind—as a thinking machine without
real world commitments. It is this assumed identity that theoretically allows the
philosopher to rise above one’s embedded circumstances to analyze and solve complex
problems about this and other possible worlds without prejudice. Typically, the ability to
occupy the ideal philosopher identity for the white male is taken to as a given. However,
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for persons with real world markers--the woman, the “racial” minority, ethnic minority,
and members of other marginalized groups, the willingness to embrace the philosopher’s
identity is considered a “competence.” One must show allegiance to it above all other
identities (and identifiers) as these embodied identities are regarded as impediments to
truly rigorous thought instead of vehicles for nuanced philosophical thought.
I discovered that the subject of race within academic philosophy is an even bigger
elephant in the room, only most never see it, and most would not care anyway. It is a
subject discussed on the periphery of philosophical discourse, usually as an aside to
subjects taken to be of overarching precedence. Thus, it is not surprising that a
philosophy about race is not readily embraced within the discipline. Indeed, its treatment
is not unlike that of feminist theory, placed off to the side in some academic basement,
only the philosophy of race receives fewer accommodations and substantially less critical
appreciation. It has only been within the last two decades that the philosophy of race even
received the privilege of sometimes being loaded in and less occasionally shot out of the
primarily male and European-friendly canon.
Of course, one would think that given problematic existential issues directly
connected to it, the subject of race would act as perfectly rich fodder for the philosopher’s
critique. After all, this is certainly the case with other topics like the environment, gender,
business, law, science, and the moral status of non-human animals. The unfortunate truth
is that in mainstream philosophy, the concept of race and even the role that it has played
within the history of Western philosophy is virtually absent from the discourse--a point
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well illuminated by philosopher, Charles S. Mills.1 And, it has been outside of this
mainstream where philosophers of race have attempted to facilitate and sustain a
philosophy of race that provides diverse and innovative approaches to the oftencomplicated issues tied to race.
A fundamental feature of the philosophy of race, one that binds the diverse set of
theories together, is that race is treated as a problem in and of itself. For philosophers of
race, its thorough examination is considered a necessary prerequisite to any truly rigorous
and comprehensive engagement of race-related issues and, in some cases, the areas with
which race often finds itself at an intersection (economics, institutions, gender, sexuality).
Race is a biological falsity--a social construct.2 Yet, in American society, race is
not only considered biologically real, it is also heavily invoked in our everyday lives. It is
a concept that acts both consciously and subconsciously as a determining factor of our
sense of self, our personal and socio-cultural allegiances, and even our ideological,
political, and global commitments. The sheer scope of these implications necessitate that
we attempt to understand the concept of race. This means doing what we can to know
when, where, how, why or, perhaps most importantly, whether we should employ its
usage. Within the discipline of philosophy, this stewardship has been taken up, almost
exclusively, by the philosophy of race. It is within this subfield of philosophy to which I
commit myself as a philosopher.
So, given my experiences in philosophy and my engagement with the philosophy
of race, moving into the academic field of education to pursue philosophy of education

1
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was quite a culture shock. I often facetiously describe my existential transition from
philosophy to education as “going from black to African American.” Similar to my
experience in philosophy, the sole basis of my (given) identity was the often vague and
ambiguous physical characteristics frequently operationalized in American society to
designate someone a member of the black race. Beyond this, my two fields diverged.
This immediately became apparent as I moved from being expected to disavow any
personal and theoretical obligations that I was presumed to have in philosophy to being
assigned to a revitalized conception of blackness in education. It was “revitalized” in the
sense that it not only contained the traditional bio-social aspects that normally accompany
race-talk, albeit in a more subtle and less deliberate manner, but also a broad ethnocultural component that acted as a mandate for new theoretical obligations.
In the educational realm, racial identity was treated as something in need of
affirmation, rather than something problematic or something that should possibly be
rejected. Often masked as a form of ethnicity, race was treated as something intrinsic to
personhood; “black” and “African American” were labels used interchangeably, to
denote natural (substantive) and ideal (normative) things. To my surprise, this treatment,
which was quite overt within the classroom space, was not simply a reflection of our
societal culture, but also a reflection of a substantial amount of race theory produced
within the discipline. I found that even theory that attempts to avoid speaking in racial
terms often does so inadvertently. Most frequently, this occurs in the form of ethnic and
cultural assumptions and designations regarding particular groups of people. As a result,
issues such as racism are treated as if independent of the concept of race. Instead, these
issues are addressed as consequences of ethnocentrism, cultural and economic conflict, or
4

disparate power amongst preexisting races. This is despite the often-overt invocation of
race to justify the maltreatment of persons in society, both past and present.
The difficulty of differentiating race from other constructs like ethnicity or culture
is a testament to the degree that race permeates the American cultural psyche and its
stranglehold on the very institutions that should be engaging it most critically. Within
parts of the field of education, the combining and conflating of these constructs (race,
ethnicity, and culture) and the lack of understanding of their actual relationship(s)
suggests an absence of analytic scrutiny of race. The more immediate consequence of
“race” being so deeply embedded in the educational realm of American fabric is that it
can prevent theorists from properly identifying and framing the problem of race as
foundational. Race can stunt our ability to find the most effective tools for bringing about
the most comprehensive and effective resolutions to the racial issues facing students in
and outside of the classroom.
Due to its practical goals and application for the educational setting, the
compartmentalized nature of race theory in education has not facilitated the type of
“surgical” discourse necessary to fully explore race at a depth adequate enough to
understand its effects. This is further complicated, if not hampered, by the fact that undertheorized suppositions of difference sometimes act as necessary components to the
various social and political agendas pushed in some of the theory. There is an abundance
of theory that speaks on racial and ethnic identity within the hegemonic paradigm, but
very little work on how racial identities are dispensed, the ontological content and status
that accompanies racial designations, or how those constructed identities find their
grounding, ontological support, and reaffirmation in the classroom advertently or
5

inadvertently by well-intentioned teachers. This omission represents a “race gap” in
education theory.
In this dissertation, I argue that this race gap within education theory needs to be
filled--that race is a problem worth isolating for analysis by theorists within education. To
do this, I attempt to shed light on the processes in which the social construct of race, the
ascription of racial, ethnic, and cultural identity, become idealized abstractions within
some education theory. This is what I refer to as the problem of reification.
Like any ascribed identities, racial identities can shape what we know, how we
come to know ourselves, and the world around us. Imposing negative racial identities is,
of course, already of ethical concern for educators. I contend that the scope of this
concern be broadened to include all racial identities, as imposing any form of racial
identity can come with consequences—ones that include the production and reproduction
of a variety of harms to students. Racial identities can take over and become our primary
point of epistemic reference. So, instead of merely seeing the world from their unique,
complex, and diverse, socio-cultural circumstances, students may end up seeing the world
as a white person or as a black person.
If we take the personal autonomy of the student seriously, then the imposing of
this reductive epistemological framework should be troubling. The possibility of
producing, enforcing, and facilitating the continued existence of errant racial knowledge
could result in the passive and active reproduction of this knowledge by the student
towards herself and others. My suggestion here, and what I attempt to show in the
chapters that follow, is that this is not merely an issue the scope of which is limited to the
classroom, nor is the problem squarely epistemic in nature. Rather, it is that the
6

implications of race have real world consequences for students beyond the classroom. As
philosophers of education, we can no longer ignore the problem of race and reification.
Race is a moral problem, and as I assert, one that rests in our hands as theorists in the
field of education and perhaps of greater importance, as agents within the broader ethical
community.

Theoretical Perspective
My analysis is grounded with what I take to be a necessary set of undergirding
propositions that will help insure that I avoid the reproduction of any further reification of
the race concept as I move my arguments forward. First, to be in keeping with what has
been accepted and supported by the empirical sciences, I acknowledge there is no
biological distinction of race(s) that corresponds to what we generally regard as races.3
As a society, we either tend to disregard or we are simply ignorant of any evidence that is
contrary to the existence of human races. Thus, I hold that some form of racial
essentialism encapsulated by our racial and ethno-cultural reifications is the necessary
component to what keeps us connected to the belief in races. My theoretical perspective
will operate on the grounds that while there may be distinctions between race, ethnicity,
and culture within the social sciences, that such distinctions are betrayed, ignored,
unknown, or conflated within societal culture. Another proposition that undergirds my
theoretical perspective is that the understanding and critical engagement of the “race”
concept is necessary when attempting to address any social and pedagogical issues in
which phenotype and morphology is used as an indicator for race, ethnicity and culture.
3
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What should be clear from this perspective is that this dissertation is intended to
be an applied exercise in the philosophy of race. Furthermore, I identify myself as a racial
eliminativist, meaning that I believe the most effective remedy in dealing with the
problem of race and its consequences is the necessary deconstruction and dissolution of
the race concept. Racial eliminativism both shapes and informs the analysis that I
undertake and it is ultimately toward the abdication of race in American society that I
argue in the following chapters.

Objects of Investigation
I recognize that there are a diverse array of viewpoints posited within the various
areas of education theory regarding race and race relations. However, my investigation
will focus on a few of the more influential and respected theorists in the broader field of
critical theory in education. This includes such areas as critical race theory, critical
multiculturalism, radical pedagogy, and Afrocentric theory.4 There are several reasons
why I have chosen critical theory in education as the object of my investigation. The first
is that theorists within this discipline attempt to engage race in both a rigorous and
philosophical manner. They approach education with a critical lens and by doing so
demonstrate a commitment to self-reflectivity and the need for adaptability and
correction where needed within the field of education. Secondly, areas within critical
theory in education attempt to confront pressing, sometimes controversial, race-related
issues head on. The final reason that I have chosen critical theory in education as the
focus of this dissertation is that it is where I situate myself theoretically, as a philosopher
4

I will sometimes refer to “critical theory in education” simply as “critical theory.”

8

of race, within the broader field of education. Hence, I have a vested interest in this field
achieving its desired ends of mitigating racial hegemony in the classroom space. These
factors are of great importance to my analysis as it is neither my goal to undermine wellintentioned educational theory nor the teachers in the classroom space that it attempts to
inform. Rather, I hope to enhance the field by adding to its arsenal and broadening and
strengthening its knowledge base.
Since the theorists that I engage in the following chapters hail from the world of
critical theory in eduation, they largely focus on the intersections between power and race
inside and outside of the classroom. Specifically, they concentrate on the black/white
racial paradigm. For the purposes of my dissertation, I, too, focus my analytic energies on
this binary. However, my primary focal point is the treatment of black Americans,
especially black students. While I do believe that my own experiences as a black
individual and scholar within the philosophical and educational domains of the academy
give me unique insight into this subject, the reason that I have chosen the black racial
group as the principal subjects of investigation is because they are rather uniquely
perceived and treated as the most monolithic of the racially/ethnically designated social
groups in education theory.
Race, especially in regard to blacks, often gets ingested into what Michael Omi
and Howard Winant refer to as “the ethnic paradigm”–a paradigm inherent within
multiculuralist theories. They state,
“…. with rare exceptions, ethnicity theory isn’t very interested in ethnicity among
blacks. The ethnicity approach views blacks as one ethnic group among others. It
does not consider national origin, religion, language, or cultural differences
9

among blacks, as it does among whites, as sources of ethnicity. It would be quite
interesting to see how ethnicity theory might address the range of subgroupings
represented in the U.S. black community.”5
The increased pressure placed upon theorists within education theory by
multicultural education proponents has meant that the ethnic paradigm has become
increasingly pervasive within critical theory in education. Moreover, its increased
ideological dominance creates a unique set of circumstances for black students in the
classroom. Persons assigned to the “black” race are thought to practice or belong to a
distinctly bordered “African,” “African-American,” or “black” culture and are also
perceived as being linked solely, and as I attempt to illuminate, even metaphysically, to
the African continent. This is simply not the case for persons designated as “white.” It is
not thought that a white person should practice or belong to a monolithic “European” or
“white” culture, nor is it expected or required that this person identify one’s assigned race
or ethnicity with all of Europe. Indeed, if a white person chooses to identify Europe as an
ethnic affiliation, it is regarded as too broad a distinction. Usually, such an identity,
“European American,” would only be employed for heuristic purposes within critical and
political discourse. In societal culture, however, this designation would usually collapse
into countries of ancestral origin or regions within the European continent. For example,
one can identify as “Irish American,” “Italian American,” both, or if she so chooses,
neither--that is, if societal culture regards her as white. Blacks are permitted the same
variability of choice in neither societal culture nor educational culture. They are

5
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considered to be African Americans or black only. It is my view that since blacks lack the
choice of self-determination in regard to identity or even negotiated identifications, they
provide a solid test case for my analysis.
I recognize that the concentration on blacks within the black/white binary presents
some limitations for my analysis. My conclusions will lack a high degree of
generalizability, especially in regard to harms and potential harms inadvertently
mandated by the theory in which I examine. There is simply too much variability and
inconsistency when we talk about race, ethnicity, and culture. Thus, the same critique
made of multiculturalism, for example, in regard to what is perceived as “black” or
“African American culture,” may or may not apply to “Puerto Rican American culture,”
“Chinese American culture,” or “Sioux culture.” This is because of the diverse histories
and circumstances of people who belong to these presumed cultures or to whom these
cultures are assigned in educational circles create their own unique sets of contextual
particularities.
Furthermore, cultural practices of certain groups are simply more identifiable than
those of other groups whose supposed “cultures” are more highly subject to external and
internal conjectural definition. The existence of an African American culture is unique
because it is treated as given, fixed by race, that is somehow thought to transcend family,
socio-historical circumstances, economics, geography and be remarkably impervious to
cultural syncretization. So, for the sake of analytical clarity, I acknowledge my specific
approach bears only contextual relevancy specific to the conception of race as it applies
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to blacks in and, in some cases, outside of the United States.6 However, I regard this
limitation as strength for the analysis that follows, as allowing ourselves to think too
broadly about particular groups rests at the root of the problem of race in education.7

Descriptive Analysis of Critical Theory in Education
In Chapter Two, I offer a descriptive analysis of critical theory in education. I
begin this task with an overview the problem of racial reification. Following this
discussion, I attempt to show how some theoretical work within critical theory in
education directly and indirectly affirms racial essentialism. I further reveal how some
theory has the tendency to treat racial hegemony or racism as the problem and our
cultural conception of race as independent and inconsequential to that problem. I attempt
to show there is a lack of understanding of the deep essentialist ontology of race in some
of the most penetrating and rigorous theoretical discourse in education. This analysis will
hopefully evoke the creation of more effective and holistic approaches to combat racial
issues, to provide a more exhaustive list of symptoms that occur as a result of racial
ontology, and to help eliminate racial ontology altogether.
I demonstrate the claims of my descriptive argument, that some critical theory in
education is guilty of reproducing race via the process of reification, by utilizing a
question--directed method to provide answers to such questions as the following:
1.

How are race, ethnicity, and culture generally defined and distinguished
within the critical theory that I will explore?

6
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a. What is the conceptual relationship between these variables within
the theory?
b. What is the conceptual ontology of these variables as presented by
the theorist? How has does the theorist reify “race?”
2. How does the theory utilize these concepts to inform theory and practice
within the field of education (e.g. in regard to identity, racism, the canon)?
I evaluate the logic of the answers/arguments that are provided. The logical
analysis that I use is based on the basic philosophical methodology utilized in most
contemporary Western philosophy. Formally speaking, I look for the validity of the
theorists’ positions, where an argument’s validity would entail that there is no way for a
conclusion to not be true if its premises are true. I also look for the soundness of the
arguments that are made, where soundness indicates that an argument meets the standards
of validity and that its premises are indeed true.8 Like most philosophical analysis, these
logical rules will be carried out implicitly rather than explicitly. While I am well aware
that this standard of logic is the subject of debate among hardcore logicians and those
within the field of education who decry an epistemic over-reliance on “reason,” I believe
that for my investigative purposes it is a sufficient, if not necessary, tool to demonstrate
the problems in the theory that I engage. Where the theorists in my analysis do not
explicitly state arguments and propositions, I attempt to draw inferences and propose
implications based on the evidence provided within their analyses. Warranted and
unwarranted assumptions that ground relevant positions are also highlighted. I approach
these theorists under the assumption that they desire their work to be evaluated in a
8
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reasonable, serious, and critical manner based on the evidence and arguments provided,
rather than rhetorical value. This is, in part, the basis on which I have chosen their
particular works for examination.
The question may be posed, “why this method?” As previously stated, logical
analysis is an integral part of most contemporary philosophy in academic circles. It is
present in pragmatic theory, existential theory, political theory, and moral theory. I
believe it can be particularly useful for the analysis of race where so much of the related
dialogue is the object of conjecture. I am in full agreement with philosophers of race, like
Kwame Anthony Appiah, who champions the use of analytical philosophy to unpack the
concept of race and philosopher Jorge Gracia, who states, 9
“Philosophy can ‘put it all together’…by taking from other disciplines what they
offer, by critically analyzing this information, and by supplementing it with the
analyses that it uniquely can provide. Logic can help us to clarify the various
conceptual issues raised by the notions of race, ethnicity, and nationality, and to
identify hidden assumptions used in discourses about them and judge the validity
of the arguments offered by various views.”10
The methodological approach that I use in this dissertation will permit us to rise
above the existential fray, so to speak, to better understand the metaphysics of the
concepts that inform how we live, how we learn, and how we know; in turn, a successful
analysis should provide useful data that will allow us to make sure that our conceptual
knowledge coheres with the actual world. Unfortunately, much about our belief in race is
9

Appiah, Color, 33.
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(Lanham: Rowman and Littlfield, 2005), xix-xx.
10

14

“otherworldly” in nature—grounded by realist assumptions, while remaining insensitive
to real world evidence. A logic-based investigation will help ground the transcendent
concept race in the theory.
There are two primary dimensions to my conceptual analysis of critical theory in
education. The first of these is an analysis in which I explore and critique how several
contemporary theorists talk about race and the role race plays within their work.
Specifically, I examine how these theorists, despite their methodological and practical
differences, have managed to take the normative conceptions of race of the past and
restructure them as substantive and idealized ontologies.
The first of these contemporary theorists is Afrocentric pedagogist Molefi Kete
Asante. Asante argues for an African-centered pedagogy as a solution to help better the
lives of African American students. He constructs his Afrocentric approach in opposition
to the dominance of Eurocentrism within education. Drawing from three of his works,
The Afrocentric Idea, “The Afrocentric Idea in Education,” and “Afrocentric
Curriculum,” I show how Asante offers an essentialist and axiomatic vision of race,
especially in regard to African Americans. 11
The second theorist that I investigate for this contemporary analysis is critical race
theorist Gloria Ladson-Billings. I draw from the book in which her theory is most fully
presented, The Dreamkeepers: Successful Teachers of African American Children. I
explore her racial and cultural views regarding the education of blacks posited in her

11

Molefi K Asante, “Afrocentric Curriculum” in Educational Leadership. 49.4 (1991), 28-31, Asante,
Molefi K. Asante, The Afrocentric Idea. (Philadelphia: Temple, 1998), and Molefi Kete Asante, “The
Afrocentric Idea in Education,” The Journal of Negro Education, 60 (1991): 170-780.

15

influential “Culturally Relevant Teaching” strategy.12 I attempt to show how reified
conceptions of race, ethnicity, and culture are intertwined within this very influential
book.
I also engage the work of critical multiculturalists Joe Kincheloe and Shirley
Steinberg. I evaluate some problematic positions that they put forth in regard to the
education of black students in their book Changing Multiculturalism.13 I argue that their
views on race are quite similar to the essentialist conception of race Afrocentric
education.
The final critical theorist of education that I will examine is Peter McLaren.
McLaren provides an interesting twist to the racial dichotomy by utilizing oppositional
political conceptions of both “blackness” and “whiteness.” I draw my analysis from two
of his books Revolutionary Multiculturalism and Life in Schools: An Introduction to
Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education.14
The second dimension of my conceptual analysis is a historical conceptual
analysis that provides an account of the development and construction of “blackness” in
the philosophy of education. This task is carried out in Chapter Three of this dissertation.
In this examination, I explore the history of black education from the philosophies
offered by persons such as Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. Du Bois, Carter Woodson,
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and some of the ideologies that surfaced out of the Black Power movements leading up to
the establishment of Black Studies. I attempt to demonstrate how the philosophies of race
argued for normative conceptions of race that, once activated, were intended to improve
the circumstances of black people. Furthermore, I follow the conceptual trajectory from
past to present to show how these historical notions of race likely came to rest as the
foundations of the more contemporary conception of blackness found in critical theory in
education.

Normative Analysis
There are potentially dangerous consequences for producing and reproducing
reified conceptions of race—consequences that I hold necessitate that we move beyond
our current starting points of looking at race. In Chapter Four of this dissertation, I argue
that critical theory in education that advocates racially diasporic strategies and content
will facilitate the continuance of pre-existing harms for black students. Moreover, I
contend that the failure to dismantle the inherent essentialism of the race concept in our
theories before re-deploying it the classroom will result in the exacerbation of these
harms. I hold that given the nature of the racial construct and its usage within critical
theory in education accompanied by the aforementioned harms, we as theorists and
educators, and most importantly, catalysts for these harms, have an ethical responsibility
to end these problems where possible. Mitigating negative consequences caused by the
construct of race requires that we attempt to understand its individual racial ontologies as
comprehensively as the available tools will permit us.
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The Philosophy of Race
In Chapter Five, I show how there are theorists in education who also suggest that
a greater conceptual clarity must gain ground within education when we approach
questions of race, ethnicity and culture. Among these theorists are Cameron McCarthy
and Warren Crichlow. They reject discourse in education circles that treats racial groups
as monolithic groups in which designated members share the same sorts of biological and
cultural characteristics.15 The work of theorists like McCarthy and Crichlow help
strengthen the mandate for the construction of a theoretical bridge that will take critical
theorists in education towards a deeper and more holistic approach to race in education.
I offer a prescriptive argument that will help address McCarthy and Crichlow’s
concerns and as well as the issues I raise in the preceding chapters. The concept of race
has been conceptually de-centered from race theory and buried within the ethnic
paradigm of critical theory in education. I contend that the philosophy of race couched in
the world of academic philosophy provides conceptual and foundational knowledge that
could help close the race gap in educational theory and thereby act as a mitigating agent
to offset harms by re-centering race in the discourse. I argue that critical theorists begin to
bridge the divide between the disciplines of education and philosophy to provide stronger
theory to confront the problem of race in education. It can provide educators with a more
in-depth view of the complexities and dangerous conflation between race, culture, and
ethnicity—variables in which students’ identities and environment are often largely
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contingent. I intend to demonstrate that these variables need to be centered in educational
discourse as constructs with consequences as such. Furthermore, I contend that educators
seek a better understanding of the substantive link between the complex nature of these
constructs and overt problems such as racism and ethnocentrism. This inquiry will
hopefully demonstrate to administrators, educational policy makers, and theorists the
need for more rigorous courses for teacher preparation that deal with such issues with a
more exhaustive depth.
This chapter also includes a second question-directed descriptive analysis that
attempts to shed light on the various ways in which the methodologies, strategies, and
knowledge within the philosophy of race can assist critical theorists in education. This
investigation will provide answers to questions such as,
1. What are some methods and approaches used to examine race within the
philosophy of race?
2. How are race, ethnicity, and culture distinguished and defined within
philosophical critical theory?
a. What is the relationship between these variables?
b. What are the ontological implications of these variables?
3. How does philosophy of race use its analysis to inform further theory (e.g.
identity, racism, race relations)
4. How do these philosophies of race relate to one another? How are they
different?
In the philosophy of race, simply asserting that race is a social construct does not
go far enough. There is an attempt to answer the question “What, then, is ‘race?’ as we
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know it our American culture.” If there are no human races, “what do we mean when we
call ourselves black, white, mixed, Asian, etc?” For these philosophers, an inherently
problematic conception of race is found in the answers to such questions and given this
problem, they ask, “how do we operationalize this new knowledge in regard to issues
related to race?”
The growing affinity for a less critical than intended multiculturalism has
complicated these questions even more so as the confusion, interchangeability, and
relationships between race, culture, and ethnicity provide further ambiguity.
Philosophers, then, have begun to take advantage of the methodological arsenals of their
field in an attempt to offer descriptive clarity to these concepts that have been at the
center of so much social turmoil. Thus, one of the primary goals for philosophers of race
is to better provide a sound starting point for normative work.
I explore the philosophical works of four important philosophers of race who
challenge the concept of racial realism to highlight this description of the philosophy of
race. The first of these philosophers is Charles Mills. My analysis will focus on his race
theory presented in the book, Blackness Visible. Borrowing from contract theory, Mills
argues that race is a vertically (hierarchically) structured, politically, socially, and
historically contingent white supremacist system. This system is maintained by a
hypothetical, intersubjectively agreed upon contract amongst whites. 16
I show how Mills, playing the role of metaphysician, offers an analysis of the
“social ontology” of race. Further drawing from the fields of ethics and the philosophy of
science, he places himself in opposition to “racial realism,” a position that asserts a
16
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biological conception of race in which cultural, social, and physical traits are passed on
genetically. For Mills, racial realism is a manifestation of a system based on power
arrangements. Thus, he endorses a social constructivist view on the metaphysics of race,
while acknowledging that race is socially real and has social and ontological
implications. I illuminate how, for Mills, “Blackness” was created in this system to be a
distinction from “Whiteness.” I further explain how racial identity, “mixed” raced, and
culture factor into the racial system for Mills. 17
I also present an overview of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s theory of race. Appiah is
perhaps the most highly regarded analytical race theorist of the last two decades. He
utilizes methods from the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science to
discover how our current folk conception of race developed from conjecture at a time
before the advent of biological science. His philosophical investigation seeks to
demonstrate how race was the product of suppositions about heritable biological, cultural,
and moral traits. 18
Much of Appiah’s critique is concentrated on “racialism,” a concept that is
accepted amongst critical race theorists as synonymous with “racial essentialism” or
racial realism. Appiah offers a definition that attempts to provide clarity essentially
stating that racialism is the belief that human beings can be divided up and separated into
races contingent upon a set of physical (e.g. skin color), nonphysical (e.g. intelligence),
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and metaphysical (essences or “racial blood”) traits. Each set of properties makes that
particular race distinct from other races.19
I include what I take to be a very significant argument that Appiah makes
regarding identity. He argues for the use of de-essentialized racial identities as ethical
identities, and provides a compelling account for why “cultural identities” are not suitable
replacements for racial identities. I also explore how Appiah confronts the problem of
race in regard to the role of collective identities based around reified constructs and how
they activate axiomatic conceptions of authenticity and, as I also argue in the preceding
chapter, can negate one’s autonomy.20
I further discuss how Appiah’s theory of race informs his views on racism. I show
how from Appiah’s standpoint one must first understand the nature of our beliefs about
race before we are able to adequately approach any conversations about race. I therefore,
present his “Racialist Triad” which consists of three concepts: racialism, extrinsic racism,
and intrinsic racism.
Another theorist that I discuss is analytical philosopher, Naomi Zack. She uses a
broad set of philosophical methodologies in her analyses of the race concept. For
example, Zack employs a historical-scientific analysis quite similar to Appiah’s to show
the ways in which scientific and essentialist notions of race that predated modern biology
were conceptualized without proper bases. She argues that science is the last line of
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justification for proponents of racial realism and challenges the notion of race on these
grounds.21
I further explain how Zack uses existential and logical analysis to tackle the issue
of racial identity. Her analysis reveals how the concept of race, by virtue of the one-drop
rule, mandates rules of racial taxonomy that maintain white supremacy. She contends this
is accomplished by authorization of a racially asymmetrical paradigm that maintains a
“racial purity” that the excludes blacks, and subsequently a group that remains virtually
ignored within ethno-racial theory, those of “mixed-raced.”22
Most of the philosophers in this investigation are in theoretical dialogue with one
another. This is certainly the case with the final philosopher of race that I examine, Jorge
Gracia. He contributes an analytical approach to race and ethnicity that is sensitive to
science and the foundational analyses provided by scholars such as Appiah, Zack, Omi
and Winant.23
Unlike Naomi Zack, and to a lesser extent, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Gracia is
more starkly anti-eliminativist. In his view, the concepts of race and ethnicity, once
unpacked and properly separated, are theoretically salvageable. Rather than utilize
problematic conflation of race and ethnicity, Gracia proposes his “Genetic Common
Bundle View” of race and “Familial-Historical View” of ethnicity, reconstructions of the
aforementioned concepts that attempts to be mindful of their reality on the ground--

21

Naomi Zack, Philosophy of Race and Science, (New York: Routledge, 2005).
Ibid.
23
Gracia, Surviving. 82-85. It is important to note that “nationality” is a central topic in Gracia’s discourse.
However, I will omit this discussion in my dissertation for the sake of brevity and to retain proper scope.
Furthermore, it is also worthy of note that Gracia’s anti-eliminativist stance on race is in opposition to
Zack’s and Appiah’s position; they both desire to get rid of the race construct. This point will be taken up
in further detail in the final chapter of my dissertation.
22

23

culturally, socially, and biologically. I believe that he offers a potentially important route
that will permit critical theorists to help unravel race and ethnicity. 24
At the conclusion of Chapter Five, I highlight some of the ways that these
philosophers of race can directly inform and supplement the work of critical theorists in
education. I believe if the concerns raised by these philosophers of race are taken
seriously within critical theory in education, the theoretical and strategic approaches to
the problem of race in the field of education will likely look very differently than they
currently do.

Toward A Philosophy of Race in Education
In Chapter Six, I offer my own vision of what a philosophy of race for education
should encompass. Like the philosophers of race that I examine in Chapter 5, I take up
the question “What is the best way to proceed given that race is a social construct and
given the type of construct that it is?” Drawing from the works of these philosophers of
race and my own analysis, I present a normative argument that calls for the necessary
move toward eliminativism. I argue that a project that includes both racial eliminativist
and anti-eliminativist components is best suited for dealing with the problem of race and
racial hegemony. This proposal is intended to take into account the social constructedness
of race, its harmful consequences, and the valuable role that race and ethnicity may
already have in the lives of many students and their respective socio-cultural
communities. I offer recommendations that I consider crucial for the success of this
multi-pronged approach.
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I further argue that for the implementation of a philosophy of race in education to
be successful, that critical theory in education must conduct and utilize conceptual
analysis to ground a skill-based approach to race for teachers in the classroom. I hold that
rigorous training in philosophical critical thinking for both theorists and teachers to
whom our theory informs can act as a useful tool to help negotiate the difficult racial,
social, and cultural terrain that acts upon students.
In Chapter Seven, I conclude this dissertation offering some final thoughts,
recommendations, and implications for implementing a philosophy of race in the field of
education. Let us now begin this analysis with an examination of the problem of
reification in critical theory in education.
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CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF REIFICATION IN CRITICAL THEORY IN
EDUCATION

The Process of Reification
Every Christmas Day, millions of children awaken to find presents waiting for
them. Many of these children believe that the person responsible for leaving these gifts is
Santa Claus—a white, rotund, bearded man who resides in the uninhabitable North Pole
and who uses flying reindeer as his mode of transportation. These same children likely
believe that Santa Claus awards these gifts to them based on the moral merit of their
actions.
The truth is, however, that Santa Claus is just a mythical figure of Christian lore.
The Santa myth is typically invoked for the sake of tradition or for cultural and
entertainment purposes. Sometimes, Santa is even used by parents as an instrument to
control or constrain the behavior and desires of their children. This is because, to
children, Santa Claus is no myth. Santa, his generous acts, and the values, rules, and
motivations that direct these actions are very real to them. Children will shape their
actions according to these beliefs. Santa Claus is so real to them that they will even set
out milk and cookies for him to consume, as a bit of a “thanks in advance” for the gifts
they will receive. The actual functional value of his existence bears no consequence to
their reality or psychological lives.
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The process by which the social construction of Santa Claus and his actions
becomes interpreted by children as a real thing is what sociologists Peter L. Berger and
Thomas Luckmann, refer to as reification. In their book The Social Construction of
Reality, Berger and Luckmann describe reification as “the apprehension of human
phenomena as if they were things…” and “the apprehension of the products of human
activity as if they were something else than human products—such as facts of nature,
results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will.”25 So, for example, Santa is a
myth but we pretend as though he is real and as a result children believe him to be a real
person. We pretend as though our placing gifts under the tree is really Santa’s doing. If
we are successful, children come to think that Santa not only must be real but also that he
must be pleased with them. Given the multitudes of trustworthy adults that “play along”
with the Santa myth through various means (e.g. parenting, business, media, church, and
education) there is little reason for children to doubt their own beliefs and intuitions
regarding his realness. Indeed, it is this broad-scale affirmation of Santa’s existence that
makes him such an effective device.
There are plenty of possible examples of reification. After all, we reify throughout
the course of our daily lives. The types of objects that we reify are seemingly limitless-places, inanimate objects, concepts, social statuses, rituals, rites of passages, etc.
Sometimes, reifications can extend to actual people, altering the way that we see them,
the way that they view themselves, or the way that they view others. Consider this
example of reification. Imagine a person who we know of by description. She leads what
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we would typically consider an ordinary life. She has an average job, a family, and
friends; she pays rent or makes house payments. She has ordinary feelings (happiness,
sadness, anger, loneliness) and desires (love, family, job security, financial stability). We
expect her to encounter all of life’s typical problems (bad relationships, job loss or
dissatisfaction, familial discord, etc.). And, even though we might recognize that there
are circumstantial factors that make her life uniquely different from ours, we still relate to
her as a person. In fact, it is the aforementioned feelings, desires, and problems that help
facilitate the sort of egalitarian and empathetic kinship that we are able to feel for her.
They are what make her “normal,” just like us.
Now let us say that this same person achieves high profile professional and
financial success, such as becoming an award winning film actress. It is likely that our
view of this person and her personhood will change substantially. She ceases being
normal to us and instead becomes a type of icon--a celebrity. In American society, we
reify celebrity. It is not simply an empty status used to describe someone with notoriety.
We give it inherent meaning and a transcendent ontology. We make it a thing in itself. In
regard to our hypothetical person, we reify her as a result of her celebrity; it becomes
who she is intrinsically. Her newly reified status will likely entail a qualitatively
different, probably higher value and set of standards than we normally would assign to
others and ourselves. Furthermore, we extend this value to her “productions.” For
instance, we begin to regard her feelings, actions, and “desires” as special because they
flow from her as a celebrity. These take on a new, often more intense meaning—her
signature becomes an “autograph”; her touch becomes something that can bring admirers
to tears; a photograph of her performing mundane tasks, such as drinking coffee or
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showing physical affection towards someone becomes something that we hurriedly
shuffle through tabloids to see; the loss of a loved one makes us grieve for her as much as
we might for someone we know in our actual lives. Even the productions, circumstances,
and objects of her pre-celebrity life, which would have once been considered ordinary or
perhaps even arbitrary, acquire greater value. In all of these cases, the celebrity’s
productions also become objects of our reification. Our continued belief in her celebrity
affirms these productions while also affirming the reification of celebrity, a human
phenomenon, itself.
The process of reification does not necessarily require intent. Public Relations
firms may help create someone’s image as a celebrity, but our affirmation of this
reification is usually something we do unconsciously. After all, we do not say to
ourselves when buying a tabloid at the newsstand or visiting our favorite celebrity gossip
website, “my action is perpetuating the celebrity of what was once a normal person.”
Similarly, the intent that leads to the propagation of the Santa myth by family, societal
members, and institutions (schools, businesses, etc.) is typically benign. Kids who believe
in Santa might unknowingly disseminate or affirm the myth to other kids in casual
conversation because they think that his existence is an established matter of fact.

The Problem of Reification
While intent is not a necessity when reifying phenomena, there are potentially
troubling issues that can emerge with the process of reification. These issues are largely
dependent on the type of human phenomena, activity or products being reified, the
properties and axioms that accompany the reification, and the degree to which the
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reification itself is containable. Sometimes, a reification can gain so much power and
influence that people regard it as self-evident. Belief in the reification can come to denote
a fideistic commitment to its realness—a commitment that remains unwavering in the
face of any credible authority or evidence that could potentially undermine it. This can,
therefore, stunt our ability to recognize, acknowledge, or deconstruct the reification as a
product of human creation.
Another issue is that the reification itself can become self-affirming. On the front
end, we might look to it to authorize and justify a particular production that we associate
with the object. We unknowingly sift through productions, selectively claiming those that
are in keeping with the narrative that accompanies the reification. We will ignore
productions that appear antithetical to that narrative or even dismiss them as anomalies.
The selected productions then act as affirmation for the reified phenomena from which
they are thought to derive. So, we can say that the affirmation exists on the back end as
well.
Finally, the societal belief in the object can be so widely held and deeply
ingrained in our cultural beliefs, that the reification can inadvertently, and sometimes
advertently, get reaffirmed and reconstructed by societal members. In this way, when
something is reified, it can take on a life of its own in such a way that it is far easier for
us to sustain it than it is for us to dismantle it. All of these complications that I have
described make up what I call the problem of reification.
The concept of “race” is a reification that finds itself entangled in the problem of
reification. It is a social construct that’s reification is dependent upon the abstracting of
biological markers (e.g. skin color). There is very little scientific support for biological
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races in humans, but as stated in Chapter 1, most people believe that race is a legitimate
biological system. 26 This strong commitment to race is demonstrated by the fact that it
operates as a primary frame of reference for how we conduct our social lives. It serves as
a basis for how and with whom we interact socially. We refer to it to determine whom
our friends and partners are, to whom we will extend moral status, and even the nature of
that status. Thus, the reification of race is not simply a biological system, it is also a value
system and as such race has been the basis for social and systematic inequity,
discrimination, and atrocities.
Over time, however, significant socially progressive change has led to
adjustments to its value schema. This has helped mitigate its capability to facilitate
certain types of harms in American society. For instance, it is, in general, no longer
socially acceptable to physically harm or discriminate on the basis of race. Despite such
alterations, however, race as a reified entity has remained relatively intact. We still
believe it be real which is a testament to its pervasiveness in American societal culture.
Another demonstration of how deeply race is woven into our cultural fabric is that it is
still invokes within our societal structure. Its realness is even affirmed and maintained by
our social, political, and educational institutions. One need only view a census form or
look at the way cultural products are marketed for confirmation of this fact.
Of course, the idea that our institutions can act as racial affirmation agents should
not be surprising. After all, they are products of their own environment supported and
operated by and for members of this society. We would think, however, that the
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Academy, despite being situated within this deeply racialized society, could extricate
itself from the reified conception of race. Unlike other institutions, it typically functions
as the primary intellectual ground in which the most penetrating, reflective work and
discourse regarding the nature of race occurs. It is where the concept of race has been
deconstructed and delegitimized as a valid biological entity. Unfortunately, the broad
scale deconstruction of race on the part of the Academy as a whole has not yet taken
place. Some disciplines have increasingly begun adjusting their mainstream theory to
reflect both the constructedness and the pervasiveness of the race concept. Other
disciplines, however, have had difficulty avoiding the problem of racial reification.
Given the potentially harmful implications of the racial circumstances within the
contexts of our application, schools, it is often critical theorists of education who
continue to recognize the importance and necessity for engaging race. Indeed, the
substantial amount of work that has been directed towards the subject in critical theory of
education is a demonstration of its own commitment toward this end. Unfortunately,
however, critical theory in education, specifically the more philosophically based theory,
remains one of those areas within American higher education where the reified concept
of race not only survives, but also gets reconstituted and re-deployed existentially. While
it is not a matter of whether we attempt to confront race and race-related issues, it is a
matter of how we engage them--whether we are keeping the concept of race grounded
while attempting to complete these tasks. The truth is that as theorists situated within
American society, we often fail to fully recognize the ubiquity and complexity of the race
concept. As a result, we sometimes allow it to frame the content and dimensions of our
work. For instance, we may unintentionally sustain race because we operate from the
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traditionally based conception of race or perhaps, we fail in attempts to provide fully deessentialized reconceptualizations of it. The potential pitfalls to the problem of reification
are many ways as subtle as they are overt.
As previously stated, race acts as a value system grounded by erroneous
biological assumptions. This means that if we are affirming race in critical theory of
education and our theory is applied in the classroom, we are promoting it its legitimacy.
It is, therefore, important to understand the various ways in which we contribute to the
problem of racial reification and the ways that it manifests in the field of education. This
means we must seek to identify how race is conceptualized in the theory, the nature of
those conceptions, and how the conceptions are supported in the theory. In the pages that
follow, I will examine how race is engaged within the various areas within critical theory
of education. Specifically, I will examine theorists from critical race theory, Afrocentric
pedagogy, critical multiculturalism, and critical pedagogy and attempt to demonstrate
how the problem of reification materializes in their work.

The Problem of Reification in Critical Theory in Education
Critical Race Theory: Race and Culturally Relevant Teaching
One of the most common ways in which the problem of reification emerges in
critical theory in education occurs when theorists apply racial boundaries to constructs
such as ethnicity or culture. This takes place even as the theory attempts to understand
and confront the relationship between race and power in the classroom. We find an
example of this with critical race theorist, Gloria Ladson-Billings.
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In the book The Dreamkeepers: Successful Teachers of African American
Children, Ladson-Billings attempts to address the low performance of African American
students in the classroom. She maintains that little scholarly attention is given to the
academic needs of African American children. Among the primary reasons for this, she
asserts, “…is the stubborn refusal in American education to recognize African Americans
as a distinct cultural group. While it is recognized that African Americans make up a
distinct racial group, the acknowledgement that this racial group has a distinct culture is
still not recognized.” 27 Consequently, the possibility that race and culture play a role in
the learning of African American students gets ignored and as an added consequence,
African American students are often treated as white students who “need a little extra
help.”28
Ladson-Billings points out that studies show that African American students
perform better in schools that attend to their socio-cultural needs. These schools prevent
them from being deprived of their culture and minimize the possibilities that students will
be judged racially or intra-racially for their positive performance. Furthermore, studies
also suggest that in schools where cultural groups are different than the dominant culture,
that certain social and cultural incompatibilities can exist that could hinder a child’s
progress.29 In response to these conclusions, Ladson-Billings proposes that teachers
practice what she calls “Culturally Relevant Teaching.” This teaching strategy, she
explains, “uses student culture in order to maintain it and to transcend the negative effects
of the dominant culture.” She goes on to say that the “primary aim of culturally relevant
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teaching is to assist in the development of a ‘relevant black personality’ that allows
African American students to choose academic excellence yet still identify with African
and African American culture.30
Here we see that Ladson-Billings advocates an approach to teaching in which
culture not only expedites success for the black student in the classroom, but also affirms
that student’s racial and cultural identity. Her postulation that African Americans are a
cultural and racial group is supported here by her use of a conception of culture that
encompasses both African and American culture. So, a clear vision of the problem of
reification emerges first as she deems the blacks/African Americans to be a fixed racial
group, an affirmation of race in itself, and secondly, by including African culture to
affirm black racial identity. If we consider African American racial and cultural
boundaries to be distinct, as she does, then we can infer that borders of the black racial
group, for Ladson-Billings, extends beyond our borders to the native continent of its
origins. Both this substantive account of race and her normative position that teachers
assist in strengthening that racial identity with racially fixed culture are affirmations of
the reified racial concept.
Ladson-Billings is dismissive of teachers who employ color-blind approaches in
the classroom, arguing that to ignore “race and ethnicity” is to the detriment of those
students situated in negatively disparate positions and circumstances in relation to the
dominant group in society. So, it is important that teachers engage the factors that
underlie the inequity in their lives.31 She adds, “If teachers pretend not to see students’

30
31

Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 33.

35

racial and ethnic differences, they really do not see students at all and are limited in their
ability to meet their educational needs.”32
I agree with Gloria Ladson-Billings that it is important to integrate relevant
cultural aspects into teaching and to attempt to understand the racial or cultural
circumstances of their student’s lives. However, by asserting that she considers African
Americans to be a distinct racial group with a distinct culture that corresponds to its set
boundaries Ladson-Billings is not only reifying race, but also conflating it with culture.
She offers no justification or explanation to ground these claims of the distinctness of
race and culture of African Americans. To send teachers into the classroom with an under
theorized conception of race and culture grounded by the un-critical societal culture that
affirms it, is to activate those teachers as agents of racial affirmation. Furthermore, these
inadequate notions could result in the non-color blind teacher becoming culture-blinded
by color as she fails to recognize and identify a student’s actual cultural makeup. This
would seemingly undermine the platform of culturally relevant teaching.
In truth, the defining of racial groups has always been contingent upon temporal,
spatial, and social circumstances. These definitions typically do not escape the broader
racial paradigm, but they sometimes demonstrate a grounded variability within it. For
instance, a person with one white parent and one black could be considered black or
African American, while in other places they are considered “mixed” or “biracial.” They
might even be able to “pass” as white. So, a problem that needs to be addressed within
Ladson-Billings’s theoretical framework is what to do when racial categories merge, as
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they often do, and how to approach race, given the diverse “racial” ancestry of many
blacks in this country.
Another problem is that Ladson-Billings uses race and ethnicity in conjunction as
if they are indicative of the same thing. Racial designations, however, do not necessarily
correspond to one’s ethnic designation. It is possible for one to carry the racial
designation “black” or “African American” and have an ethnicity that is not typically
associated with a black racial designation, e.g., Haitian American.
Finally, the claim that the black racial group has a distinct culture is a claim that
requires an argument that Ladson-Billings neglects to provide. However, if we imagine
the ethnic or cultural groups whose members are comprised of many persons assigned the
black racial designation, we can see that a claim that there is a distinct black culture is an
overgeneralization. Some examples are Louisiana creoles, the Gullah people of South
Carolina/Georgia, Puerto Rican Americans, Dominican Americans, Cuban Americans,
Jamaican Americans, Kenyan Americans, and the descendents of slaves and freedmen
scattered throughout various rural, urban, and suburban regions of the United States. All
of these groups are situated in a society in which there is a significant degree of intermarriage and cultural syncretism.
To try to describe “African Americans” or “blacks” as a distinct cultural group
merely offers a notion of culture in which cultural members and their culture are
impervious to interactive influence. Moreover, it would make culture a racialmetaphysical birthright, instead of something learned, engaged, and shaped.
The operative conception of race in American culture has always packaged racial
designations and selective cultural productions together. This is carried out with
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indifference to how people actually live. Ladson-Billings’s shared belief in this
conception, her using it to ground her theory, and disseminating it for normative action in
schools is codifying it institutionally. If we, as critical scholars, are going to make use of
such racial reifications then it is important that we provide evidentiary support for them
and their place in our theory. Unfortunately, this grounding does not always occur, as I
shall now show as we move to an examination of Afrocentric education.
Afrocentricity In Education: Constructing Diasporas
Over the last several decades, theorists from within the field of education have
increasingly begun to mount strong challenges to the prevalence of Eurocentricity within
the American educational system. Philosopher of education, Molefi Kete Asante is one of
the most influential and well-respected scholars spearheading this movement. Asante’s
position is that the Eurocentric paradigm that currently dominates education is inherently
white supremacist. This is because the substantive content distributed to students reflects
the histories and perspectives of white students. Non-white students are taught to center
white narratives in their own lives. Narratives reflective of their own perspectives are
either ignored or treated as something akin to bit part characters in the story of whites—
as objects in which white subjects come into contact and “act upon.”33 For the African
American student, this ultimately means having to engage the content of education
through the eyes of white persons, some of who are responsible for committing atrocities
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against their ancestors. African and African Americans who may have resisted their white
oppressors are suppressed within the discourse.34
Given these consequences for African American students, Asante posits that the
Eurocentric paradigm must be dismantled. He holds that the only way to accomplish this
task is through multicultural education because it is best suited to de-stratify and equalize
cultural narratives. However, he contends this multicultural education must be directed
by an Afrocentric approach if it is to effectively undermine Eurocentricity.35 Asante
describes Afrocentricity as
“a frame of reference wherein the phenomena are viewed from the perspective of
the African person. The Afrocentric approach seeks in every situation the
appropriate centrality of the African person…this means that teachers provide
students the opportunity to study the world and its people, concepts, and history
from an African world view.”36
The Afrocentric approach is intended to have application to all major subjects
within liberal education. However, Asante states, it is not the goal of Afrocentricity to
operate as a facsimile of Eurocentricity, nor is it intended to assume the hegemonic
positioning of Eurocentricity in education. Rather, he asserts, the goal of the Afrocentric
approach is to disrupt the white supremacy endemic to Eurocentric paradigm. 37 It is to
accomplish this as,
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1) ”It questions the imposition of the White supremacist view as universal
and/or classical.
2) It demonstrates the indefensibility of racist theories that assault multiculturalism and pluralism.
3) It projects a humanistic and pluralistic viewpoint by articulating
Afrocentricity as a valid, nonhegemonic perspective.”38
At first glance, we can see how Asante’s Afrocentric approach could loosen the
tight grasp the Eurocentric paradigm has on the various levels of education. For example,
if we were to visit the world of academic philosophy, we would find that European
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, J.S Mill, David
Hume, John Locke, St. Augustine, Sartre, and Foucault are considered the Great
Thinkers. It is from the theoretical vantage points of European philosophers, or American
philosophers inspired by them (the Pragmatists), that textbook content and classroom
discourse is often framed, and from where the majority of contemporary philosophers
construct their analyses. African and African American-related philosophies are, at best,
relegated to minimal status in textbooks and as result remain largely invisible within
mainstream philosophy. As I mentioned in the preceding chapter, works by philosophers
of race, even those that rigorously employ methodologies from “the Western tradition” to
examine the social and/or moral status of blacks or who provide analyses of frameworks
in which race and racial identity are constructed, are typically marginalized from the
content. As the relevance of such works get diminished in the canon, so do, in many
ways, the lives and conditions of the people that these works attempt to address.
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It is not impossible to imagine how a successful implementation of Asante’s
Afrocentric Idea could, in theory, yield positive benefits for the discipline of philosophy
and its members, especially those regarded as African American. A new African center
that acts as the frame of reference by which we do philosophy could mean a re-evaluation
of philosophers treated as moral universalists in the classroom, but whose devaluation of
the moral status of blacks (e.g. Kant) is typically omitted in the classroom and in
textbooks. Such philosophers’ works would likely be subject to deeper, richer, and
consequently less abridged analytical and interpretive exegeses within the theory and in
the classroom. An Afrocentric approach to philosophy could also result in race and
racism receiving broader consideration and being met with a sense of urgency within the
discipline. The introduction of African philosophies might finally result in their epistemic
and methodological entry into and influence within the larger philosophical conversation.
Among the primary goals of Afrocentric education is the placement of African
American students inside of the educational content--to permit them to see themselves as
an integral part of the discourse.39 Thus, a re-situation of African and African American
philosophy could allow persons of African descent, like so many of those of European
descent, to have their lives and circumstances reflected within the content, which could
permit them to finally “see themselves as the subjects, rather than the objects of
education.”40
I agree that the current state of education at secondary and higher levels
necessitates that we provide effective and holistic alternatives to the Eurocentric
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paradigm. Heuristically, as I have shown, Asante’s approach can have great value.
However, upon deeper scrutiny, Asante’s Afrocentric approach maintains the problem of
reification. The way in which Asante reifies race is, on one hand, a reaffirmation of the
white supremacist model of the Eurocentric paradigm. On the other hand, it is a
reinvention of the reified conception of race found in American societal culture.
We first find Asante’s affirmation of race with his validation of the traditional
racial category of “white” as he corresponds it to the content within the Eurocentric
education. While it is certainly possible that the subject matter of the traditional
Eurocentric narrative entails parts of the lives or histories of some of the persons
designated “white,” it is certainly not the case for all whites within this country.
Considering the ethnic diversity of “white” people in the US, persons whose ancestries
may extend from Sicily to Zimbabwe, a claim that the traditional canon even represents
this wide spectrum is, at best, an overstatement. By Asante’s own description, the
Eurocentric model has historically reified the content of its selectively chosen narratives
and facilitated their attachment to the “white” racial category while omitting nonEuropean content. Asante, however, appears to follow the lead of this model, only he
designates Eurocentric education “white” while simultaneously ignoring the actual
ancestral and historical diversity of those assigned to that category. This is an example of
back-end and front-end affirmation. His “diversity omission” allows him to affirm race
by placing a broad group of people into the Eurocentric model fixed by the white racial
boundary. As a result, the “white” productions that make up the Eurocentric model
become theirs. This, in turn, permits us to look to the Eurocentric paradigm’s content to
affirm racial categories.
42

The problem of reification also emerges as Asante attempts to link the white
racial group to a particular culture and its products. He states, “…teachers do not have to
think about using the white child’s culture to empower the white child. The white child’s
language is the language of the classroom. Information that is being conveyed is “white”
cultural information in most cases.”41 It is important to recognize here that Asante’s
position is not that teachers are promoting the language as white, nor is he claiming that
teachers are disseminating cultural products to students as white culture. Rather, he is
asserting that the language and culture of the classroom are white. In doing this, Asante is
both affirming the concept of race and applying the boundaries of its reification to
include linguistic and cultural productions.
Asante’s racial affirmation of the black racial category differs from the treatment
that he gives to the white racial category. Asante’s reification of “African American”
shows a historical basis as he attempts to connect the lives of contemporary African
Americans to greater Africa via ancestral lineage. Asante states, “Naturally, the person of
African descent should be centered in his or her historical experiences as an African.”42
However, this treatment also suggests an essentialist element to his belief that there is
something that should connect the African-American child to Africa and in his belief that
this something is ideal. It appears that, for Asante, this idealized element should exist for
African Americans in spite of the intentional ethno-cultural genocide committed against
sub-Saharan Africans. This genocide meant the enslavement, devaluation, and
displacement of peoples from a variety of ethnic backgrounds followed by the deliberate
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destruction of their cultural productions (language, social and moral communities,
spiritual practices, values, customs, etc.). Furthermore, it is clear that he believes that this
essentialist element should exist regardless of the linguistic and cultural indoctrination of
post-slavery African Americans carried out by Eurocentric education and by the white
supremacist societal culture. Even if African Americans were a people, they were not
culturally the same people as their African ancestors. However, Asante’s model
diminishes the content of the actual lives of African American students while elevating
an abstracted historical Africa.
Asante’s essentialist conception of race cuts quite deeply into who African
Americans supposedly are intrinsically. When explaining the cultural dislocation of
contemporary African Americans from their African ancestry, he offers the following
psychological account of what he calls the “African American psyche”:
“The African person was physically separated from place, from culture, and from
traditions. In the Americas, the African person was punished for remembering
Africa. Drums were outlawed in most of the colonies soon after the arrival of
large numbers of Africans. And since the drum was an instrument intimate to the
cultural transmission of values and traditions, its disappearance was one of the
great losses in the African-American psyche.”43
Here, Asante presents an account of race in which the cultural productions are
inherently tied to a distinct ontology. The oppression of African slaves—the suppression
of their cultural products, has a consequence in the psychology of the contemporary
African American. Asante fails to ground these consequences to the physical or social
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world. He provides no account of what constitutes the African American psyche, much
less an account of how the loss of drums and the cultural content for which they act as a
conduit constitute a loss for this psyche. There is certainly little doubt that a loss of
culture would have a psychological impact on the persons who actually practice that
culture. However, to state that this loss amounts to a psychological deficit in descendents
generations removed is to suggest the presence of a deeper metaphysics at play-something beyond the physical that links past and present psycho-metaphysical
dispositions and that links those dispositions to culture.
It could be argued that Asante is simply providing a rich account of ethnicity. He
certainly speaks of larger groups, whites and African Americans as if they were
ethnicities. I contend, however, that it is more probable that he is conflating race,
ethnicity, and culture. His use of culture and over-generalized ethnicities ultimately hold
up the concept of race because they are structurally congruent to race. This is supported
by Asante’s synonymous usage of Black with African/African American and White with
European. Africa and Europe are not places that have distinct cultures. Rather, they are
continents made up of many countries with large numbers of ethnic groups, languages,
and cultures. Asante’s use of these designators is more consistent with the traditional
account of race in the United States, where African descent is all that is required to
determine black personhood. Indeed, he makes no mention of persons with both
European and African ancestries. Consequently, there is no explanation of how one’s
“Africanness” gets positioned qualitatively in relation to one’s “Europeanness” (or any
other “ness”). However, given Asante’s adherence to the traditional axioms of race for
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both whites and blacks, it is safe to infer that African ancestry overrides all other
ancestry.
Asante’s designation “African-American” entails an essentialist component that
constitutes what we are intrinsically. His underlying assertion is that this component is
suppressed within blacks by white supremacist hegemony, even if blacks are unaware of
this suppression. In other words, they are being alienated from their true selves as blacks.
The implicit goal of Afrocentric education is to replace this component in ontologically
deficient blacks. Thus, race for Asante is not simply substantive in that it constitutes what
blacks are intrinsically, it is also normative inasmuch as it determines what people should
be ideally. So, Asante’s reification of race would permit teachers, as it does with him, to
have the theoretical ground to say to their students, “That culture is your culture” to
students who do not practice, understand, or know about the existence of that culture or
the socio-historical formation of that culture.
It follows from Asante’s metaphysical account of the African American psyche
and from his normative claim that blacks should be centered as African, that there must
be a correct way to be black or a correct way for blacks to be—a substantively mandated,
normative blueprint for ideal racial action. If “black” or “African” were an ideal
metaphysical ontology, then it would make sense that blacks educated under a “white
supremacist paradigm” would likely deviate from Asante’s racial blueprint, therefore
violating the demands of their ontology. This is in essence what Asante is suggesting.
Further evidence that Asante adheres to this view emerges as he discusses
consequences of European universalism that he believes to accompany the Eurocentric
paradigm. He explains that this universalism is why “some scholars and artists of African
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descent rush to deny their Blackness,” and prefer “European art, language, and culture
over African art, language, and culture”—people who “believe that anything of European
origin is inherently better than anything produced by or issuing from their own people.”44
Here Asante’s Afrocentricity reveals an axiomatic racial essentialism in which persons of
“African descent” who may prefer “European” forms of art are accused of denying what
appears to be a true fixed racial ontology--blackness. This shows, once again, that race,
for Asante, constitutes personhood and the properties of that personhood are extended to
particular cultural productions. In this case, black personhood is attached to black cultural
productions. The implication is that one’s “blackness” should govern particular actions,
specifically those toward or against particular cultural products. So, Asante’s Afrocentric
approach appears to be more than a challenge to the Eurocentric paradigm as socializing
system. It is a challenge to the Eurocentric paradigm as a white paradigm that suppresses
black racial ontology.
Both the Eurocentric model and Asante’s Afrocentric remedy impose value-laden,
racial truths. The Eurocentric approach selectively places values on some European and
European-influenced knowledge—knowledge that affirms its superior positioning. It
marginalizes knowledge that problematizes or fails to affirm it. As a consequence, it
devalues those persons assigned racial identities associated with that excluded knowledge
and forces their adherence to Eurocentric values and epistemology. Thus, it affirms both
white and Eurocentric as the standard for all.
Asante’s strategically oppositional approach is more overt as it creates the
problem of reification. As it tries to dismantle white supremacist education, it constructs
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ethno-racial identities as ideal types for black students. It is African-centered or more
succinctly, “black-centered,” and it creates racial axioms for “black authenticity” and
“black performance.” So, the ultimate qualitative deviation of Asante’s Afrocentric
education from Eurocentric education is that it is not an interracially hegemonic paradigm
that facilitates the structuring of races hierarchically. Instead, the Afrocentric paradigm
makes Afrocentricity, itself, the authority for an intra-racial hegemony for blacks. It
structures blacks that fall under it hierarchically based on their adherence to its
ontological dictates.
One reason I chose Asante’s Afrocentric education for this analysis is because his
conception of Afrocentricity is quite influential within critical theory in education.
Additionally, as we have also witnessed with Ladson-Billings, the way in which the
problem of reification surfaces in his work represents both a trend and tendency reflected
within critical theory. In particular, this includes the affixing of racial categories to
particular ethnicities and/or cultures and the treatment of ethnicity and culture as static
entities fixed by racial boundaries and made up of racial properties. These tendencies are
present even as the theory itself attempts to escape essentialist conceptions of race. Such
is the case with critical multiculturalists, Joe L. Kincheloe and Shirley R. Steinberg, who
oppose essentialist Afrocentric approaches, but still fail to avoid reaffirming and
reinforcing race. Let us now examine how the problem of reification materializes in their
work.
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Critical Multiculturalism: Race and Affirmation
In the book Changing Multiculturalism, Joe Kincheloe and Shirley Steinberg
present a view of critical multiculturalism that is suspicious of the essentialism found in
some leftist multicultural theory in education, such as Afrocentric theory, to address
oppressed groups. They state that
“left-essentialist multiculturalists often connect differences to a historical past of
cultural authenticity where the essence of a particular identity was developed – an
essence that transcends history, social context, and power. Such essences can
become quite authoritarian when constructed around a romanticized golden era,
nationalistic pride, and a positionality of purity that denies competing axes of
identity….”45
So, already we find that the Afrocentricity of theorists like Molefi Asante would
come under this critique as he firmly roots the essentialist ideal of blackness in similarly
essentialized, historical Africa. Moreover, the axiomatic aspects of Asante’s reification of
blackness reflects a diminishing of other possible identities that may be in competition
with the Afrocentric identity, such as the one that could explain why a black individual
may have a preference for European cultural products. Indeed, Kincheloe and Steinberg
further contend that the tendency to romanticize essentialist multicultural theories can
lead to various intra-group issues. Groups privilege some forms of knowledge and
identity over others, even as groups are bound together by circumstances. So, for
example, Afrocentric essentialist theory, might not allow the Afrocentric GLBT (gay,
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lesbian, bisexual, transgender), gender, multi-racial knowledge to share the same status
as, let us say, an Afrocentric, gender-neutral, heterosexual based knowledge. As a result
this would create a selective and incomplete version of an African-centered worldview.
The voices and socio-historical knowledge of “bi-racial,” homosexual, females would be
subjugated and therefore take on inferior status within the theory.46
Kincheloe and Steinberg also argue that the romanticization in these types of
essentialist theories show a propensity to offer authoritative privilege to identity itself,
leaving group members to have to fight for what is or should be considered the authentic
identity.47 They maintain that critical multiculturalists show suspicion of this onedimensional authority and thus make it a priority to understand the internal arrangement
of identities within groups. Moreover, they assert that a goal of critical multiculturalism
is to facilitate the interaction of the various identities that intersect at the point of the
group’s commonality.48
In describing aspects of their vision of critical multiculturalism, Kincheloe and
Steinberg stress that it is the job of critical multiculturalism to produce a curriculum that
attempts to know and understand the subjugated knowledge of oppressed groups.
Furthermore, it is important for this curriculum to explore the consequences of that
subjugation and the relationship between the knowledge of the oppressed and the
knowledge of the oppressors.49 To accomplish this task, Kincheloe and Steinberg argue
that a critical multicultural curriculum must escape the dominant Eurocentric frame of
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reference that has diminished and brought harm to the lives of those in marginalized
groups. Therefore, a critical multicultural curriculum is centered from the perspectives of
these marginalized groups to mitigate the damage and diminishment they have incurred
as oppressed people within American society.50
As I have stated, Kincheloe and Steinberg are suspicious of Afrocentric theory
because it can exhibit a type of essentialism that privileges some forms of knowledge
over others. This does not mean, however, that Afrocentrism has no place in their critical
multiculturalism. While they do not advocate a strategic paradigm shift from the
Eurocentric to the Afrocentric framework, they consider Afrocentrism a valuable
resource to garner knowledge that exposes the real life circumstances of blacks as an
oppressed group. 51 In their view, Afrocentrism is deeply tuned in with what is taking
place for black people as it “understands the intimate connection between the economic
and social stresses that afflict black communities in Western society” as well as having
and understanding knowledge of the “the crises of knowledge and human meaning that
subvert the culture’s ability and/or willingness to respond to the chaos.”52 For Kincheloe
and Steinberg, people such as rappers, reggae artists and critical black economic theorists
act as the voices of Afrocentrism that convey information through their creative
“protests” and pointed analysis. These Afrocentric agents are able to inform critical
multiculturalism of circumstantial and psychological effects of racism of black youth and
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as well as show them how to create countercultural students who are able to disrupt the
institutionalized status quo that harms them.53
Furthermore, Kincheloe and Steinberg also believe that, as a marginalized
perspective, Afrocentrism can prove useful in informing the content of what they call a
“curriculum of affirmation” for blacks.54 They state,
“As a critical multiculturalist curriculum explores the degradation of Africanness
in Western societies, it concurrently looks at the genius of things African for the
purpose of providing affirmational experiences for black students. Critical
multiculturalists want children of African descent (and children from other
cultural/racial backgrounds as well) to understand African history, philosophy and
culture.”55
In addition, Kincheloe and Steinberg hold that a critical multicultural curriculum
can draw from the African tradition and “diasporic tradition” to “affirm individuality and
collectivity” and to provide uplifting narratives from the past that will help contemporary
black youth contend with the conditions of their oppression.56 This curriculum also looks
towards contemporary activities and productions for black affirmation. They state that
this curriculum of black affirmation operates as “a black studies programme that overtly
forges connections between academia and everyday black life, black cultural productions.
Drawing upon the collective experience in life and literature, the curriculum induces
students to re-examine their lives from an Afrocentric perspective.”57
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Kincheloe and Steinberg also operationalize what they refer to as “the black
aesthetic” for this curriculum. This aesthetic encompasses creative forms such as jazz,
hip-hop, “black literature,” and “black film.” 58 According to Kincheloe and Steinberg, it
can operate as an affirmation agent as it facilitates for black youth the ability to
experience the world through an African vantage point. Furthermore, this aesthetic is able
to convey types of collective sentiments; examples are hip-hop as an expression of “black
rage” and jazz conveying “black pain.” 59
While Kincheloe and Steinberg acknowledge the realness of race in American life
and its centrality to the lives of many people, they reject race as a legitimate biological
entity, insisting, as I have, that these essentialized categories are maintained by political
and social structures.60 Unfortunately, however, their critical multiculturalism appears to
betray these sentiments. If we look closely at the theoretical implications of their critical
multiculturalism, we find that their treatment of blacks provides affirmation and
reconstitution of the race concept.
We first find the problem of reification in Kincheloe and Steinberg’s approach as
they set boundaries around racial identities. Now, as I have shown, they are quite mindful
of how theory can constrict and privilege knowledge when engaging marginalized
groups, such as blacks. The way in which they sidestep this problem is by constructing a
conception of race, for blacks, that is seemingly inclusive of a broader amount of content.
Prima facie, their use of the racial category “black” does not necessarily reflect anything
other than a socially constructed designation. However, their knowledge about blacks as
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an oppressed group is informed by what they consider Afrocentric voices. I have shown
that Kincheloe and Steinberg believe that Afrocentricity, given the authoritative nature of
its essentialism, can privilege identity, limit knowledge, and set standards for
particularistic forms of authenticity. It is, therefore, questionable that they would use
Afrocentrism as the primary reference to learn about the lives and situations of black
people given that the sources of this knowledge (rappers, reggae artists, jazz musicians)
would theoretically be of an ideologically constricted type. In doing this, Kincheloe and
Steinberg, themselves, are privileging ideological intermediaries to gain knowledge about
the existential lives of blacks, writ large. They are, in essence, filtering knowledge and as
a result, creating a deceptively broad, essentialized narrative of black existence. In this
regard, Kincheloe and Steinberg’s approach does not deviate from left essentialist
theories as they too allow particular identities to represent a diverse group. In privileging
the knowledge gathered and expressed by these Afrocentric voices as representative of
blacks, that knowledge affirms the racial boundaries of that group.
So far, I have described what I regard as Kincheloe and Steinberg’s inadvertent
affirmation of race through their reification of the circumstances of blacks. Taken alone,
it is plausible that this may not provide conclusive evidence of these theorists’ deep
entanglement with the problem of reification. One could argue that my criticism only
reveals a miscalculation in strategy as they attempt to account for the experiences of a
more diverse array of black persons. To this, I respond, that while certain theory
constricts the terms of group identity and membership for blacks, this primarily bears
relevancy to intragroup and intergroup dynamics. These dynamics have always been in
flux and possess minimal impact on the structure of race itself. Kincheloe and Steinberg’s
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approach presents a conception of race as a diverse, yet fixed category that affirms what
the reified conception of the black racial group has always been--a broadly encompassing
biologically grounded, fixed category with a diverse membership. So, the structure of
race in their theory remains relatively stable. Where these theorists fall short in this
regard is by essentializing the conditions of some blacks and extending the essence to
encompass all blacks. This mirrors the treatment of the black racial concept within
societal culture, where we apply the lives, activities, and circumstances of some to the
whole, for better or worse.
It is certainly possible that Kincheloe and Steinberg would also rely on other
sources of knowledge to inform critical multiculturalism about the existential conditions
of blacks. However, in their treatise on critical multiculturalism, Kincheloe and Steinberg
overwhelming privilege Afrocentric conduits of knowledge to report these conditions.
Furthermore, as they continue to utilize Afrocentrism to address these conditions as they
relate to black students, a deeper affirmation of race emerges from their theoretical
framework. There is a broadening in function of Afrocentrism as Kincheloe and
Steinberg lay out the curriculum of black affirmation. We discover this shift as they
provide the framework for this curriculum, which incidentally is very similar in structure
and purpose to Asante’s Afrocentric approach. Both approaches operate from the view
that Eurocentrism has damaged black students in some regard and that as a result, black
students are in need of affirmation. Furthermore, the nature of their remedies is an
implementation of Afrocentric education that will affirm the black student, as black.
In the previous section, I demonstrated how Asante’s Afrocentric education is
implicitly intended to correct an ontological deficiency in black students. We can infer
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from Kincheloe and Steinberg’s position that black students should be affirmed with
African curriculum, that there already is some ontological connection with an abstracted
Africa. This also represents a conflation between race (black) and ethnicity (African). It
is similar to what arises in Asante’s Afrocentrism where a person’s “blackness”
necessitates their connection to Africa, African knowledge, and culture. However, in this
regard, Kincheloe and Steinberg go further than Asante. Not only do they regard African
content as ideal for a curriculum of black affirmation, they also employ reified concepts
such as “the black experience” and “black productions” toward this end. So, while
Kincheloe and Steinberg’s goal may be to affirm black students to help strengthen and
better equip them to overcome the harms that they have incurred, their project
inadvertently affirms ethno-racial ontology and extends that ontology to cultural
productions.
An aspect of Kincheloe and Steinberg’s curriculum that further undermines their
resistance of essentialism is found in their referencing of “the black aesthetic” or “black
pain” and subsequent treatment of these abstractions as things in themselves. These
reifications are comparable in nature to Asante’s transcendent, African/African-American
psyche. The primary difference is that Asante’s psyche extends chronologically starting
with Africans of the past to present day African Americans. Kincheloe and Steinberg’s
reifications are more generalized racial abstractions that capture essentialized collective
sentiments and productions, to which black students are supposedly able to relate by
virtue of their racial ontology. So, while critical multiculturalism’s curriculum of black
affirmation rejects the legitimacy of essentialist, biological races, it manages to ground
persons by their biological, phenotype (skin color) and genotype (African ancestry) and
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assign them reified racial dispositions and cultural abstractions. What does this mean for
black students and non-white students? This “knowledge” about racial aesthetics,
dispositions, and feelings, constructs an epistemological and ontological barricade around
black people that prevents others from fully entering. With their production-end
otherization of blacks, Kincheloe and Steinberg ignore that in reality these things are
constructed in dialogue with others and are therefore unreflective of the actual social,
cultural, ethnic, and even biological syncretism that may lead to their production.
This reductionist sentiment is further illuminated as Kincheloe and Steinberg
assertion that rap is “Truly a black art form” and therefore “cannot be easily ‘covered’
(appropriated) by white musicians-the short-lived career of Vanilla Ice being no
exception.”61 The obvious implication of this argument, and quip about Vanilla Ice, a
white rapper, is that there is some metaphysical ownership over cultural products because
they act as reflections of a “black aesthetic.” Furthermore, it suggests that it is easier for a
person who shares the “black aesthetic” to change art forms within this racial diaspora of
productions, as long as that newly chosen art form is fixed by black racial perimeters. For
instance, a black jazz pianist who decides to become a rapper will require less effort than
a white person in the same position, because rap and jazz contain the same essentialist
black aesthetic. On the other hand, If we follow Kincheloe and Steinberg’s logic, a white
person who appreciates rap music will have a more difficult time participating in that art
form because it is “truly black” and she is not. This implanting of essence into cultural
products constructs a reified conception of race that is self-affirming. As it embeds the
racial essence into a type of aesthetic production, that production subsequently gets
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assigned to that corresponding racial group. Racial members own its production and thus
when they produce it, it becomes a reflection of their race.
Racial reifications are like attempted snapshots of reality--abstractions. When
they fail, there are often consequences. Kincheloe and Steinberg’s assertion that rap is a
“truly black art form” is a prime example of this failure. As Peter McLaren more
accurately points out “rap music developed among relocated black [Caribbean] and
Puerto Rican male youths of the South Bronx….”62 As a consequence of the racial
reification of this particular cultural product, various individual and socio-cultural
influences are suppressed in the abstracted narrative. The result is students from
marginalized groups, such as Puerto Ricans, perhaps in need of affirmation, are forced to
vie for entry into a narrative locked by race. Kincheloe and Steinberg’s racial
essentializing is subject to the same criticism that they offer left-essentialist
multiculturalism in that it suppresses “competing axes” of knowledge and identity.
Kincheloe and Steinberg, like all critical theorists, are attempting to examine and
engage the circumstances of marginalized groups within complex and rugged political,
socio-cultural terrain. Thus, it is understandable that there is a tendency to address the
conditions and consequences with politicized conceptualizations of these groups.
However, the problem of racial reification that permeates our society makes it difficult,
as I have shown, for theorists to separate the essentialist conceptions of race from those
politicized conceptions of race. By politically (diasporically) essentializing sentiments,
dispositions, experiences, and creative forms using the traditional racial boundaries and
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rules (inclusion of certain forms under a racial fixed umbrella), Kincheloe and
Steinberg’s affirmation of race acts as a demonstration of this difficulty.
Politicizing The Racial Binary
As I have stated, the penchant of critical theory to present politicized conceptions
of marginalized groups is understandable. However, there is a tendency to politicize the
mundanity of life using well-intentioned, agenda-driven racial narratives. In some
contexts, ordinary acts such as going to work, working at home, taking care of children,
going to jail, having sex, playing music, get filtered through a critical ideology and thus
get characterized as representative expressions of broader essentialized political themes
such as: “feminist struggle,” “class resistance,” or the “demonstration of the communal
bond of the African American family.”
We find examples of this as critical pedagogist, Peter McLaren, offers analysis
from his semiotic investigation of hip-hop. He states,
“Rap helps to communicate symbols and meanings and articulates
intersubjectively the lived experience of social actors. The ontological status of
the gangsta rapper resides in the function of the commodity of blackness, but a
certain quality of blackness that is identified through the expressive codes of the
rapper is the “inner turmoil” of the oppressed black subject of history.”63
This example demonstrates a unique departure from Kincheloe and Steinberg’s
treatment of the black rapper in that McLaren recognizes that the ontology of the rapper
is contingent upon a commoditized blackness—a prepackaged construct with the intent to
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sell. Kincheloe and Steinberg fail to acknowledge this potential aspect of their black
rapper and arguably they, themselves, commoditize the blackness of their subject as they
authorize her position as a medium of knowledge about racial circumstances and as a
conduit to express to black students “black pain” and “black rage.” However, McLaren
appears to re-converge with Kincheloe and Steinberg as he, too, identifies the rapper as
expressing sentiment through his blackness, in this case, the “inner turmoil” of a broader
black racial group.
It is certainly possible that cultural forms and their expressions, even when
racially reified, can provide useful information about real life, as they have with the three
aforementioned theorists. However, these reifications can hinder the gathering of
penetrating and nuanced insight into the complex lives of individuals. This is because the
expressed knowledge and its human medium(s) get dispersed within the political
narrative of that reification’s essence. So, McLaren’s gangsta rapper (and expression)
gets enveloped into “the inner turmoil of the black subject of history” in the same way
that Kincheloe and Steinberg’s rapper (and expression) become enclosed in “the black
aesthetic.” The actual individual and the complexities and nuances of her life get
diminished while her essentialist racial category gets affirmed.
What often gets ignored as a consequence of this political essentializing of
knowledge are the multiplicity of variables that push people towards particular cultural
products—ordinary reasons such as boredom, trends, curiosity, racial authenticity, peer
pressure, countercultural expression, etc. Consider, for example, the 1980’s, when rap
was beginning to gain acceptance in mainstream venues like MTV, but often promoted as
racialized content (black music). As gangsta rap was introduced into my relatively small,
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semi-rural, hometown in Tennessee so were the behaviors, attitudes, and fashion
displayed in its music and/or its corresponding music videos. Responding to these
images, many young black males started to emulate Los Angeles gangs like the “Crips”
and “Bloods.” It became “cool” to carry guns, sell drugs, display misogynistic attitudes,
and even go to jail (which became a badge of honor). These cultural products were
marketed as belonging to them, as black, despite their not residing in circumstances
similar to those in inner city Los Angeles.
In this example, the broader socio-political circumstances, both in its maintenance
of a racial paradigm that assigns races to particular cultural products and its
commodifying of blackness (among various other related factors), no doubt facilitated the
establishment of new axiomatic identities for black authenticity. However, the actual
taking up of these identities was usually no more of a political expression than following
any other cultural trend. In fact, it was likely the ordinariness of all of these
circumstances that made it easy to transition into these identities and that made it difficult
for their parents to address effectively. Narratives like this one are likely too close to the
ground for encapsulation by politicized, racial abstractions, which typically speak and
interpret for persons, rather than let those persons speak for themselves.
Another issue is that “black identity” has been interpreted through what I would
call an “American Freedom Narrative.” A freedom narrative, in its most positive form,
centers blacks always within the context of liberation, Emancipation and the Civil Rights
movement, etc. This narrative has been exemplified by the critical theorists that I have
covered thus far, where black peoples’ lives are never presented as ordinary, but rather,
as inherently or ideally political—always struggling or always in need of racial
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affirmation to struggle harder for freedom. McLaren’s rapper’s expression of blackness,
serves as an example of this narrative.
Critical theory can sometimes play a game of opposites when it comes to race. In
his book, Life In Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of
Education, McLaren engages the concept of “whiteness.” In addressing the tendency
within education theory to focus on diversity, he asserts that the focus of multiculturalism
be turned towards “the analysis of white ethnicity, the destabilization of white identity,
specifically white supremacist ideology and practice.”64 Whiteness, he describes, is a
“cultural disposition and ideology linked to specific political, social, and historical
arrangements.”65
McLaren’s more detailed outline of whiteness represents an overwhelmingly
active and negative portrait of whiteness. It is, in sum, a malleable, ethnic, hegemonic
type of consciousness that otherizes, dominates, and demoralizes non-whites,
homosexuals, and women and that facilitates capitalist exploitation. Thus, he regards the
taking up of this identity as to situating oneself at the top of the white supremacist
hierarchy. Moreover, for a white person to attempt to take up a raced identity (black or
brown), in McLaren’s view is to deny one’s responsibility for white supremacy.66 He,
therefore, recommends that we move toward the “denial, disassembly, and destruction of
whiteness as we know it and advocate its rearticulation as a form of critical agency
dedicated to social struggle in the interests of the oppressed.”67
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Before continuing my analysis of McLaren’s treatment of race, it is important to
note that he considers race a social construct, even cautioning against using it as “an
analytic category without qualification because race has no biological basis or
philosophical legitimacy.”68 He states that race should always be problematized and even
warns against using the term “race relations,” preferring instead “racialized ethnic
relations.”69
That being said, an interesting aspect of his description of whiteness, a conception
that appears frequently within critical theory, is that it treats it as something occupied—
something that can be taken on, taken off, manipulated, and reconfigured for particular
ends. “Whiteness” is a useful device that helps persons reflect how their own social
ontology might privilege them and how their identity might make them active
participants of a larger paradigmatic white supremacy. As a powerful tool, it resonates
with students. So, there is sometimes value in using reified conceptualizations as devices
to help us comprehend and explain the social and political circumstances of groups.
Like any other reification, however, there is a risk of using racial reifications,
even for heuristic purposes. This is because they can fail to fully connect with what is
actually taking place on the ground. It is true that in the United States races have been
organized asymmetrically and in opposition to one another. McLaren’s political
reification of whiteness effectively captures these aspects of the race construct as they
can operate between the white and black racial groups. It does not, however,
acknowledge that people are typically situated accidentally. No one chooses his or her
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place within the racial hierarchy.70 The acquisition of privilege and oppression are like
games of chance--matters of luck; this is the case even if the dice were loaded by some
evil genius prior to the players coming to the table, or in this case, their birth. No matter
how unfair and asymmetrical reality actually is, employing reified oppositional identities
places intent at the table. Thus, racial opposition itself gets affirmed and justified because
these identities permit the accidental to appear intentional.
Being part of a non-raced groups means that many whites do not see themselves
as privileged or as affirming the status quo. Most are likely unaware of it. They do not
realize that the dice are loaded, so they keep rolling and often, depending on their own
socio-economic circumstances, win. Similarly, many blacks may feel that whites are
cheating them or benefitting at their expense. Many whites, not understanding that they
benefit from their designation, feel like they are being unfairly accused. The
consequences are unbalanced, but both of these viewpoints and positions within the
paradigm are unfair.
Both the fetishizing and devaluing of particular racial identities by scholars
maintains the status quo by treating the racial categorizations themselves as valid.
Furthermore, it underestimates the nuance of racial identity by failing to address the
potentiality for non-whites socialized within the same paradigm to internalize and affirm
oppressive values. Students, white and non-whites, are victims of the racial circumstances
supported by their surrounding social, political, and cultural environment. The political
essentializing of race carried out by many critical scholars neglects this victimization.
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I contend that the omission that blacks and whites are victims of white supremacy
is precisely how race gets reaffirmed and reconstituted in McLaren’s works. If we look at
the way that race is constructed and viewed in our society, this becomes clearer. Whites,
for instance, are treated as though they are rational, with a broad range of choices,
desires, and emotions. Moreover, whites can operate in society with a high degree of
racial anonymity because they are racially unlinked to the aforementioned variables. This
is because “white” is the default racial category that acts as an indicator for a collective of
individuals. If a white person becomes a scholar, she is not considered a white scholar,
white musician, or white politician. When a white person commits a crime, it is not seen
as a reflection upon the entire white racial group. Only in relation to non-whites, is she
raced by society.71
Blacks on the other hand lack this variability and anonymity. They are not viewed
as individuals, but as a group. Thus, they are treated as representatives of the black race.
As a result, their actions are often considered expressions of their blackness if those
particular expressions are in keeping with how society links those expressions or their
means of expression. This is likely the reason why some blacks feel as though they to
have to regulate their thoughts and emotions around whites for fear of being labeled “an
angry black man/woman.”
These are important elements found within the mainstream conception of race.
McLaren simply problematizes the value system. However, aside of assigning
responsibility to whites for their whiteness, assigning the negative aspects of society to
whites, he maintains a mirror image and internal structural blueprint of traditional racial
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ontology. Whiteness is treated as something that one rationally occupies or chooses not to
occupy, while blackness, as shown with his gangsta rapper, is treated as something
expressed, something intrinsic, something representative of the whole.
Assigning politicized identities and narratives to racial groups reinforces, instead
of problematizing the legitimacy of their boundaries. In addition, it inserts meaning
within boundaries to share space with the properties already accompanying race.
Applying reified political content to racial groups, thus, is no different than assigning
fixed cultures or fixed ethnicities to racial groups as they both reinforce the idea that
races are monolithic groups. They all require the invoking of essence when reifying
already reified groups.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigated the problem of reification as it emerges from within
critical theory in education. As we have seen with each of the theorists I have examined,
there is difficulty in fully disengaging from the reified conception of race found within
American society. Most often this was found where there was an ambiguous relationship
between race and ethnicity or culture, or where race is assigned ethnicity or culture, or
where there is politicization of race that mirrors the traditional race concept. In the next
chapter, I show that a significant reason why the problem of reification arises within
critical theory in education in the manner that it does is directly related to important
events and philosophies that emerged from the history of black education.
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CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PROBLEM OF
REIFICATION IN CRITICAL THEORY IN EDUCATION

In Chapter Two, I examined how the problem of reification arises within critical
theory in education. As I have demonstrated, this occurs within often-confused
relationship between race, ethnicity, and culture and through the employment of political
reifications of race that are not fully extricated from our culturally reified conception of
race. While the problem of racial reification is prevalent in educational theory, it is not a
new problem. After all, only in recent decades have we had the scientific tools available
to investigate the biological soundness of the race concept. Historically, education
theorists often operated under the assumption that race is a biological reality or they
regarded the question of whether race is real inconsequential to the real life
circumstances facing blacks at the time. So, some degree of maintenance of the race
concept was unavoidable.
A troubling aspect of today’s critical theory in education is that is has not
managed to disengage from the aforementioned theory, despite what we currently know
about the race construct. Indeed, the contemporary approach to race actually reflects the
discourse taking place within the first half of the 20th century. In this chapter, I attempt to
show that the problem of reification as it emerges from contemporary critical theory in
education is a consequence of the historical trajectory in liberatory black education that
preceded it. I will accomplish this task by 1) examining important events and
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developments in the history of black education, 2) investigating the theoretical
underpinnings that shaped these events, 3) exploring the theoretical and active responses
to these events and 4) showing how aspects of these events and the responses to them
informs and influences critical theory in education as it attempts to address similar
problems related to the education of blacks.
I further contend that considering the historical foundations of black education
that I shall present, critical theory in education must begin to extricate itself from these
foundations. I argue that this disengagement is necessary in order to gain a richer, more
updated, and nuanced understanding of the race concept that will provide a more in-depth
view of how or whether it should permeate contemporary theory. To begin this
undertaking, let us first examine black education coming out of the Reconstruction era of
America history.

The Hampton Approach
Soon after the Civil War and the abolishment of slavery in southern states, former
slaves began to seek universal education that would include blacks. Within a short period
of time, this idea had gathered an irreversible momentum as it gained support not only
from blacks but also from white Southerners. This development worried members of the
Southern white planter class facing a potential socio-economic shift brought about by the
emancipation of black slaves who once tended their lands for planter profit. The question
became, if blacks become educated, how would this labor vacuum be filled?72 The
answer to this question buttressed one of the most important events in the history of black
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education; that is, Samuel Chapman Armstrong’s, a Northern white philanthropist,
founding of the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute in 1868 in Virginia.73
Hampton was a school intended to train potential teachers to provide black children with
an industrial education, a curriculum that would have students learning various trades and
forms of manual labor.74 Historian James D. Anderson states that the main task of the
school
“was to work the prospective teachers long and hard so that they would embody,
accept, and preach an ethic of hard toil or the ‘dignity of labor.’ Then, and only
then, believed Armstrong, could his normal school graduates develop the
appropriate values and character to teach the children of the South’s distinctive
black laboring class” 75
Hampton-educated teachers would essentially act as Armstrong’s ideological
ambassadors to the black populace. Teacher success in this capacity means that the
Hampton model would appease both the needs of white planters and blacks. On one hand,
blacks would have their right to universal education. On the other hand, the planter class
would have new obedient, hardworking black laborers with a strong commitment to the
value of work, thus maintaining some degree of the pre-existing socio-economic caste.76
It is important to note, however, that Armstrong’s philosophy of education went
beyond the needs of the planter class. His conservative agenda also discouraged blacks
from taking part in any important aspects of public life, such as participating in politics,
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voting, or any other activities that could facilitate the disruption of the social order.
Hence, the Hampton ideology fulfilled a broader purpose; to continue the subordination
of blacks for the political, economic, and social desires of whites.77
Armstrong’s beliefs regarding racial ontology were crucial to the foundations of
the Hampton ideology. As a consequence of both subjugation and pre-enslavement
practice of what he regarded as “paganism,” blacks were a morally deficient race. In
contrast, Armstrong considered whites superior to blacks because they were permitted to
develop morally over generations. He estimated that it would take centuries for blacks to
become a moral and civilized race. Moreover, the white race’s superiority mandated that
they continue to govern over blacks while this development progresses. Hence, in
Armstrong’s view, the ontological status of black was sufficient enough justification to
exclude blacks from the social and political sphere and to relegate them to the labor
status. 78
Incidentally, Armstrong’s contention that slavery had caused moral defect in
blacks contradicts his remedy to correct it. He believed that labor had instilled what
limited moral virtue blacks had acquired. Thus, a Hampton-based industrial-moral
education as James Anderson states, would “ultimately prepare blacks for self
government.”79 However, for Armstrong, “the right industrial training would make them
an economic asset instead of a burden to the south.”80 So, it is evident that, for
Armstrong, labor would be the saving grace for blacks. Moreover, the value of blacks
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rests with the fruit of their toil--moral fruits in which he felt ripe enough that Southern
whites should take advantage.81
In sum, for Armstrong, the moral inferiority of blacks justified the following:
servitude, disenfranchisement, education aimed towards strengthening moral sentiment
toward labor, industrial training, redeployment into the southern labor force, and the
preservation of white rule. This justification was predicated on a temporally and socially
contingent conception of a morally compromised black ontology. Taken together, the
implicit claim of the Hampton idea encompassed by Armstrong’s philosophy of
education is that racial subjugation against blacks is a moral necessity. Armstrong’s goal
was to embed this morality into the psyches of black students of Hampton, who would in
turn spread this philosophy as a black ideology. This ideology was to shape how blacks
conceive of work and ultimately, how they conceive of themselves as persons. The
Hampton ideology involved the creation of a self-affirming and self-regulatory
conscience in blacks. Its purpose was to keep blacks in their place—out of the way of
whites while simultaneously remaining at their disposal. Moreover, it was to make blacks
love their place in society and prepare them to go out into the world and teach other
blacks to honor that place.82
The ideological and ontological exportation of Armstrong’s philosophy to other
educational institutions marked another important development in black education.
Underscoring this is the fact that the transmission of this white supremacist model was
broadcast, facilitated, and endorsed with the help of a black man, Booker T. Washington.
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Washington was a former student at Hampton who had been transformed by the values
(self-organization, self-sufficiency, etc.) instilled in him by its praxis. He shared
Armstrong’s belief that blacks are morally underdeveloped and Armstrong’s view that
blacks remain excluded from social and political position. However, Washington’s
reasons for promoting the Hampton ideology were not for the purpose of benefiting
whites. Rather, he saw this philosophy as a means to improve the circumstances of blacks
in American society; it was remedy that would progress the moral development of blacks
just as he felt that it had done for him.83
Washington’s emergence as the poster child for Hampton ideology and his
willingness to become a fervent vehicle for it demonstrate the ideological effectiveness of
its schema. In fact, it had so inspired Washington that, according to William H. Watkins,
“he developed a philosophy of racial uplift that accommodated existing racial or
economic relations.” 84 This philosophy included components of “self-help, hard work,
and character building”—all crucial elements of the Hampton ideology.85 However,
perhaps a more telling example of Hampton’s impact on Washington was his founding of
the Tuskegee Normal Institute in Alabama in 1881, an institute that he modeled after
Hampton.86 Tuskegee’s students were given an intellectually non-rigorous liberal
education in favor of a trade based, labor-intensive education. According to James
Anderson, for Washington, even a minimalist intellectual education was superfluous to
the needs of black students. At one point, he even shared responsibility in pushing an
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initiative to further reduce their education. Tuskegee’s goal under Washington was the
same as Hampton’s under Armstrong; that is, to create teachers who will spread the word
about the importance of labor.87
One of the major precedents that this model set for black education was the
increasingly widespread commitment within education to the idea that the collectiveinterest of blacks was to be constituted by and for the self-interest of whites. This is
demonstrated by the fact that the Hampton idea garnered a great amount of supporters.
The supporters included the Northern industrialists who, along with many Southern
whites, shared a desire to maintain the social and racial order by relegating blacks to
basic fieldwork to further white interests. Thus, the Hampton and Tuskegee models
necessitated a push to spread the model beyond those two campuses. It was to become a
quiet, ideological, social movement.88
This proved successful as a broader and stronger surge of black endorsement of
the Hampton model began to grow, thus strengthening its societal legitimacy. “Racial
uplift” in the Hampton form, became regarded as in the best interest of many blacks and
the white powers-that-be in the north and south. This growing sentiment, however,
entailed an equally influential occurrence in black education; that is, the rise of a countercontingency that did not see the Hampton model as something substantively different
than modern slavery.
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Liberal Education
While there was a growing popularity for the Hampton/Tuskegee idea of
education, it was not the only educational ideology implemented in the South in the late
1800’s to early 1900’s. White missionaries and black religious leaders funded black
universities such as Fisk, Howard, and Virginia Union. These institutes implemented a
liberal curriculum that was quite different from the Hampton model—a curriculum
geared towards strengthening and broadening the intellect of black students. Instead of a
pro-labor curriculum, blacks were taught literature, mathematics, philosophy, natural
sciences, and foreign language. The intended purpose of this education was the
production of new, stronger leaders for black people. 89
The missionaries’ granted blacks a broader degree of equality than Armstrong.
However, Anderson states,
“Equality was carefully defined as political and legal equality. They [the
missionaries] consented to inequality in the economic structure, generally shied
away from questions of racial integration, and were probably convinced that
blacks’ cultural and religious values were inferior to those of middle-class whites.
Their liberalism on civil and political questions was matched by their
conservatism on cultural, religious, and economic matters.”90
In this regard, the missionaries shared both similarities and differences with
Armstrong. The missionaries were different insofar as they were willing to share some
social and political power with blacks. However, they were ideologically unified with
89
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Armstrong inasmuch as their conception of race also presupposed blacks as morally
deficient due to socially contingent factors (slavery and religion). This is highlighted in
both cases by the concerted attempt to construct the lives and characters of black people
by acculturating them with the “right” qualities that suited the appropriate purposes and
expectations of whites. To the missionaries, blacks were still considered as childlike, but
not so much that they could not be expeditiously socialized by a liberal education. This is
in contradiction to the multi-generational approach to black education implicit in the
Hampton model. Moreover, blacks were not considered so uncivilized and morally
bankrupt that they were discouraged from participating in political life. In this way,
liberal education for blacks was an approach that is antithetical to the desires of the
Hampton model, the industrial philanthropists, and the Southern planter class who all
wanted a structure more akin to the pre-civil war status quo—where social harmony
means one group’s total dominance over another.91
The liberal education model found some success in empowering black students.
When the Hampton model all but failed, the philanthropic industrialists attempted to
salvage its basic ideology. Theoretically, it suited their needs despite the fact that
Hampton was unsuccessful in meeting the contemporary, required, academic standards of
education. Moreover, Hampton and prospective students began to reject the
subordination as education model. 92 Thus, the philanthropists began to pour their
resources into other black institutions for purposes of implementing the Hampton idea
and recreating a new subordinate class of black leaders that would assist in furthering its
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agenda. Eventually, they were able to gain a foothold at Fisk University and put their
support behind the university’s similarly minded president, Fayette McKenzie. With
philanthropist backing, McKenzie offered what amounted to a totalitarian grip on the
liberally educated black students at Fisk. James Anderson states that McKenzie
“attempted to repress student initiative, undermine their equalitarian spirit, and control
their thinking on race relations so as to produce a class of black intellectuals that would
uncomplainingly accept the southern racial hierarchy.”93 However, a successful rebellion
on the part of the black student body and community against the newly instituted
oppressive policies procured McKenzie’s resignation.94
These actions by the students were no doubt the type of black leadership that their
liberal education was supposed to evoke. Unfortunately, the philanthropists were not
deterred and eventually gained a stronger influence on black colleges, which in turn
allowed them to employ their retrograde, racist agendas. As a result, students on black
campuses did not maintain the type of spirit that liberal education was meant to instill in
them. 95 Anderson states, there began to emerge a “certain amount of compromise,
indifference, apathy, and fear among blacks students.” 96 These students (and their
teachers) were heavily criticized for what was perceived as an acceptance of the social
status quo, internalizing the values of white benefactors, and their failure “to think and
act on behalf of the interests of black people.”97
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The significance of this criticism relates back to the Hampton model. While
blacks students tried to flourish and get an education in a society that wanted neither for
them, there was a desire on the part of those who control their lives and shape their
conception of self. Both the Hampton and liberal philosophies attempted to engineer
students as active instruments intended to re-enter and shape black society towards the
desired ends of their educators. Blacks students were being treated as means to an end.
Under the Hampton ideology, they were political mouthpieces for white hegemony. The
missionaries’ liberal model of education told a similar story. Only its aim was not
intended to benefit the white race, but rather make possible the betterment of the black
race.
The aforementioned examples demonstrate the willingness within education
ideology to construct, substantiate, and activate politicized ontologies along racial lines.
In other words, the goal of these models was to reconstruct the concept of “blackness” or
“black identity” as a moral and/or political agency (whether for the benefit of blacks or
whites). This is a characteristic that has been maintained by critical theorists such as
Ladson-Billings, Asante, and Kincheloe and Steinberg as they put forth their constitutive
content for black identity; content that is not necessarily reflective of the lives of black
students, but rather idealized content intended to alter the socio-political order. As I
continue this analysis, it should become apparent that the conceptualization of black as a
reified political identity is a constant throughout the history of black education.
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New Black Intelligentsia
W.E.B. DuBois
The events within liberal education (and its conflict with the formidable Hampton
ideology) produced two important intellectuals whose influences are still felt both in and
outside of the academy. The first of these scholars is W.E.B. Du Bois. Du Bois was a
crucial figure in the struggles that were taking place within liberal institutions, even
having an active role in such events as the student rebellion against McKenzie at Fisk.98
However, he was better known as a vocal critic of Booker T. Washington, even debating
Washington publicly over their differing philosophies of black education.
Du Bois often criticized Washington for his willingness to push the industrial
education philosophy to the extreme and for his acceptance of black subservience to
whites, which Du Bois regarded as an accommodation of the white notion of black
inferiority. Additionally, he took issue with Washington’s advocacy of particular aspects
of the Hampton philosophy that would bring harm for blacks. These included political
disenfranchisement, lessening of social standing, economic marginalization, and the
degradation of black positioning within higher education. He felt that Washington’s
agenda and influence was harming the liberal agenda that he was trying to progress for
black people. 99
Du Bois was a strong advocate of a liberal black education for students because,
as Jacqueline Fleming points out, he felt “liberal arts curriculum best fit the needs of
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black Americans.”100 This was most evident as he pushed the idea that a select group of
black students should be educated as leaders for the black race. In examining those
educated blacks that he felt had already contributed to uplifting blacks from their
circumstances, he describes the role of the leader:
“he is, as he ought to be, the group leader, the man who sets the ideals of the
community where he lives, directs his thoughts and heads its social movements. It
need hardly be argued that the Negro people need social leadership more than
most groups; that they have no traditions to fall back upon, no established
customs, no strong family ties, no well defined social classes. All of these things
must be painfully and slowly evolved.”101
Working from this idealized conception of black leadership and this view of
blacks, Du Bois felt that the appropriate aim for education is the creation and nurturing of
what he referred to as the “Talented Tenth.”102 These were the black individuals who
were to be educated and trained with liberal education in universities to become new
leaders of the black community. They were to go out in the world and help lift the black
race out of its oppressive circumstances.103
Du Bois believed that among the greatest deficiencies of the black race was a lack
of “knowledge about life,” poor moral character, and insufficient tools and skills to help
blacks facilitate their own survival. The education of black children must attend to these
concerns. He believed that Hampton’s industrial education was insufficient for “civilizing
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a race of ex-slaves.” Moreover, simply attempting to build up their characters or provide
them liberal education without inspiring them to appropriately use their knowledge was a
futile endeavor. Du Bois felt for these types of educations to find success amongst black
children, members of the Talented Tenth should serve as teachers to oversee this
education. Furthermore, Du Bois held that members of the Talented Tenth be the ones to
educate teachers about how and what to teach children. This is because these educated
elites, by virtue of their rigorous study at liberal institutions, are best equipped to address
the deeper needs of the black race.104
However, over time, Du Bois would reconceptualize and broaden what he
regarded as liberal education. Indeed, Du Bois’s most influential and long lasting
contribution to black education was his development and promotion of what is now
commonly known as Afrocentric education. He believed that American education had
provided blacks negative stereotypes of Africa. This resulted in a disconnect between
blacks in America and blacks in Africa. He, therefore, began to advocate a diasporic,
Pan-African view of the world for the purpose of uplifting the black race and believed it
was the obligation of black intellectuals to draw a connection between black America and
Africa. This Pan-Africanism eventually became central to his approach to pedagogy.105
Derrick Aldridge points out that, for Du Bois, Pan-African education “was the obvious
strategy for addressing the misinformation about Africa and for helping people of African
descent around the world unite politically to overthrow oppression.”106 We can get a
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sense of how Africa fits into Du Bois’s Pan-Africanism as he explains his own
connection to it in his famous essay “What is Africa to me?”107 He states that,
“…the physical bond is least and the badge of color relatively unimportant save as a
badge; the real essence of this kinship is its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination
and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends
through yellow Asia and into the South Seas. It is this unity that draws me to Africa.”108
This quote is revealing, as it does not suggest a racialist basis for connection to
the African continent. It also does not offer a declaration of extended cultural ownership
as a foundation of connection. Rather, it offers a conception of Pan-Africanism that is
founded on a commonality of oppression, one that extends beyond the confines of skin
color, ancestry, and ethnicity—a diaspora of the suffering. This is a point in which I will
later return.
W.E.B. Dubois was among those who expressed disapproval for the actions of
black students once the influence of Hampton had embedded itself into black colleges.
He considered these students unappreciative of the education offered to them and
regarded their partaking in debauchery and indulgences more common of white college
students. 109 He began to believe the “Talented Tenth” that he, the missionaries, and the
other black leaders put their hopes and resources behind were beginning to negate their
responsibilities as future leaders of the black race. 110
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Carter G. Woodson
It was not just Du Bois who felt this way about the state of black education. A
growing contingent of black intelligentsia shared Du Bois’s sentiment.111 Among these
intellectuals was Carter Woodson, a famous historian of black pedagogy and founder of
the Journal of Negro History. He shared his feelings on what he considered to be the
primary goals of education in his highly influential book, The Mis-education of the
Negro.112
Woodson’s position on black education diverged from black education advocates,
like Du Bois, who believed that the aim of education should be the training of future
black leaders. In fact, Woodson argued for the de-emphasizing the goal of leadership
because he believed that it undermines a spirit of cooperation and community. He felt
that leaders are typically contentious in their ambition and often attempt to usurp the
authority of other leaders. Moreover, the ambition to lead places blacks in competition
with one another.113 Woodson, therefore, argued for service rather than leadership as a
central aim of black education. He states,
“If the Negro could abandon the idea of leadership and stimulate a larger number
of the race to take up definite tasks and sacrifice their time and energy in doing
these things efficiently the race might accomplish something. The race needs
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workers not leaders. Such workers will solve the problems which race leaders talk
about and raise money to enable them to talk more and more about.”114
Woodson further claimed that under the leadership model, the economic situation
of blacks had actually worsened and so had their conception of themselves and their
capabilities as a race. Moreover, blacks were used to satisfy the agendas set by leaders
instead of being encouraged to address their own actual circumstances. Woodson
believed that service would put persons in a better position to attend to their
circumstantial needs as blacks in addition to facilitating the improvement of black
Americans as a group and preparing them to “contribute to modern culture.”115
Despite this divergence from Du Bois on leadership, Woodson shares credit with
Du Bois as being among the first and most influential proponents of Afrocentric
education. He held that current model of education portrays blacks as sub-persons who
operate without rational ability. Woodson considered Africa a missing component of
American education. African contributions to language, art and science to the world were
subject to exclusion from the educational narrative. When Africans are spoken of they are
minimized to object and savage status. He further claimed that black teachers educated
under this model tend to do nothing to change this portrayal of Africans. This means that
these teachers are using the same racist tools and praxis as white teachers consequently
making them as ineffective as racist white teachers.116
Woodson also maintained that education harms blacks by failing to include their
lives and histories into classroom content. This, he believes, undermines the notion of
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interracial cooperation because blacks are educated to feel as though they have nothing to
offer anyone and whites are educated to feel that blacks have nothing to offer them.117 To
correct this “mis-education,” Woodson believed that blacks must have the opportunity to
acknowledge their history’s ups as other races had been permitted to do. Moreover, they
should be taught that the accomplishments of the black race were equally as good as
those made by any other group. If this is achieved, he asserted, then blacks “will aspire to
equality and justice without regard to race.”118
As we can see, both Du Bois and Woodson’s Afrocentric frameworks are very
similar. Both aimed to supply what they felt was missing from the black race to better
help it succeed. However, the ultimate goal of that success was different for these
theorists. Afrocentric education under Du Bois would permit blacks to connect with the
oppression of oppressed people. This is quite similar with Kincheloe and Steinberg’s use
of Afrocentric knowledge to provide black students with inspiration to arise from their
circumstances. Woodson, however, wanted blacks to see both good and bad aspects of
African history so that they could connect with others and contribute to humanity writ
large. It is also apparent that Afrocentric thought informs the affirmative education that
Gloria Ladson-Billings desires for blacks as she uses what she regards as African and
African American culture to help foster a “relevant black personality” in African
American students.
Another aspect of Du Bois and Woodson’s philosophies is the collective
responsibility and black solidarity inherent in their work. These aspects come to light not
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only as they hold black students and teachers accountable for the progress of the black
racial group, but also as they ultimately challenge black individuals who they feel fail to
demonstrate proper allegiance to certain content. These are themes emanating from the
work of Asante, both in his view of what should constitute black culture, but also in his
criticisms of those that he feels are “denying their blackness” by showing preference to
European cultural productions. Indeed, Du Bois and Woodson were the progenitors of
Asante’s Afrocentricity. Asante even cites Du Bois as an inspiration for his approach in
his book The Afrocentric Idea and credits Woodson’s Afrocentric pedagogy put forth in
The Mis-education of the Negro as the “impetus” to his own approach in “The
Afrocentric Idea in Education.”119
The Afrocentric, political, and nationalists themes of W.E.B. Du Bois and Carter
Woodson would emerge in later years within the Civil Rights movement. Let us now
discuss a more contemporary series of historical events in the history of black education
that further reflect the influence of both of these theorists.

Black Power and Black Studies
In 1954, the Supreme Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson putting a legal end to
“separate but equal” in the case of Brown v. Board of Education. The court ruled that
segregation had an ill effect on black students because it instilled in them feelings of
inferiority.120 This landmark case would eventually lead to widespread desegregation in
public schools, which subsequently changed the college landscape forever. By the late
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1950’s, blacks slowly started to matriculate onto the newly integrated white college
campuses. A rising sentiment amongst black intellectuals and black nationalists began to
surface--one that echoed the critiques of racially hegemonic American education in the
early part of the 20th century. Proposals for a new type of studies also began to emerge.
Black Nationalist groups like the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) spawned
proposals for curricular reform that would include Black Studies in universities.
In the mid 1960’s, two of RAM’s members, Bobby Seale and Huey Newton, went
on to found a group called the Soul Students Advisory Council and the Black Panther
Party, groups that undertook efforts to get students to advocate for Black Studies. RAM
had generally used low-key tactics and demonstrated a willingness to work with
mainstream groups. The Black Panthers offered fairly direct approaches to accomplish
their goals such as attempting to spark conflict with the police “in order to attract
attention and establish their credibility as a group that would not back down from white
power.”121 The Black Panther’s and their strategic tactics would soon prove instrumental
in bringing about the highly sought after change that had eluded Black Studies
proponents.
According to sociologist Fabio Rojas, there were three conditions that made Black
Studies possible. These included: 1) “disappointment with civil rights and an
unwillingness to wait for white assistance, which was linked to calls for militancy and
black controlled education, 2) the rise of groups such as the Black Panthers, in which
individuals could learn the intricacies of movement tactics and forge strong
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identifications with nationalist values, and 3) the creation of foot soldiers, the newly
admitted black students who were willing to fight on college campuses.” 122
In 1966, these circumstances were firmly in place when the Black Panthers sent
one of their agents, Jimmy Garrett, onto the campus of San Francisco State College. His
goal was to enroll in the college and organize students by converting “the black student
club into a platform for revolutionary action” to instill in black students a sense of
nationalism.123 He carried this mission by holding off-campus meetings to talk about race
and identity, and to enlighten the students about racism present at the SFSC campus. In
conjunction with this was the expressed need to establish curriculum that addressed these
and other concerns of black students.124 These initiatives were further advanced by
students participating in the activities of the Tutorial Center and San Francisco State’s
Experimental College. The Tutorial Center was a student-run program in poorer
neighborhoods that offered both experience in academic leadership and additional
exposure to groups like the Black Panthers that emphasized black identity. The
Experimental College was a program with student-taught courses, including those of the
“Black Arts and Culture Series” that would become a platform for the eventual
development of a formal Black Studies department.125
This increased involvement of these black-led organizations as well as protests by
black students at San Francisco State and throughout California began to create tension
within the academic ranks. However, the so-called Gater incident and its aftermath
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heightened the unrest and culminated in the Third World Strike that lasted from 19681969. The Gater incident occurred following escalating disagreements between white
students working for the student newspaper, the Daily Gater, and students of the Black
Student Union (BSU). These disagreements eventually spiraled into a physical altercation
when a group of black students, including BSU and Black Panther member, George
Murray, confronted Daily Gater employees. This, and other controversial incidents,
resulted in Murray’s suspension from San Francisco State College.126
The suspension of Murray was only successful in igniting further controversy.
Students of the BSU and the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF) threatened to strike if
Murray was not reinstated into the college. Furthermore, they demanded the
establishment of Black and Ethnic Studies programs, and increased minority enrollment
at the college.127 The protracted clash that followed between these student groups and the
college administration led to numerous protests and eventually the temporary closure of
the college.128 However, the strike ultimately succeeded in causing the administration to
acquiesce to some of the demands of the BSU and TWLF. Among the concessions made
on the behalf of the administration was the establishment of the first Black Studies
department.129
The success of groups like the Black Panthers in bringing about the installation of
Black Studies inspired those at other schools around the country to follow suit. Similar
successes began to occur at schools where strong Black Nationalist sentiments eventually
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lead to the implementation of Black Studies departments.130 Today, Black Studies are a
part of the structural fabric of higher education. These events were important to the
history of black education because they mark recognition on the part of universities of the
accuracy of the substantive critiques on education made by theorists such as W.E.B. Du
Bois and Carter Woodson. They also demonstrate the broadening, ratification, and
formalization of their early Afrocentric remedies to these problems.
However, this acceptance of Afrocentrism on the part of critical theory bears
ontological importance. As I stated earlier, how to constitute a particular black identity
was always the underlying question answered within Hampton and liberal philosophies of
education. Moreover, their competing conceptions of this identity were political in nature.
Industrial education intended to create a black labor identity to maintain the socioeconomic order and liberal education advocated black identity as an agency for racial
reform and uplift. At the end of the day, the liberal conception of black identity prevailed.
The materials intended to construct this identity (African and collective black American
culture, history, and collectivism) did not necessarily reflect how black people lived and
thought, but rather reflected a Pan-African vision for what is ideal for blacks. The Black
Nationalist and Black Power movements were, in essence, an activation of a radicalized
conception of this political black identity.
The establishment of Black Studies as a permanent part of the academy meant the
formalizing and encoding of this particular political conception of identity and its
constitutive materials into the academy. This black ontology has effectively shaped the
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views of blacks within societal culture. This is apparent not only as the identification for
the black racial group that transitioned from Negro to African American—from race to an
ethno-race, but also as a broad range of cultural productions continue to get assigned to
this broad but rigidly defined racial group.

The History of Black Education and Critical Theory: A Synthesis
When disciplines are accepted into the academy, they, and their way of doing
things, get adopted as well. Once they are allowed into this space, these disciplines most
often present themselves and are accepted as the authority on their subjects. So, if we
want to know about biology, we look to academic biologists and journals. If we want to
know about how people of particular socio-economic and cultures are living, we rely on
the academic disciplines of sociology or anthropology, because they are thought to house
the experts and specialized knowledge on such matters. Thus, it makes sense that the
installation of Black Studies within institutions of higher education, like the
aforementioned disciplines, means that its cultural, historical, and epistemological
content are often the authoritative resource for information about black people for other
disciplines within the academy. Moreover, most disciplines within higher education
selectively privilege narratives, histories, and epistemologies in their content. So, it is
comprehensible why Afrocentric and nationalistic conceptions of blackness and black
education are reflected to varying degrees within some critical theory in education. After
all, as I have demonstrated, Afrocentrism and Black Nationalism were integral parts of
the development of Black Studies.
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Unfortunately, however, there are immediate consequences that follow from the
acceptance of politicized conceptions of blackness by critical theorists in education.
These are consequences that can skew and obscure how we, as theorists, approach race in
our work and how race gets deployed within the classroom space. The first is the
privileging of a particular black narrative. It is as obvious now as it was for Du Bois,
Woodson, and Black activist groups inspired by their vision, that the identities and the
content that they were proposing was not reflective of the actual lives of black people.
Rather, such content was intended to accomplish such tasks as providing affirmation and
solidarity for and amongst blacks, or it was meant to act as remedy to correct for what
some considered black moral deficiency.
Employing these visions of black education by critical theorists today devalues
competing and contradictory narratives. More importantly, it diminishes the lives of all
those assigned to the black racial group, and all of their diversity, as they actually exist.
Moreover, the inadequately problematized extension of flawed and outmoded normative
conceptions of blackness treats blacks as deficient as it renders the content of black
individuals’ own lives, their interpretation of self, ethnic or racial identity inconsequential
to discourse intended to impact their lives.
Critical theory in education often accomplishes the aforementioned inadvertent,
but rather comprehensive, devaluation of black people as it elevates universalized and
idealized standards of blackness. Within these standards, blackness manages to become
inherently political, while maintaining its ontological realness historically assigned to it.
In other words, the political content of what is to constitute blackness becomes
encompassed by the traditional reification of blackness.
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The historical development of this identity from Hampton to critical theory is the
story of the process of reification, indeed, the problem of reification in operation. The
acceptance of the Pan-African/Afrocentric conception of blackness by critical theorists is
simply an uncritical settlement on a particular conception of race. However, given that
this conception is founded upon the traditional reified notion of race, insofar as it is
supported by assumptions of phenotype and an idea of a dominant genealogical African
(black) descent, it is ultimately an affirmation of the race concept.
The final consequence of this acceptance of reified conceptions of blackness is the
ontological reconfiguring of race done on the part of critical theory in education. The
conception of blackness as it progressed throughout the history of education was a
normative vision; that is, it was not an “is” but rather a “should be.” In deferring to this
vision of blackness, some critical theorists in education have transformed the normative
into the substantive. In other words, blackness the remedy is treated as thought it is
blackness the reality. This is evident for the theorists examined in Chapter Two, as
Asante, Ladson-Billings, Kincheloe and Steinberg, and Peter McLaren as they grant
slightly varying degrees of diasporic ownership over sentimental, cultural, social, and
historical products to all black Americans. Moreover, they grant epistemic privilege to
political (or politicized) voices, and authorize those voices to act as representative of an
entire socially constructed and engineered racial group. In doing so, they are treating the
long fought war for the ontology of blacks as a decided conflict with a clear and distinct
victor. Subsequently, these theorists are applying the winner’s ontology to the lives of
students. These actions by critical theorists in education goes beyond simply reaffirming
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the traditional reified conception race; it is the reconstituting of a racial monolith as it
adds and ratifies new substantive materials and internal rules for black ontology.

Conclusion
In this Chapter I provided a brief sketch of the history of black education in
America. I attempted to show that some critical theorists of education utilized broad
source material written by black scholars to ground their approach to race. Furthermore, I
argued that these critical theorist have reified race by transforming normative conceptions
of racial identity, meant to address specific sets of circumstances at particular moments in
history, into substantive conceptions of blackness. Taken alone, I believe these to be
compelling reasons for those of us within critical theory in education to cease and desist
using these reified conceptions of race and to step back and re-evaluate how we approach
race in the theory. In the chapter that follows, I continue to expand on significant
consequences that occur for the black individual as a result of critical theorists in
education operating as agents for racial affirmation. Specifically, I argue that continuing
to proceed without reflection and regard to the problem of reification can bring about real
life consequences for students in the classroom.
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CHAPTER IV
CRITICAL THEORY IN EDUCATION AND THE PROBLEM OF
RACE

Critical theory in education is not a neutral endeavor. It is deliberately political
because it actively tries to do what other theoretical areas within education often neglect;
it attempts to recognize, expose, and mitigate the harms created by hegemonic paradigms
as they present themselves in the classroom. Thus, that some critical theorists in
education have adopted black affirmation strategies intended for the same liberatory
purposes is as understandable as it may have been inevitable. However, as I attempted to
establish in the preceding chapters, many of these theorists have not freed their
conceptions of race from the reified concept of race that is so pervasive in American
society. Given that race is not a passive concept and has real life consequences, the
failure to disengage from an essentialized race concept prior to deploying raced-based
diasporic strategies in the classroom facilitates the potential for serious consequences for
students.131
In this chapter, I argue that the instituting of political conceptions of race risks
bringing harm to black students. This, I will show, is because these strategies affirm the
race construct and rely upon it for their success. While I believe that there is the potential
for various sorts of harms that could occur as a consequence of the affirmation and
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reconstitution of race with diasporic content, I will limit the focus of this argument to
harm against the black student’s personal autonomy. Specifically, I attempt to show the
various ways in which political conceptions of race, once validated by teachers, can
undermine the autonomy of black students at both the personal and social level.132
One reason that I have chosen to focus on the autonomy of the black student is
that the existential conditions created by the harms to her autonomy (as a consequence of
the validation by teachers of political conceptions of race), are the types of preconditions
that will facilitate more destructive harms. A second reason that I believe that the
autonomy of the student is important to consider is because the United States is a liberal
democracy. Political philosopher Will Kymlicka points out that polls have shown that in
democratic societies, “[t]he commitment to individual autonomy is deep and wide” and
this sentiment spans across “ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines.”133 I also believe that
autonomy is an implicit value that underlies the views of justice put forth by critical
theorists regarding the education of black students. After all, it makes little sense to
critique white supremacist or Eurocentric education as inhibiting the success of black
students, if there is no concern about the manner in which these frameworks control those
students. This is a point to which I will return later in this chapter.
I will rely on two versions of autonomy, as I believe that they capture the
sentiments regarding the matter of personal autonomy in the United States. The first is
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philosopher Marina A. L. Oshana’s overview of autonomy. She describes the
autonomous or “self-guided” person as someone who:
“…formulates certain goals, as relevant to the direction of her life, and is able to
pursue these goals and make them effective in action. Moreover, she formulates
these goals according to values, desires, and convictions that have developed in an
uncoerced and conscious fashion. Such values can be described as the agent’s
own even while they reflect the influence of factors external to her. Additionally,
an autonomous person is able to meet her goals without depending upon the
judgments of others as to their validity and importance. Though the autonomous
individual may require the assistance of others in meeting these goals, she decides
which of them are most important.”134
The second view of autonomy that I will use is Will Kymlicka’s description of
autonomy as “rational revisability” which refers to one’s capacity to revise “one’s own
inherited conceptions of the good.”135 While I believe that this view is implicit in
Oshana’s explanation of autonomy, I think that Kymlicka’s version provides some
clarity, given that the subjects of these diasporic strategies will most often be persons
situated within the K-12 classroom. So, where such students might not be of age to
rationally engage the conceptions of the race that are presented to them, they assumedly
will reach that cognitive juncture at some point. In fact, persons revising their
conceptions of the good are typical occurrences in the United States. It is common, for
example, for people to reject their childhood religions. Sometimes, doing so is not a
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popular decision to one’s parents or religious community. However, in the broader social
context it is regarded in American society as a right, both socially and legally.
Following the discussion of harms to the black student’s autonomy, I will argue
that considering the harms facing black students, we address race as a problem in and of
itself. Let us now begin this analysis with a discussion of race as an axiomatic system.

Race as an Axiomatic System
Before we examine harms that may emerge from activating political conceptions
of race in the classroom, let us briefly return to the race concept, itself. As I have stated,
race plays such a central role in how we conceive of ourselves as individuals that even
those who acknowledge its construction have a difficult time fully freeing themselves
from its essentialist entanglements. The critical theorists in Chapter Two serve as an
empirical testament to this point as their own analyses and remedies situate the black
racial group monolithically. The problem is that race is an axiomatic entity and its nature
as such presents itself in a multilayered fashion. We tend to regard race, its internal
parameters, and its guidelines for determining racial membership as self-evident truths.
Moreover, we treat people as though their actions are and should be governed by race.
Race, as we conceive of it in the United States, is not simply a matter of being. Rather, its
racial ontologies often require performance by the individuals to whom they are ascribed.
These performances can encompass a wide range of actions such as the perception,
interpretation, and treatment of persons or objects.
I believe that the idea of race as a performative ontology is crucial to any
discussion regarding the deployment of reconstituted or reconfigured racial ontology into
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the classroom. I have shown that critical theorists in education sometimes fail to unpack
the race concept before re-implementing it for use. So, it is quite possible that the way
these conceptions get repackaged with our traditional notions of race will affect the way
they are interpreted and disseminated by teachers and, consequently, processed and
performed by students. Before we move forward in our discussion, it may prove useful to
extract a few of the relevant axiomatic principles that govern race, specifically those that
concern the assignment of racial identity. It is my hope that this will provide a stable
frame of reference that will show us the types of axioms that can merge with these
refurbished racial ontologies as they intersect with the lives of black students.
Let us first briefly look at some of the principles I refer to as Racial Identity
Axioms.136 We can start with a very basic axiom,
I. x is an R, therefore x performs r1 (or performs r1 in a particular way).
With this postulate, there is the presupposition of race, its assignment to a
particular individual, and a presumed causal connection to a particular type of action. It
captures how race creates the anticipation for action. Examples of this axiom are
statements such as “Black people are athletic,” or a valuated performance of ontology,
“Black people play basketball well.” These examples help reveal an important aspect to
racial axioms; that is, the type of performance may be highly contextual (e.g., ethnic,
geography, culture, religion) yet it is still broadly applied across a racial group. In other
words, the typical ways in which racial axioms are articulated allows the performance of
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race to be simultaneously particular and universal. The following axiom captures the
metaphysics that undergirds race as a performative ontology:
II. x is an R, therefore x’s performance of r1 is a reflection of x’s Rness.
This Racial Identity Axiom treats race as something real and something
expressible. When performed by individual members of a race, the action is regarded as
both a display of one’s connectedness to the racial group and an expression of the
collective racial group as a whole. Its transcendent metaphysics emerges, first, from the
reification of race itself. We also see this transiency appear as racial essence assigned to a
particular action, a consequence of being marked as inherently racial or as a consequence
of the performer’s race. Finally, there is the individual whose racial ontology allows her
to express its essence through a particular action. We can find an example of this type of
axiom at work with Peter McLaren’s black gangster rapper expressing a trans-historical,
collectivist essence of blackness through the rapper’s art form.137
A third Racial Identity Axiom enables us to see how racial principles can get
expressed or interpreted as though validated empirically:
III. If x is an R, x will perform r1 because r1 is a performance of R.
As with the second postulate, this axiom assumes the existence of race and a
person’s racial identity predisposes her to a particular form of action. However, while the
first axiom merely assumes this predisposition to perform a particular action, this axiom
treats it as more or less verified. This is a common way of talking about race in American
society--as if its performance are matters of probabilistic assessment. Ultimately,
however, this axiom requires the same types of metaphysical assumptions as our first
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See my discussion of McLaren’s conception of race from Chapter Two.
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axiom. Namely, it assumes that race is ontologically connected to the performance of
particular types of action. Furthermore, the action is assigned to an entire racial group.
Given the size, biological, and cultural makeup of racial groups, even if one constricted
one’s judgment to racial groups within the United States, such a designation would
require the positing of racial essence. Finally, the action, when performed, would still act
as an expression of that person’s race. So, while this axiom might appear different than
the second on the surface, ultimately they are quite similar.
Axiom III also allows us to see how race works through action, meaning that an
action that is racialized (or that is bound to a raced object) creates the anticipation of its
performance by the individual with the corresponding racial identity. Examples of the
axiom in this type of manifestation are “whites play hockey because hockey is a white
sport” or “Blacks support President Barack Obama because Barack Obama is black.”
These three Racial Identity Axioms represent expectations of the performance of
race. They express the performance of the raced individual in a categorical way. Race is
often conceptualized in terms of expectations within societal culture, especially now, as
society progresses technologically giving people access to knowledge that deconstructs
previously held notions about racial groups. While the expectation of racial performance
is obviously problematic by itself, the situation becomes precarious when the
performance of racial ontology shifts from expectation to requirement, meaning these
axioms transition from asserting what raced individuals do, to telling those with racial
identity what they should do. In other words, axioms of expectation often become axioms
of requirement:
If x is an R, x will perform r1 because r1 is a performance of R,
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becomes
If x is an R, x should perform r1 because r1 is a performance of R.
This transition occurs when axioms of expectation are subject to authoritative
validation. By authoritative validation, I mean the acceptance or affirmation of racial
identity axioms of expectation as substantive truth by those who maintain a degree of
power or control over individuals with racial identities. The authorities can include
family members, teachers, religious leaders, politicians, social and political institutions,
etc. The legitimacy of the validation is dependent on the how much the raced individual
(or other raced individuals) values or is forced to value the authority as such. In the
United States, the belief in races and their racial ontologies is so widely held that the
authoritative validation of racial identity axioms comes from large segments of societal
cultural itself. Thus, the standardization of axioms of expectation, i.e. their acceptance as
mandates, is more the norm than the exception. It is, for instance, not uncommon for
people to believe or assert that blacks should not marry whites, blacks should prefer blues
over country music, or blacks should practice Christianity not Judaism.
Race’s axiomatic schema is often quite complicated. Sometimes, its axioms of
requirement yield axioms that affirm their performative ontology. These types of Racial
Identity Axioms act as principles by which a person, assigned a particular racial identity,
is judged for the performance, manner of performance, or lack of performance of her
racial ontology. Consider, as examples, the following axioms:
A. If x, who is an R, performs r1, then x is affirming x’s Rness.
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B. If x, who is an R, does not perform r1, then x is denying one’s Rness.138
Axiom A operates as a sub-axiom. Implicit within it is the claim of the
requirement formulation of Axiom II, that a person’s performance of a required racial
action is a reflection of her race’s essence. However, this axiom goes farther as her
performance of that action is not simply a reflection of her race, but also a demonstration
of allegiance to its ontology. Axiom B differs from Axiom A because if the person fails
to carry out her ontological commitment, she is rejecting her racial ontology. Axioms of
this nature can create harmful situations for those with racial identities, because they are,
in effect, axioms of authenticity. The failure to perform the necessary action is the raced
individual not being who she really is; she is not being authentic to her true self. We see
this type of example in American society quite commonly with claims such as “Middle
class blacks are abandoning their responsibilities to their race by moving into the
suburbs” or “You’re white, you are supposed to listen to ‘white music.’”139
Now that we have examined some of the types of axioms that often emerge from
the race concept, the pervasive schema in which some critical theorists in education have
inadvertently attached their own drafts of race should appear more lucidly. Our
discussion on the history of black education showed us how its philosophical arbiters
attempted to instill in black students value systems that would influence how they
conceive of themselves, others, their place in the world, and the manner in which they
conduct their lives. The goal was that these normative value systems would become
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Let r1 represent required racial action.
Sometimes, axioms of authenticity can arise in a more intense manner when the individual is presented
with a choice of performing her required racial actions and required actions of another race. We will see
this more clearly in our discussion of social harms.
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substantive conceptions of blackness that would achieve the desired ends (black student
success, racial uplift, racial contributions to humanity). The diffusion of these values
systems was to occur through teachers.
In Chapter 2, I argued that critical theorists in education have taken diasporic
conceptions of race and adopted them as substantive forms. Additionally, many of these
theorists, such as Asante, Ladson-Billings, and Kincheloe and Steinberg call for the
employment of Afrocentric strategy and/or content to help facilitate the success and
improve the circumstances of black students. The problem is that to complete these tasks
in the manner in which these theorists do, would require the affirmation of race itself.
Specifically, it would require an upholding of the black racial group that extends
biologically and metaphysically to persons outside of the United States. In taking African
and black diasporic content (cultural practices, products, history, and experiences) and
assigning it to the entirety of the black racial group, not only do such theorists affirm
race, but they also help structure it as a pan-ethnicity.
The purpose of critical theory in education is to operationalize strategies and
distribute content within the classroom by teachers for particular outcomes.
Unfortunately, because this content is bound to an unpacked supposition of race, it will
be communicated to students as categorical within the classroom. In other words, in the
K-12 classroom (or the university classroom), the content will not be introduced as
elements of a theoretical strategy, as one conception of race amongst possible others.
Rather, broadly construed African content will be presented to blacks as though
belonging to black students. Rap music will be presented as their music. The expressed
pains of other blacks will be presented as their pain. The struggle of people or a particular
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people in Africa will be presented as though ontologically connected to their struggle, as
blacks, in the United States. Even where ontological association will be expressed
explicitly, an unmitigated reification of race sets the conditions in which such
connections are inferable.
These political revisions of race, encapsulated black racial ontology, will thus be
intertwined with its axiomatic physiology. Let us now move our focus to possible
consequences of this entanglement for black students.

Autonomy and the Black Individual
As an ontological system, race operates as if prior to the person. In essence, it
creates a person by defining for them who and what they are and who and what they
should become. I have shown how, as an axiomatic system, race produces guidelines by
which people are to perform their racial ontology—axioms that tell persons how they
ought to be in relation to their racial identity. The potential for harm to the autonomy of
the black student largely rests on how powerfully theorists attach their politicized racial
ontologies to the race concept. These critical theorists in my analysis actually nourish
race with ethno-cultural content for black students. In doing so, they are merely providing
the specific meanings of R and r1 for race’s axioms and allowing teachers, as respected
conduits of knowledge, to provide authoritative validation for these axioms.
The relationship between race, its critical revisions, and teachers are of key
importance in understanding how the autonomy of the black student is at stake. That is
because this relationship can impede the student’s ability to recognize politicized
formulations of race as what they inherently are; that is, revisions of the race construct.
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This can occur as these revisions are packaged and presented as black student’s racial
ontology—as, by racial association, what she is and what she does. Afrocentric content,
for instance, will get taught to black students as black. Thus, the content is not likely to
be interpreted by black students as content with which she may choose to identify.
Rather, the axiom-cooperative conditions encourage the black student to interpret these
materials as facts about her.
A presentation of the history of the Swazi ethnic group of southern Africa as
connected to the black student, whose African ancestors may have been Yoruba or Igbo,
coheres with what the race concept already provides for us in American society, that
blackness is grounded in biology and that Africa is the bio-geographical locus of that
blackness. Given the teacher’s ratification of this sentiment, there is significant likelihood
that knowledge about Swazi will shape how the black student envisions and evaluates
herself. Indeed, when employing diaspora-based strategy, critical theorists are relying on
the student’s identification with the black racial group to achieve the ends anticipated in
their accounts. The question is, does this influence inhibit her ability to create values,
desires, and ends for herself or does the presentation of content as ontologically relevant
create values for her? Moreover, does the presentation make it difficult for her to see that
teacher as an authority and as someone trying to influence her ontology?
We must remember that the race construct to which theorists attach their
revisions, is a value system. As such, race itself is a conception of the good. It designates
value to groups that shapes how we view ourselves and how we view one another (as
blacks, as whites), and it guides action amongst and within those groups. However,
although similar in some ways, race is not a conception of the good like a religious or
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philosophical ideology. We treat those types of ideologies as ones to which you
volitionally bind or unbind yourself. They are still treated as matters of choice, even if we
are indoctrinated with them from birth. We permit people to switch and reject religions.
Race is a different type of conception of the good, because its categories are
biological and metaphysical ontologies--ontologies to which you are bound. We do not
consider it as a matter of choice. Rather, we regard it as something intrinsic. Moreover,
race’s axiomatic directives are constitutive of race; they are not independent axioms in
competition with alternative conceptions of the good.140 Thus, race is an ontological
ideology; the revisions of this ideology are merely denominations of it. We typically do
not rationally revise that which we do not consider revisable. It is certainly possible that
we may revise how we perform race or even choose not to perform it. However, the
pervasive assumption of a bio-metaphysical union between race and its performance,
hinder even the modification or rejection of performance. It clouds our ability to see race
or performance as revisable or at best places limitations to degrees in which they are
revisable. The treatment of political conceptions of race as categorical reality by teachers
would only serve to enhance the illusory notion of non-revisability for the black student.
The difficulty of revisability is likely further complicated when the student reenters her social environment. Here, she might actually witness the performance of race
at a level where the requirement axioms of race are more contextually stringent. So, for
example, teachers may present rap music as an authentically black performance, thus
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The exception here being when racial ontologies are in conflict with one another. An example would be
when a black individual is faced with a choice between a white racial action and black racial action. Each
of these ontologies represents a particular conception of the good under the banner of a larger conception of
the good, race.
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validating for the black student that rap music belongs to her—is part of who she is. If the
student looks to her surroundings through this racial and pan-ethnic lens, she may find
some empirical legitimacy for this validation. As a result, the choice of appreciating,
declaring allegiance to, or taking part in rap music as an artistic form might require that
she evaluate herself through race’s axioms of authenticity. A failure to act in accordance
with her ontological demands could mean that she judges herself as inauthentic. She can
internalize the guilt associated with this betrayal or she may choose to perform the
required racial actions placed upon her as a black person. Thus, her desire to perform her
assigned racial ontology was not of her own construction. Rather, it was generated by the
axioms of her externally validated racial ontology.
A similar harm arises as a consequence of critical theorists in education failing to
acknowledge the ethno-cultural and genetic diversity of the black racial group. In doing
so, such theorists maintain the tunnel vision inherent in the traditional taxonomy of race.
This sets the conditions for the reduction of competing value systems by restricting the
black student’s own life, values and experience.
Let us imagine a student whose ancestors consisted of individuals that fall under
the black, white, and Native American racial group. 141 They included African slaves,
Black freedmen, Cherokee and Chickasaw Indians, English Americans, and Irish
Americans. The diversity of this ancestry is something that was openly acknowledged
amongst his family members. Most of his family’s cultural practices were random, rarely

141

It may be of importance to recognize the inconsistency in our racial categorizations. Native Americans
are treated as a race. It is quite common to hear persons refer to themselves as “white and Native
American” or as having “Native American blood.” I will not explore inconsistency within this dissertation,
but I do believe that it is something that is worthy of exploration.
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uniformly shared, and typically were never made reference to in terms of race or
ethnicity. For instance, their individual religious and spiritual beliefs range from various
forms of Christianity (mainstream and unorthodox) to “Hoodoo” to atheism. They listen
to broad ranges of music from country to hip-hop to heavy metal. American society
designates his family black, because of their appearance or their known African ancestry.
Thus, most family members have accepted black as their racial identity, including family
members who are able to physically “pass” as white. While some individuals in his
family affirm many performative racial axioms, a significant number neither endorse nor
organize their lives around them. Thus, there is a fairly wide variation in the ways in
which family members have constructed their lives.
A teaching strategy that attempts to connect the black students to the sentiments,
cultures, cultural products, and experiences of others based on the presumption of a
shared racial ontology, could present a serious challenge to this student’s autonomy.
While it is clear that race has some effect on how this student sees himself, given his
background, he would likely enter the classroom with a relatively loose conception of
race. However, the teacher is validating the notion, common to strategies for black
affirmation, that one’s blackness is (should be) the central aspect to persons assigned to
the black racial group. This could diminish this student’s own value system—one that
acknowledges the ethnic and cultural plurality that makes up not just himself as an
individual, but also his family and the black racial group writ large. Moreover, inherent in
the teacher’s validation is that the type of performance that should matter for blacks are
performances of that ontology.
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Diasporic revisions of race can convey to the student that the content of his actual
life is too broad to fit the axiomatic parameters of black identity. So, the student has a
seemingly credible mandate to regard aspects of his own experience, knowledge, and
history as inconsequential to his true black self. Thus these revisions can decide for the
student the relevant identities, values, and performances and in doing so eliminate choice
where choice could have been present for him. In this way, political conceptions of race
can accomplish what the racial ontology that undergirds them already attempts do; that is,
they invalidate or supersede competing conceptions of the good.
The final potential harm to the student at the personal level that I would like to
discuss involves the activation of the black student as an ideological activist. This harm
relates back to attempts to instill in blacks particular types of agency advocated by such
figures as W.E.B Du Bois, Carter Woodson, Henry Armstrong, and Booker T.
Washington. While the desired ends in those cases ranged from laudable to deplorable,
there is little question that the achievement of these ends required placing the personal
desires, values, and conceptions of the good aside. Indeed, the purpose behind their
education strategies was to mold these facets of the student’s character and in some cases
mold them in such a way that these students would set their own desired ends aside.
Thus, personal autonomy itself was treated as trivial in relation to the ends of the big
picture.
It seems that some critical theorists in education are also setting aside the
autonomy of the black student in a similar manner to the aforementioned philosophers of
black education. The fact that many black students are hindered and demoralized as a
consequence of their positioning within America’s racial paradigm is no doubt as
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probable now as it was in the days of Du Bois and Woodson. The remedies that critical
theorists in education advocate today do not diverge very far from those of Du Bois and
Woodson. There is little difference between constructing a type of black student for the
purpose of black service and black leadership and attempting to create a “relevant black
personality,” or to reinstate Africa to into the psyche of the African American student,
even if the desired end is the success of the black student. All of these visions require the
actuation of political conceptions of blackness within the black student.
Once again, the problem surfaces with the teacher’s presentation of this
knowledge as truth. The black student is denied the opportunity to assess these
conceptions as political because of the assumption or reconstitution of a racial ontological
connection to the actors, creators, and practitioners of the content of her affirmation. As
she embodies the axioms of these particular conceptions of the good, she becomes an
unwitting poster-child for a political conception of the ideal black individual. So, like the
black students of our historical analysis, black students of today may have their own
autonomies set aside to achieve an end that they have not desired, planned, or
constructed.
In this section, I put forward some of the personal harms facing the black student
once indoctrinated with the diasporic revisions of race advanced by some critical theorists
in education. Unfortunately, the validation of these revisions by teachers can produce
significant impediments for the student that go beyond his psychological life. Let us now
explore some the possible harms to the autonomy of the black student at the social level.

110

Autonomy and the Black Social Self
Race is a deceptively social ontological system. We unknowingly create it.
Moreover, we act through it, often unconsciously. We determine its values: its content, its
axioms, and its internal borders. In return, it acts through us. One of the ways that it does
this is by assigning us our racial ontologies. In our discussion of the axiomatic structure
of race, I explained how principles that emerge from the race construct create
expectations and requirements for racial performance. The relationship between race and
performance is a relationship between the individual and his assigned racial ontology.
The individual’s performance of that ontology is a demonstration of his allegiance to it.
What does it mean to demonstrate an allegiance to a racial ontology? At the
individual level, it means affirming, through performance, his assigned racial identity. It
also requires that he evaluate his own performances from an external perspective as
though he were a fellow member of his race. In this sense, race creates for the individual
an internalizable racial community to which he is accountable—a moral community. So,
even at the individual level, through a kind of mimicry, race is social. Through its identity
axioms, race tells us to whom we are accountable in the social world. It tells us that the
moral community for whites is the membership that makes up the white racial group; for
the black individual, it is the black racial group. Race tells us that the white moral agent
is rational, individualistic, and has a wide range of performative actions that are not
functions of his race. It also tells us the black moral agent acts from blackness and
therefore has limited rationality, is communitarian, and that his performative actions are
consequences of race and indicative of his race.
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Examples of what I am asserting here, that race assigns moral community, are
easily found in American societal culture. It surfaces in our social interactions through
our various forms of segregation. It emerges from our pop culture where whites are
presented as diverse individuals and blacks are presented as bound to type. It plays out in
political media, where whites have no spokespersons as they are shown to embody
various ideologies and platforms, but where blacks are typically only present when
considered representing the views of blacks.
Unfortunately, the diasporic conceptions of race offered by critical theorists in
education are a further example of how race constructs races as moral communities. The
reason is found not only in the sense that their strategies advocate the ontological
connection between blacks, but also in the supposition that underlies them—that black
students should be affirmed, because of their race, by content deemed black. By itself, the
concept of race already impedes the autonomy of blacks by assigning moral community
to them, thus denying them the authority to decide for themselves who, if anyone, they
value as persons. However, the teacher who impresses upon black students the view that
the characters of a Ghanaian folktale, for example, should mean something to her because
Africa is the continent of her relevant (black) ancestors, is reinforcing this racial view of
moral community. This form of indoctrination on the part of the teacher validates for the
student that black people should matter most because she shares their racial ontology.
The circumventing of the autonomy of the black student has some serious
implications. One consequence is that it may determine the nature of her interactions with
others in her social life. For instance, it may mean that the black student does not see
non-blacks as being relevant to her life. This can go beyond simple social interactions
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and extend into how she eventually comes to regard her moral commitments in our
participatory democracy. The validation of the notion of a black moral community might
mean that the only social and political performances that matter are those carried out on
behalf of or in respect to this community. This is not without precedent. Black persons in
the United States have consistently been victims of moral exclusion on the basis of their
race socially, institutionally, and politically throughout the history of this country.
Indeed, this is the reason why critical theorists in education attempt to address the
circumstances of blacks, because in a white-centered country, the lives of black people
are and continue to remain of secondary importance.
The final two harms to the autonomy of the black student relate to this validation
of race as a moral community and the actuating of students as ontological activists. As I
have stated, the internalization of race means that a person judges herself by how she
imagines that other members of her race would judge her. This is, in essence, the
acceptance of her race, as her moral community. However, a moral community does not
always simply constitute the people whom you value, the people whom you assume share
your values, or the people to whom you hold yourself accountable. It can also mean those
who hold you accountable for your moral actions. While it may vary depending on the
type of agency your morality assigns, you typically expect other moral agents to carry out
the mandates of your shared morality. For race, the mandates of morality are racial
identity axioms like the ones that I provided in this chapter. As mentioned earlier, race
creates black agency as tightly bound to its racial ontology. Thus, the race construct sets
the conditions for the black individual to be activated as, not only the demonstrative
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activists, but also as enforcers of the racial identity axioms of her black moral
community.
I also stated that the political revisions of race supported by critical theory just fill
in the “who” and “what performance” for those axioms. Authoritative validation by a
teacher provides the black student with a seemingly objective mandate to enforce and
judge the performances of others sharing the black ontology. So, the autonomy of the
black student can be hindered in the sense that she is indoctrinated with a value system
that puts her into action as a social enforcer of a critical theory’s diasporic draft of
blackness. In other words, in creating and assigning moral community, it permits her to
act upon others.
On the flipside of this, the teacher’s validation of these political revisions in these
conditions can create other activists that act upon the black student. For this reason, once
again, it affirms that the black racial group is a moral community. Then, by assigning the
student and all other blacks to this community, it makes her accountable to it, even if she
does not assent. This is because it provides a mandate for other blacks students to enforce
the axioms of these political revisions of race on her because she is black. It permits these
students to say things to her akin to Asante’s criticism of black scholars that I presented
in Chapter Two; that is, her preference of things not designated black is a denial of her
blackness. It gives other black students the authority to say that what should matter is her
blackness, not her actual racial, ethnic, and cultural life content. It allows them to act as
social constraints against her autonomy. They can inhibit her capacity (psychologically,
socially, culturally) to pursue her own constructed conception of the good life because
critical theory has bound her to both traditional racial ontology and revisionist ontology.
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Finally, the teacher’s presentation of diasporic conceptions of race may mean
their validation for all of those present, black or otherwise. This facilitates the activation
of non-black students as activists that can police ontological performances of the black
student. This is, in part, because diasporic strategies verify for students the determinate
racial boundaries. The teachers validation also legitimizes the notion that there is
collectively shared content, agency, axioms, and thus ontology amongst black persons. In
other words, it affirms for non-blacks that blacks are a moral community. However, in
doing so, it also validates the legitimacy of their own assigned racial groups as moral
communities.
Depending on the particular agency assigned to the non-black group, the teacher’s
affirmation of racial moral communities provides the non-black student reason to enforce
her own racial identity axioms and axioms of the black racial group. For instance, the
white moral agent, as a member of the most-powerful racial group in the United States,
has relatively broad societal authority over groups. White students are thus permitted to
protect performative boundaries of their racial group by asserting to the black student,
through various performative means, “this is ours” and “this is what we do.” Moreover,
white students will also have the authoritative validation to declare to the black student
through voice or action “that is yours” or “that is what you are supposed to do,” thereby
acting as social constraints similar to the previously mentioned intra-racial constraints.
Thus, the political conceptions of race offered by some critical theorists risk harming the
autonomy of the black student rather comprehensively at the social level.

115

Engaging the Problem of Race in Critical Theory in Education
One of the primary critiques made by critical theorists in education concerns the
elevation of Eurocentric or “white” content in the classroom and the ignoring of the lives,
histories and achievements of black persons in the United States and Africa. The
consequence of the invisibility of black people in education is that students are
indoctrinated with the same sentiments that asserted about black people throughout the
history of the United States--that white people are relevant, intelligent, and important and
black people are none of these things. Thus, the black student often adopts this as
something intrinsic about her, which impedes her desire and success.
The aforementioned critique made by critical theory is consistent with the
arguments that I have put forth regarding the autonomy of the black student and the
political conceptions of race inherent to diasporic teaching strategies. The white
hegemonic establishment is impeding the black student’s chances for success with its
selective, self-affirming content. With the traditional axioms of race in the backdrop, the
validation of this content by teachers leads to the subsequent internalization of the
implicit claims within the content itself. The student’s education encumbers her capacity
to guide her own life because it creates for her a particular conception of race—one that
devalues her. Thus, American education undermines the autonomy of the black student
because what it is to her (a social impediment) and what it does to her (creates an
ideological impediment).
While, I agree with the above critique by critical theorists in education, I also
believe that it should apply to their theories as well. My analysis has shown that the racial
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circumstances that rest in the background are the same, only that the notions of blackness
that are offered by critical theorists in education are such that once employed within the
classroom they will evoke in the black student that she is indeed valuable as a black
person. While the ends of white hegemony and critical theory in education (in regard to
race) are different, the means are the same (indoctrination), and the consequences to the
child’s autonomy are the same.
The history and advancement of the problem of reification and the harms for the
black student necessitate that we re-evaluate our path as we move forward in our attempts
to make the classroom a just environment. My analysis in this and the two preceding
chapters has demonstrated that race has not simply been a part of the problem. Rather it is
and has been the problem all along. It is causally antecedent to the problem of racial
reification in critical theory of education and if its conceptual core is maintained, it will
be the causal antecedent for harms to the black student.
So, moving forward for critical theorists in education requires that we attempt to
understand the race concept, so that we can grasp what it is, how it operates, and why it
operates the way it does. We need to understand why and how it entangles us, as
theorists. Then we will better comprehend why it is that even those of us who
acknowledge its social construction still act from it as though it were biologically and
metaphysically real when we attach our revisions to it and we rely on its axioms for our
strategies to work. Most importantly, we need to gain a deeper understanding of how race
defines life outside of the classroom, and then we can grasp more fully how it can, will,
and does affect students within the classroom. This means that we must attempt to know
race as comprehensively as we can. Once we gain this understanding we can create
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strategies that address related issues for the student and environment around us more
holistically and effectively.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored how political conceptions of race offered by some
critical theorists in education, once deployed by teachers in the classroom, can present
serious harms to students personally and socially. I have argued that this is a consequence
of these conceptions being supported by the axiomatic, ontological value system that is
the race construct. I have asserted that it is our responsibility as theorists that we attempt
to confront and understand race as a problem in and of itself. In the chapter that follows, I
argue that a theoretical and strategic alliance with race theory emerging out of the
discipline of philosophy can prove resourceful in our attempts to unpack the concept of
race.
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CHAPTER V
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RACE

The notion that the race concept is neglected within critical theory in education
(or education theory writ large), while not widely held, is certainly not new. Some of the
critical theorists that I have examined in this work acknowledge that it is a concept in
need of exploration given its importance both in and outside of the classroom. For
example, in “Toward A Critical Race Theory of Education,” an article examining the
intersection between race and property, Gloria Ladson-Billings, along with co-author
William F. Tate IV, emphasize that race, as a social construct, has not garnered
theoretical attention from critical theorists in education, especially when compared to
other factors such as gender.142
It is relatively rare in critical theory in education circles that there is an attempt to
engage race on a meta-level. Exceptions are Cameron McCarthy and Warren Crichlow
who argue that the concept of race is under-theorized in critical theory in education. Their
anthology, Race Identity and Representation in Education, is intended to fill this
theoretical gap, by offering various analyses on race from a variety of analytical theorists.
In its introductory article, “Introduction: Theories of Identity, Theories of Representation,
Theories of Race,” McCarthy and Crichlow reject discourse within education
(specifically, Afrocentric theory) that treats racial groups as monolithic, as though
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conceptual work on race carried about by Michael Omi and Howard Winant.
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members of these groups collectively share biological and cultural characteristics.143
Moreover, McCarthy and Crichlow highlight the tendency of radical pedagogists to
approach issues of race in such a way that “conceptions of racial inequality can be
described as essentialist and reductionist” because they “effectively eliminate the ‘noise’
of multidimensionality, historical variability, and subjectivity from their explanations of
racial differences in education.”144 They also point out that race theory in education
tends to treat social groups like “Asians,” “Latinos” and “Blacks” as if each group
contained essences that “set them apart from each other and from whites.”145 McCarthy
pursues similar analyses independently in his other works, such as with his article, “The
Problem of Origins: Race and the Contrapuntal Nature of the Educational Experience,”
where he challenges essentialist theorists such as Molefi Asante and further confronts the
notion that racial groups fit tidily into cultural categories. 146
Unfortunately, the overarching essentialist and diasporic narratives of race are so
pervasive within American education, that ethno-racial affirmative theory usually
overshadows critiques offered by theorists like McCarthy. Challenging our notions about
race, even in contemporary times, is radical work. It is radical because we do not view
race in the same way as we view class and gender—as concepts that are as mutable as
they are psychologically and socially ubiquitous and sometimes subtly insidious. We
have difficulty recognizing that race is not just a means to hegemony, but that it is a
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hegemonic paradigm in itself. This failure to recognize race as problematic is in part a
consequence of the obvious and seemingly benign, constitutive meaning that we derive
from it on a personal, social, and even political level. It is also a consequence of race’s
gradual encapsulation by the ethnic paradigm in both societal culture and the academy.
At the end of the day, however, race has exhibited itself historically and culturally
through power arrangements within and across its groupings. As I stated in Chapter Four,
as liberatory theorists, it is our responsibility to understand how the concept of race
contributes to these relations and to do this, we must approach the concept of race in a
theoretically holistic manner.
There are lots of disciplines in the arts and sciences that engage the race concept
in ways that can benefit our theoretical approaches. However, in this chapter, I draw
attention to the discipline of philosophy where we find the philosophy of race, or what is
often termed “the metaphysics of race” taking place. I believe that philosophy of race
offers useful tools and analyses that can help us understand what it means for race to be a
social construct, as it is often referred to, but not always treated as, within critical theory
in education. The metaphysics of race will help us make sense out of race by allowing us
to see how race is essentialist, why and how it is ontologically powerful, and how we can
deconstruct it in a way that allows us to avoid its internal metaphysical and axiomatic
entrapments.
In this chapter, I examine four prominent philosophers of race, Charles Mills,
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack, and Jorge J. E Gracia. I will place them on a
conceptual, methodological, and strategic map that shows how they engage the problem
of race. I examine how these theorists approach (or suggest that we approach) issues
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related to race such as racial and ethnic identity, racism, and white supremacy. I also
show several ways in which these theorists implicitly and explicitly converge, diverge,
and build upon one another’s works methodologically and theoretically. Following this
analysis, I will pull out some of the important aspects of their work that I believe will
benefit critical theory in education as it moves forward in its own analyses.

Theoretical Positions within the Philosophy of Race
Before beginning this examination, let us briefly look at some of the various
underlying theoretical views found within the philosophy of race. This will assist in
understand how the theorists in our examination are situated within in the discourse, thus
making it easier to make sense of their respective approaches to the concept of race.
Charles Mills suggests that there are three primary theoretical positions that emerge from
philosophy of race. These are, “realism, otherwise known as naturalism (race is a natural
biological kind, and is real), eliminativist constructivism, (race is socially constructed, is
unreal, and should be eliminated as a theoretical term), and anti-eliminativist
constructivism (race is socially constructed, is real, and should not be eliminated as a
theoretical term).”147
While there are philosophers of race who attempt to restructure or reconceptualize the traditional biological conceptions of race, these positions are
increasingly rare and do not reflect of the majority of race theory taking place in
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contemporary philosophy.148 Most philosophers of race are in keeping with the majority
of the scientific world; they reject the biological realness of human races (at least as we
generally conceive of them).149 In other words, they contend that race is a social
construction. Of course, taken alone, this position is not necessarily at odds with the
theory coming out of many non-philosophical disciplines where race is considered a
relevant variable in social life. Many of these disciplines, including critical theory in
education, tend to focus specifically on issues concerning racism, discrimination, and the
epistemic gaps that have occurred as a consequence of white supremacy. The philosophy
of race, on the other hand, centralizes the deep epistemological, normative, and
descriptive content of race, and its circumstantial consequence. It maintains a strong
commitment to understanding the way(s) in which race is framed conceptually and
ideologically within societal culture. In other words, if race is a social construct, then
philosophers of race attempt to understand what kind of construct it is (“what is race?),
how its ontology impacts life (personally, ideologically, socially, and politically), and the
possible avenues available to mitigate or eliminate the negative consequences of race.
Jorge J.E. Gracia posits that there are two primary challenges to the race concept
within the philosophy of race and ethnicity in his article “Race or Ethnicity: an
Introduction.” First, there is what he terms the “Factual Challenge.” Central to this
challenge is the breadth of scientific evidence that shows races are not definable or
distinguishable on the basis of an individual’s genetic make-up. A second challenge to
148
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race is the “Epistemic Challenge.” This challenge often highlights the contextually
contingent (localized) and inconsistent properties (i.e. skin color) that are often applied to
relegate an individual to a racial group. Due to these problems, there are no concrete and
discernable properties that are applicable to races.150 Gracia also presents several
positions found in the philosophy of race that attempt to respond to these challenges.
Among these are the 1) substituting of race for ethnicity, 2) replacing race with racial
identity, 3) reframing of race and ethnicity as hybrid concepts, and 4) re-conceptualizing
race in such a way that it avoids the pitfalls of the problem of conception of race in
societal culture.151
The philosophers that I examine in this chapter draw from philosophy’s broad
methodological arsenal and knowledge from other disciplines (e.g., genetics) in order to
conduct the analysis to make or engage challenges and responses like the ones above. So,
with Mill’s and Gracia’s descriptions of philosophy of race in mind, I will explore the
metaphysics of race conducted by Charles Mills, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack,
and Jorge Gracia. Let us now look at how three of these theorists engage the problem of
race.152
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The Problem of Race
Charles S. Mills
Charles Mills puts forth his treatment of race in the book Blackness Visible, He
seeks to produce a philosophical schematic of the ontological and operative structure of
race--a metaphysics of race. Before accomplishing this task he offers a descriptive
comparison to illuminate the basic structure of the American system of race.153 In the
chapter entitled, “But What Are You Really?,” Mills asks us to imagine a system, called
“quace,” in which each member of society is designated to be a member of one of three
“quaces”: Q1, Q2, or Q3. The assignment of one’s quace is purely random, no different
from being given a name chosen from a hat. Quacial categories themselves are
superficial. They are not connected to phenotype, economic status, family, or any other
socially relevant variable. Furthermore, quacial membership is disconnected from one’s
future socio-cultural positioning. Thus, it provides no basis for valuation, oppression,
discrimination, privilege, or wealth, nor is it governed by axioms that determine one’s
inter-quacial and intra-quacial interactions.
Given the nature of this system, it should not be surprising that if one were to
inquire of another’s quacial designation that the answer would have no ontological
import. There would be no need for a more incisive inquiry in hopes of revealing any
deeper meaning—no reason to ask “But what are you really?” out of suspicion that one
may be withholding the real truth about one’s quace. Being a member of a particular
quace simply means that one just so happens to have received a particular arbitrary
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quacial designation.154 Mills describes the basic structure of quace as a horizontal system
due to inconsequential positioning of its categories and “because it has no present or
historical link with political power, economic wealth, cultural influence.” It is a system
that is “completely disconnected from patterns of discrimination.”155
It should be evident by now, that Mills’s description of the hypothetical system of
quace differs substantially from our actual system of race. It is true that race is not like
quace as it is “morphologically/genealogically grounded.”156 This distinction is, for the
most part, cosmetic. By itself, phenotype or genotype would not necessitate a claim that
race is not a horizontal system. What makes race substantively distinct from quace is that
racial groups of this system are stratified circumstantially and ontologically. Races are
situated in such a way that one group, whites, are regarded as superior to all other racial
groups. Whites are the privileged group socially, historically, economically, and
politically, while other races are relegated to comprehensively subaltern statuses.157 As a
result, it is a vertical white supremacist system, rather than a horizontal racial system.
Charles Mills’s description provides a basic blueprint that shows the structure of
race--one of a “white supremacist polity.” This description neither tells us what
constitutes that system, nor how that system constitutes us. However, according to Mills,
a person’s “racial category has been taken as saying a great deal about what and who one
is, more fundamentally.”158 The next step, then, is to attempt to understand the deeper
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metaphysics of this system so that we can ascertain “to what extent and in what ways…is
race real, and how deep is this reality.”159
Mills proposes that a metaphysics of race can assist us in uncovering the realness
of race. Borrowing from philosophy of science and meta-ethics, he offers a taxonomy of
available positions on what metaphysics of race may look like. Mills suggest that there
are two primary types of racial theories, objectivist and anti-objectivist. A racial
objectivist theory would affirm the proposition that the existence of race is not contingent
on whether we believe or affirm it to be true.160 There are two types of objectivist
theories, realist and constructivist. Realism assigns a valuation of a thing or action. This
valuation would be true regardless of what we think or how we feel about that thing. On
the metaphysics of race, a realist would claim that races are objectively real.
According to Mills, a stronger version of racial realism would stress the belief that
“differences between races are not confined to morphological characteristics of skin and
hair types and facial features, but extend to significant intellectual, characterological, and
spiritual characteristics also, that there are racial essences.” 161 Mills acknowledges that
the racial realist view is the most pervasive view in our society. Most people believe in
the existences of races as natural human divisions as well as such peculiarities, as Mills
notes, as racial blood and the one-drop rule.162 This point is evidenced by the fact that
black ancestry is still the determining factor of black racial membership and that absence
of black ancestry is required for white racial membership.
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Racial constructivism, like racial realism, asserts that race is real. However, there
are stark differences between these two positions. Where racial realism supports the
notion that race is biologically grounded, racial constructivism asserts that it is a
constructed taxonomy. Mills states, “racial constructivism involves an actual agreement
of some under conditions where the constraints are not epistemic (getting at the truth) but
political (establishing and maintaining privilege); the idealization is pragmatic,
instrumental to the best way of achieving this end.”163
When Mills speaks of the “idealization” within social constructivism, he is
referring to the type of agreement that holds the racial system together. He asserts that
this agreement is dependent on idealized intersubjectivity.164 To better understand what
this means, let us apply the constructivist perspective to Mills’s system of quace. Let us
imagine that we, as societal members under the system of quace, were given those
particular designations of Q1, Q2, and Q3. By our participation in the system, we are in
effect agreeing to its operation even if in actuality we do not believe in the legitimacy of
its markers. Our participation is our consent and that operative consent gives the system
legitimacy. By our treatment of Mills’s hypothetical system as real it takes on a kind of
realness. The racial constructivist position would therefore be that race has been
constructed this way—only the vertical nature of its racial positioning was intentional and
idealized social consensus provides its continued maintenance.
There are three anti-objectivist positions on the metaphysics of race:
subjectivism, relativism, and error theory. Racial subjectivism proposes that one’s race is
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whatever a particular individual wants it to be.165 The racial subjectivist views race as
something similar to quace in that it has no objectively true ontology. Mills argues,
however, that the subjectivist position is in error because race is contingent on any one
person’s belief about races. For example, a person may believe that races are false, but
that would not negate the fact that people within the racial polity believe that races are
natural kinds.
The position of racial relativism is similar to subjectivism. The difference is that
for the racial subjectivists, race is dependent on the beliefs of the individual, but for the
racial relativists, the status of race is contingent on the “decisions of a sub-community of
like-minded people within a larger population.”166 Mills acknowledges that
constructivism has some element of relativism insofar as the realness of race is dependent
upon the vertical system. However, the ontology of this system does not permit the status
of race to be dependent upon “sub-communities.” R2’s or R3’s, for instance, can hold
the belief that races do not exist or that all races are equal. Unfortunately, however,
holding this position does not negate that fact that within that system races are thought to
exist and to be inherently unequal. So, the racial relativist is in error because it does not
reflect the nature of the race system. 167
Finally, error theory of race would reject the propositions of both the realist and
the constructivist in asserting that race is biologically and socially unreal.168 Once again,
the verticality of the system of race and the social, historical, ontological significance of
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racial assignment is testament to the social realness of race. 169 Race, in other words,
means something within societal culture.
The realist position is the primary opponent in Mills’s analysis because as stated
earlier, it is the most pervasive view on the metaphysics of race—the view held by most
societal members. However, Mills argues that race is socially, contextually, and
historically contingent. This is demonstrable by the lack of universality of racial
designations. For example, the race system in the United States is different than race in
Puerto Rico or Brazil. Furthermore, the scientific community does not support the racial
taxonomy nor do they support peculiarities like the one-drop rule.170 In this sense, race is
unreal because racial realism is false. However, race is quite real inasmuch as race is
given operational consent by the social members whom it governs. Mills, therefore,
endorses the racial constructivist view because it accounts for both the biological falsity
of race and social realness of race—a view that acknowledges the intersubjectiveobjectivity of race while placing itself in opposition to racial realism.171
Kwame Anthony Appiah
Kwame Anthony Appiah is an analytical philosopher who, like Charles Mills,
challenges the position of the racial realist while attempting to provide an answer to the
question “what is race?” The difference between these theorists, however, is that Mills is
interested in understand the “social ontology” of race as a white supremacist system,
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while Appiah is concerned with understanding the development and legitimacy of race as
a concept.
In his essay,” Race, Culture, and Identity: Misunderstood Connections,” Appiah
posits that “America’s social distinctions cannot be understood in terms of the concept of
race: the only human race in the United States is the human race.” 172 To prove this
claim, Appiah makes use of two methodologies borrowed from the philosophy of
language and the philosophy of science that allow him to play the role of critical race
investigator. The first method is called the ideational view of meaning. It involves
collecting people’s ideas or “criterial beliefs” about the meaning of a word and finding
what, if anything, corresponds to those beliefs. For Appiah’s purposes, the ideational
method will allow him to answer a conceptual version of the question “What is race?”;
that is, “What is it that we mean when we speak of race or races?”173 One potential
problem using an ideational method in contemporary society is the variable and
sometimes conflicting nature of beliefs about race. Over time, race has come to mean
many different things to many different people. To account for this, Appiah uses what he
calls a vague criterial theory in conjunction with his ideational method. Under this view,
once Appiah has collected criterial beliefs, race will be “something that satisfies a good
number of those beliefs.”174 In other words, the goal is to find what is common to all of
the criterial beliefs.
It is important for Appiah, however, to obtain the strongest criterial beliefs about
race. Since our current ideas about race are the weaker remnants of the ideas held by
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those before us, this necessitates that his ideational analysis look to the past where beliefs
about races were the strongest. Thus, an ideational analysis for race must also be a
historical analysis. He argues that collecting criterial beliefs of those who are responsible
for our current ideas about race, specifically those who existed at a time in which there
was “more full-blooded discourse,” will provide greater clarity.175 He states that, “We
can explore the ideational structures of which our present talk, so to speak, is the shadow,
and then see contemporary uses of the term as drawing from various different structures,
sometimes in ways that are not coherent.”176
Once Appiah is able to collect the ideational criteria for race, he will then employ
the second method, the referential view of meaning. This position asserts that if we want
to discover the meaning of a word, then we need to find the thing to which that word
refers.177 Appiah uses a version of this view utilized by the philosophy of science called
the “causal theory of reference.” According to this theory, we must “find that thing in the
world that gives the best causal explanation” of a word.178 So, Appiah’s referential
method asks that he use the criterial beliefs about race gathered from his ideational view
to find the referent that caused our beliefs about races.179
Appiah explains that our common criterial beliefs about race are generally
assumed by most to be grounded in science. Questions about race have been deferred to
the experts—scientists. So, for the purposes of his analysis, Appiah uses persons who
would have been considered the experts of their respective times. One of the persons,
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Thomas Jefferson, was an instrumental participant in the racial discourse that took place
in the United States in the early 1800s.180
For Jefferson, characteristics such as hair, intelligence, creativity, courage,
disposition, beauty, smell, skin color, were naturally distributed among racial groups.
This means that whites, for example, had more physical beauty, a greater propensity to
produce great art, literature, and were intelligent, while the natural makeup of blacks
caused them to smell unpleasantly and lack intellectual ability. 181 So, for Jefferson, race
is “a concept that is invoked to explain cultural and social phenomena, it is also grounded
in the physical and psychological natures of the different races; it is, in other words, what
we would call a biological concept.”182
Appiah draws a similar conclusion when investigating criterial beliefs of famous
late 19th century British literary critic, Matthew Arnold. Unlike Jefferson’s criterial
beliefs, Arnold’s beliefs about race were not based on a black/white racial binary. Rather,
his races included groups such as the Saxons, Normans, and Celts. He believed that each
race carries with it an essence that contains certain positive and negative characteristics.
For example, he attributes tendencies such as spirituality or “love of beauty” to the Celts
and tendencies like vigorousness and insolence to the Normans. These essences were
heritable and therefore could be combined with other essences through the biological
intermingling of races. Such essences could even present themselves in the creative
products of their biological owners. Indeed, according to Arnold, the existence of
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different moral characteristics in the British literature was a consequence of the mixing of
racial essences of the Celtic and Saxon essences.183
Both Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Arnold’s beliefs about race constitute what
Appiah calls racialism. It is a view that is homogenous with Mills’s description of the
realist position of the metaphysics of race (an equivalence that Mills acknowledges in his
work).184 Appiah states that it is the belief that “we could divide human beings into a
small number of groups, called ‘races’, in such a way that the members of these groups
shared certain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural
characteristics with one another that they did not share with members of any other
race.”185 Appiah points out the scientific dubiousness of their claims. Thomas Jefferson,
for example, espoused his views of biological races before there was an actual field of
biology. During Jefferson’s time, there was only a field of natural history, which would
not have been able to account for a biological notion of race.186 Thus, there would not
have been strong empirical grounding for the belief that races were biological entities nor
any reason to presume that “talents” or character traits were heritable. Where Jefferson’s
racialism was unfounded, Arnold’s was incomplete. Appiah points out that Arnold’s view
has no inheritance theory that can explain the biological interactions and racial diffusion
of essences, nor does he provide an account of “how we balance the effects of nature and
the effects of culture.”187 Appiah attests that Darwin’s work detailing his theory of
evolution had been published years before Arnold was presenting his beliefs about
183

Ibid., 57-58.
Mills, Blackness, 44.
185
Appiah, Color, 54.
186
Ibid., 49.
187
Ibid., 60.
184

134

races.188 Arnold’s usage of the term race did not cohere with the scientific meaning of
race of his time period. So, where Arnold was speaking about a conception of race in
which racially distinct essences were transmitted biologically, Darwin was speaking
about the role of environment in determining the fate of biological traits via natural
selection.189
Appiah argues that the criterial beliefs of Jefferson and Arnold fail on the
ideational view. These beliefs do not cohere with what is currently known about human
biology. Biology, simply put, does not account for moral and cultural traits, nor does it
support the existence of human essences thought to entail characteristics. However, what
contemporary science does support is that humans are genetic creatures subject to the
circumstances of our surrounding environment. Furthermore, Appiah points out that even
the actual biological traits that were attributed to races by Jefferson could not be captured
by just one classificatory system. There are multiple biological classifications that could
be created to account for these traits in human beings. Therefore, under the ideational
view, there are no races.190
Under the referential view, the concept of race does not fare any better. Appiah
looks to two possible referents to fit the biological criteria. The first referent is a
“population,” a “community of potentially interbreeding individuals at a given
locality.”191 Appiah offers two senses in which the term populations could potentially be
appropriate. The first is a more technical usage of the term, used by population
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geneticists, in which populations could denote isolated, genetically diverse groups that
are able to interbreed with one another. Appiah notes that this usage of the term
population is more applicable to plants and animals where one will find different strains
and breeds. However, this is not true of humans.192 For example, the difference between
what we consider black and white race is not like the differences between the Cairn
terrier and the Yorkshire terrier breeds in dogs. Rather, humans are more like one of
those breeds, only genetically isolated, because there are no other human breeds.
Another view of population could be a “relatively reproductive” isolated
community within a given locale. Appiah contends that there are isolated groups in the
US, such as the Amish, that could qualify. However, this conception of populations fails
to correspond to the biological characteristics used to denote the racial groups “blacks”
and “whites.”193
Appiah proposes that a second possible referent for the biological criteria of race
could be “groups defined by skin color, hair, and gross morphology, corresponding to the
dominant pattern for these characteristics in the major subcontinental regions….”194 He
argues, however, that given the human variation of phenotype and morphology amongst
Americans, sometimes a result of biological intermingling, categories may or may not
provide for a perfect fit for everyone, if at all. Furthermore, he asserts that this referent
offers no biological or social import.195
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He concludes his analysis by asserting the futility of the concept of race. Not only
does it fail under the ideational view, but he states that “you can get various possible
candidates from the referential notion of meaning, but none of them will be much good
for explaining social or psychological life, and none of them corresponds to the social
groups that we call ‘races’ in America.”196 So, in regard to the traditional race concept,
we can say that Appiah is an eliminativist.
So far, I have presented an overview of the theories of two philosophers of race.
To review, social and political philosopher Charles Mills offers a theoretical framework
that, in opposition to the realist position, proposes that race as white supremacist polity
maintained by idealized intersubjective agreement. The realist is also posited as a
dominant false position held within the context of that system. Analytical philosopher
Kwame Anthony Appiah provides a conceptual analysis of race that attempts to
demonstrate that our contemporary conception of race is based on racialism (realism),
and that racialism is false. In Appiah’s theory, the realist position gets framed causally.
I will later show how both of these theorists center their accounts of race in their
analysis of issues such as racial identity and racism. For now, however, let us turn to a
brief discussion of another theorist--a philosopher of race who is perhaps known for
offering a comprehensive engagement of the race concept.
Naomi Zack
As stated earlier, Mills and Appiah are attempting to provide a theoretical account
of what race is (although for Appiah it is a necessary antecedent step). Philosopher
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Naomi Zack, however, seeks to demonstrate what race is not (in this sense she
reconverges with Appiah). To accomplish this, she makes use of a wider set of
philosophical approaches ranging from general methodologies in the philosophy of
language, philosophy of science, existentialism, and traditional philosophy.
In the book Philosophy of Science and Race, Zack takes up an analytical
argument against the biological conception of race. She argues that most people are
committed to a position of minimal realism. It is the belief that,
“There is a world that exists independently of thought, sensation, perception,
language, and other symbolic representation. Information about this world is
accessible through the human senses. Similar sensory conditions and sensory
equipment result in the same or equivalent symbolic descriptions among different
observers. The sensory information thus agreed upon can be combined in agreedupon ways to result in knowledge.”197
The “world” that exists independently for the minimal realist would include the
physical world.198 With that being said, Zack’s argument can be summarized as follows:
Most people [within the context of the American public] believe that scientists are the
primary authority on knowledge of this world. Most people also believe that races are
natural kinds and that this position is scientifically grounded. If it is not the case that
science supports the existences of human races as biological entities, then it is not logical
to maintain the belief in human races.199 So, in Philosophy of Science and Race, Zack’s
methodology, arguing from the realist position, attempts to show that there is no
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biological basis for race, by challenging positions defending a scientific basis for race—
positions that argue that traits like skin color are the products of races.
There is some interesting overlap between Zack’s theory and both Mills’s and
Appiah’s. To some, Zack taking up a realist position may seem in contradiction to Mills’s
constructivist position. However, I argue that Zack’s argument from the realist position
illuminates an implicit realism inherent in Mills’s and Appiah’s theories; that is, like
Naomi Zack, they both rely on science to prove the falsity of the racial realist position.
Thus, there would have to be a commitment on both of their parts to a position of
minimal scientific realism.
It is also worth noting that there are methodological and conceptual parallels
between Appiah’s and Zack’s analysis. Indeed, Zack’s analysis could be considered an
expanded and more scientifically exhaustive version of Appiah’s analysis. Zack’s starting
point, like Appiah’s, is the belief in racialism found in those who preceded us. She
examines the racialism of philosophical thinkers Immanuel Kant and David Hume (as
opposed to Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Arnold).200 She furthermore suggests a
causal connection to contemporary racial realism. She states, “Hume and Kant’s kind of
unquestioning belief in the existences of races in private folk belief and in many quasiempirical and “soft” intellectual areas, which include: defenses of anthropological
typologies and critiques of these typologies…; claims of race-based links in the
habitability of intelligence.”201 It is these racialist beliefs that she seeks to overturn by
demonstrating that there is no scientific basis for them. Thus, the parallels between Zack
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and Appiah are vivid. It serves as an example of how philosophers of race are in constant
dialogue with one another. Moreover, it shows how these theorists attempt to refine each
other’s positions. In Zack’s case, she is doing what Appiah’s conceptual analysis using
the philosophy of language does not require; that is, she is placing the conceptual battle
more firmly in the territory of the sciences, the last line of defense for the racial realist, to
make a more complete case for why we need to abandon the race concept.
Now that we have examined how three of our theorists approach the problem of
race, we will now turn our attention to these theorists’ engagement of race as it relates to
factors such as identity and ethnicity. I will also introduce the race theory of Jorge Gracia
as he attempts to engage some of the positions that follow. Let us first begin, however,
with Charles Mills as he engages racial identity.

Race and Identity
Mills on Racial Identity
Charles Mills’s question “But what are you really?” represents a very complex
conundrum for most anti-realist or anti-racialist philosophers of race. Even though race is
biologically false, it has ontological implications in social life. One of the problematic
characteristics of race is that it is not an ideal system. An ideal system of race would
“have rules that regulate its interstructure and guarantee as far as possible its
reproduction…every person in the system should have a designation, R1, R2, R3….if
there are people for whom that designation is R0, then this would be an outcome of the
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system rules.”202 He goes on to say that in an ideal system, the rules must be concise and
account for all potential ambiguities, intra-racial offspring, the offspring of those
offspring, newcomer to the system, etc.203
Since race lacks concise and lucid internal rules to govern, then attempting to
ascertain the criteria that could determine one’s racial identity can be problematic. How
then can we know who we are in the ontologically deep sense?204 Mills demonstrates this
by testing criterion to see how they could measure up as indicators of one’s racial
identity. One of these candidates encompasses standard criteria for determining race,
phenotype and morphology. The problem with phenotypic traits, like skin color, for
example, is that it is not a failsafe criterion for determining one’s real metaphysical
status. It is possible that someone who “looks white,” lives her life as a white person, is
therefore taken to be intrinsically white. However, in American society, a revelation that
she has some “black blood,” would mean that she was never really white, but instead an
ontologically black person pretending to be white.205 The one-drop rule, therefore,
undermines physical bases for race, as criteria for racial identity.
Another candidate for racial identity is culture. Mills contends that under the
realist metaphysics that culture would be a result of one’s racial biology. This means that
there would be a biological commitment to use one’s own cultural products. To carry out
this commitment would be to be true to one’s ontological self. On the other hand, to use
the cultural products of another race would be an act of true-self negation. Thus, playing
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both the banjo and the guitar should cause a metaphysical dilemma within that person.
Mills correctly points out, however, that American culture is a composite made up of a
multiplicity of cultural influences from every continent. This is not generally
acknowledged within the broader context of American culture, even though it is true at its
most basic levels. The vertical white supremacist system facilitates a selective racial coopting of the products of cultural syncretism--one that, to use my previous example,
allows the African banjo to become a white cultural product.206 Mills’s analysis reveals
that other potential criteria for racial identity, ancestral awareness, experience, and selfidentification suffer similar problems, leaving the problem of identity within a vertical
race system unsettled.207
Zack on Mixed Race Identity
These sentiments are echoed in Naomi Zack’s Race and Mixed Race, her critique
of the exclusive nature of a binary concept of race. She asserts “the American biracial
system does not permit the identification of individuals, in the third person, as mixed
race. If individuals cannot be identified, in the third person, as mixed race, then it is
impossible for them to have mixed race identities, in the first person.”208
Through an existential analysis, she shows how a racial “kinship schema” that
accompanies the race concept requires one to ask Mills’s question, “But what are you
really?” as “what are they?” That is because one’s racial identity is contingent upon the

206

Ibid.,. 53.
Ibid.
208
Naomi Zack, Race and Mixed Race. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 4.
207

142

racial identities of one’s forebears.209 The kinship schema structures whites and blacks as
two separate families, each with its own particular guidelines to claim an identity within
those families. According to Zack, white identity is closely connected with our folk
concept of race (racialism). The white family scheme follows the one-drop rule—a rule
meant to maintain white racial purity. The white family schema, however, goes beyond
the one-drop rule, which limits itself to ancestry. For a person to have a white identity
under the white family schema not only can she not have any black ancestors, she also
cannot have any black descendents or spouses, as they too will act as a basis by which to
race her. Thus, white identity is a denial of blackness and an affirmation of white
superiority.210
According to Zack, the black family schema is the same as the white family
schema, except it encompasses a broader notion of what is considered white. The black
family schema uses phenotype for racial designation. Thus, people who belong to groups
that normally considered “white” (some Latinos, Turks, Sicilians, etc.) by the white
family schema may be considered non-white in the black schema. So, in the black
schema, for someone to be considered white, she must satisfy both the descent condition
and the phenotype condition.211 Zack asserts that, in general, blacks do not share the
same biological conception of race as whites, meaning there is no necessary belief that
they are ontologically inferior to whites or that whites have better intrinsic qualities.
Sometimes, black identity entails an oppositional view towards whites because they feel
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that whites are in control.212 However, this does not negate the fact that the physical
concept of race is central to the binary racial family model. The black schema affirms the
white schema by excluding others from white racial membership and by assigning black
membership to those whose race is ambiguous. In other words, a person must be
designated either white or black, even if she has black and white ancestors, thereby
leaving no room for a mixed race identity.213
Mills and Zack’s visions appear compatible. Mills frames the issue of racial
identity in the context of a vertical political framework--one that positions identities
hierarchically but also, as a consequence, in opposition to one another. Zack’s existential
presentation provides a demonstration of how a race-based white/black family framework
inhibits the emergence of mixed identity. It could be argued that Zack’s analysis shows
the non-idealness of the vertical race system. We will now see how Appiah moves his
discussion of identity into more normative territory, offering an analytical re-conception
of racial identity that is sensitive to the biological falseness and social realness of race.
Appiah on Racial Identity
Appiah, like Mills, rejects culture as a suitable replacement for the concept of
race, if what is meant by culture are shared values, products, and beliefs. He asserts that
the belief that the black racial group has a common culture-a culture that is universally
held amongst blacks within the United States is something that is in need of proof. He
points out that the common contention regarding blacks and culture is that if x is assumed
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to be a member of the black racial group, then x is assumed to have a particular culture
regardless of whether or not it reflects x’s experienced culture.214 Appiah refers to this
spurious view, that cultural is disseminated to individuals biologically, as “cultural
geneticism”—a view that he likens back to Matthew Arnold’s racialism. 215 Appiah also
points out that diasporic notions of culture treat blacks as though there is an “authentic
self” and Africa American cultural identity as though constructed independently of white
society.216 Appiah rejects this view. He states,
“African-American identity…is centrally shaped by American society and
institutions: it cannot be seen as constructed solely within African-American
communities. African-American culture, if this means shared belief, values,
practices, does not exist: what exists are African-American cultures, and though
these are created and sustained in large measure by African-Americans, they
cannot be understood without reference to the bearers of other American racial
identities.”217
So, for example, it would be difficult to speak of cultural products that are
typically attributed to black people (Christianity, gangster rap, or “soul food,”) without
understanding the role white persons, white-favored institutions or conditions played in
the creation of racially designated cultural ownership.
Appiah argues that racial identity may be the most optimal replacement for the
concept of race. Racial identities are generally already ascribed to us and labels can have
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a significant effect on how we look at ourselves and how we live our lives. In general,
labels affect the process called “identification.” He describes this as “the process through
which an individual intentionally shapes her projects---including her plans for her own
life and her conception of the good—by reference to available labels and available
identities.”218 He contends that sometimes labels can come with the expectation that we
perform a particular way in a particular context. For example, the label “professor,” as
generally perceived in the university setting, may compel us to present ourselves with a
degree of authority, to dress a certain way, or to modify our common way of speaking.
These types of labels are more superficial. There would be little expectation that a
professor perform her identity to her friends, family, or sales clerk. They ask nothing of
us other than to act in a particular ways, in particular times and places.219
Racial labels, on the other hand, have a deeper dimension. They are different from
labels like “professor” because their expectations are ontologically mandated. To borrow
the phrase from Mills again, the labels are expected to provide the answer to “but what
are you, really?” and prescribe actions in deference to that answer.220 Appiah states that
“because ascription of racial identities—the process of applying the label to people,
including ourselves—is based on more than intentional identification that there can be a
gap between what a person inscriptively is and the racial identity he performs: it is this
gap that makes passing possible.”221
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Appiah further insists that identification is not always voluntary, as some
identities are ascribed to us by general consensus, but we are able to control how much
those identities shape our lives. Racial identity is an example of this. However, the
physical bases, social realities, consequence, and consensus for racial ascription make
controlling the centrality of the racial identity more difficult.222 Historically, the
recognition of racial identity has been based on the tendency to focus on the body as a
basis for collective identity. So, one conceives of herself as connected to others based on
something ontologically shared: “I am black, that person is black, and therefore, we
share blackness.” The result has led to a reaffirmation of racial essences. This has been
the mistake in the politics of identity—to look to the body for the answers. 223
Appiah’s proposal is that we decentralize the body, in this regard, and instead
conceive of racial identities in terms of the label, itself, as it has always been what
determines the terms and consequences of racial membership. Recognizing the
importance of identity in the politics of identity, Appiah offers this re-conception of racial
identity as,
“R, associated with ascriptions by most people (where ascription involves
descriptive criteria for applying the label); and identifications by those that fall
under it (where identifications implies a shaping role for the label in the
intentional acts of the possessors, so that they sometimes act as an R), where there
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is a history associating that label with an inherited racial essence (even if some
who use the label no longer believe in racial essence).”224
Under Appiah’s view, one’s racial identity does not suppose racial essence, but
also does not have to deny that an essence was historically attached to it; it is racial
without being racialist. I can conceive of that identity as being connected with others
who share that designation, without having to affirm what is designated. As a result of its
ontological disentanglement, I can, if I desire, regard that identity as any other—of some,
little or no importance in regard to how I choose to live my life. It can be arbitrary or it
can be an ethical identity. This allows for identities to have political import, without the
ontological import. Appiah’s proposal of racial identity can therefore provide a response
for those who resist Mills’s system and Zack’s schemas. That is because it allows one to
acknowledge the constructedness of the designated racial labels, without having to
endorse the ontological content that usually accompanies those labels.
Jorge Gracia on Race, Ethnicity, and Identity
Jorge Gracia attempts to respond to the challenge of making sense out of race
while responding to the critiques of theorists such as Appiah. Gracia rejects racial and
ethnic essentialism “not only because it is false but also because it freezes groups of
people in certain states and circumstances preventing them from adapting to different
situations in order to satisfy effectively the conditions imposed on them by their
environment.”225 However, he believes that Appiah (and many scientists) are acting too
hastily in concluding that race is incoherent because it fails to correspond to anything that
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actually exists in the world. Gracia maintains that even if race is a social construct, it has
properties that make it distinguishable from other human categorization systems. 226 For
example, we typically understand that “black” denotes race while “Haitian-American”
denotes ethnicity and that Haitian denotes a nationality.
Gracia also takes issue with the assumption that if something is a social construct
then it is automatically dangerous. After all, he asserts, we group each other in multitudes
of socially constructed ways (e.g. height) all the time with seemingly little consequence.
Another problem for theorists who side with Appiah is that there are some scientists who
assert that there is some genetic variation between groups of humans that may indeed fall
within the boundaries of the traditional concept of race. Gracia further points out the fact
that there is broad agreement amongst scientists that humans can be grouped genetically.
While he is not claiming to advocate for the traditional concept of race, he does believe
that the aforementioned issues are sufficient enough for showing some restraint in regard
to dismissing race as a concept.227
Like Appiah, Mills, and Zack, Gracia believes that attempting to understand race
is a valuable undertaking. He, thus, attempts to offer a nuanced, heuristic presentation of
race that attempts to free its essentialist metaphysics and that also disentangles race from
the ethnic paradigm. Gracia believes that leaving race and ethnicity untouched is
dangerous. He believes that it is necessary to provide adequate explanations of the
concepts of race and ethnicity that will make it possible to make sense of what it is that
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we are referring to when we talk about race or ethnicity. Let us look first at Gracia’s
formula concerning ethnicity, the “Familial-Historical View.” He states,
“An ethnos is a subgroup of individual humans who satisfy the following
conditions: (1) they belong to many generations; (2) they are organized as a
family and break down into extended families; and (3) are united through
historical relations that produce features that, in context, serve (i) to identify the
members of the group and (ii) to distinguish them from members of other
groups.”228
Ethnicity, for Gracia, is simply the relation(s) that binds individuals within the group to
one another. In other words, an individual’s ethnicity consists of her having whatever
particular feature or features connect her to that ethnos.229
To summarize Gracia’s view, for a group to be considered an ethnos it must have
a period of development that lasts over multiple generations. To understand Gracia’s
second condition, it is important to recognize how he conceives of the notion of family.
There are several types of families, including the nuclear family, which would include
what we tend to consider our immediate family (partner, spouse, children, etc) and the
extended family which could include those family members not residing with you or who
perhaps have their own families (cousins, in-laws, step-cousins, etc). For membership in
a family, it is not necessary that a family be related genetically. For instance, if x marries
y, then x becomes part of y’s family and y becomes part of x’s family. X’s father, for
example, become’s y’s father-in-law. If x and y adopt a child, then that child becomes
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part of both x’s and y’s family. One’s membership in a family might be the result of
being x’s adopted son, and another’s membership might be a consequences of marrying
that son. Thus, as in the case of nuclear and extended families, there does not have to be a
common feature binding for all members of the family.230
Gracia maintains that an ethnos consists of similarly variable, historical
relationships to the aforementioned types of families. He uses as an example, what he
considers a Hispanic ethnos. There are a wide variety of available features that allow a
person to have a Hispanic ethnicity. Examples of this are, a person who was born in
Puerto Rico, or who was born in Germany but grew up in Spain, or who is the child of
someone whose mother grew up in Mexico. In all of these cases, these people would be
regarded as Hispanic because of their particular relationships to the ethnos. For Gracia,
all that matters in regard to an individual’s ethnicity is that the individual has a feature(s)
that is distinct to her ethnos. This does not mean that the individual shares that feature
with all other Hispanic persons, only that she shares a feature that is considered
distinctive to that particular group. Those historical features might be filial (motherstepdaughter), social, linguistic (language), cultural (shared customs), and even biological
(blood relative). These factors are contingent on the historical development of a particular
ethnos, because it is through the course of this history that what counts as relevant
features are determined.231
An important aspect to Gracia’s Familial-Historical View is the overall
contingency of an ethnos and its membership. Gracia states that “[e]thne are fluid, open,
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and changing; members come and go, enter and leave, as they forge themselves and with
members of other groups depending on particular and contingent circumstances.”232 If a
person from Denver, Colorado is Hispanic because she resides in Puerto Rico after
marrying someone who is Puerto-Rican, then it is possible that she can leave that ethnos
by simply moving back to the Denver. This is because moving away for Puerto-Rico
would sever the historical relation that connects her to members of the Hispanic
ethnos.233 It is also quite possible for an individual to have multiple ethnicities. For
instance, someone might be a member of Gracia’s “Hispanic” pan-ethnic group, but have
also have a distinctive feature of another possible ethnos (or ethne), such as “African
American.”234
We are able to see here how Jorge Gracia’s description of ethnicity escapes the
type of essentialism that is often applied to ethnic and ethno-racial groups. An essentialist
concept of ethnicity would mean that there is some fixed property that the individual of
an ethnos shares with all members who share that ethnicity. Gracia’s Familial-Historical
View, recognizes that 1) the development of the ethnos is historically contingent, 2) the
relations within the ethnos vary from person to person, 3) the properties used to
determine membership are historically and contextually contingent, and 4) that the
individual is not bound to that ethnos as its membership is always in flux either as a result
of either the actions of the individual (e.g. severing ethnic relations) or the evolution (e.g.
changing criteria for membership) or possible dissolution of the ethnos.

232

Ibid., 52.
Ibid.
234
Ibid., 72-73.
233

152

Now that we have examined Gracia’s account of ethnicity, let us investigate the
concept of race, another type of family.235 Gracia calls his theory of race the Common
Bundle View.236 It states,
“A race is a subgroup of individual human beings who satisfy the following
conditions: (1) each member of the group is linked by descent to another member
of the group who is in turn also linked by descent to at least some third member of
the group; and (2) each member of the group has one or more features that are (i)
genetically transmittable, (ii) generally associated with the group, and (iii)
perceptually perspicuous.”237
In Gracia’s Common Bundle View, race, like ethnicity, is a matter of the
individual having the appropriate historical relation that binds him to other members of
his racial group. However, the primary divergence from ethnicity is that links such as
marriage, language, or cultural practices bear no metaphysical import for racial
membership. Instead, for Gracia, the defining aspect of race is the historical, genetic link
between racial members; this is an aspect that would have only been sufficient, but not
necessary for some ethnicities (depending on the properties that emerged from an
ethnos’s development). To be linked by descent means that the pertinent relationships are
matters of birth. For instance, x might be an R because x’s mother is an R. If x also has a
phenotypic feature considered indicative of x’s race, such as black hair, then x as has
satisfied the second condition thereby making x an R.
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In the three stipulations for the second condition, we see several ways in which
Gracia’s racial metaphysics attempts to avoid the essentialism of our traditional notion of
race; that is, there is some essential property each member of a racial group has that
makes her of that race. First, his view does not posit a feature (or set of features) that
could be construed as a collective essence. Rather, he is asserting that an individual need
only have one of the collectively assigned, but not collective held features. As with
ethnicity, there is no feature that is common to all members of a race. Thus, Gracia is
acknowledging the high variability of persons who were assigned to racial groups.
Secondly, it is clear that, for Gracia, these features designated to a particular race are
socially determined, as they are “generally associated” with a particular race as opposed
to being properties intrinsic of the individual.
A third way in which Gracia’s Common Bundle View avoids essentialism is by
responding directly to Naomi Zack’s contention that the racial identity schema is
asymmetrical and therefore does not permit mixed race identities. Gracia agrees with
Zack on this matter, but argues that under the criteria that he has provided, the one-drop
rule for racial identity has no place in his model precisely because of this asymmetry,
which favors the notion of white purity. In other words, with the traditional model of
race, not only are the features of the bundle different, but the rules for determining racial
membership are also dissimilar from race to race. Gracia holds that the Common Bundle
View provides an objective way to determine what race and racial identity entails. As
was the case with ethnicity, it is quite possible for an individual to have multiple races.
All that would be required is that a person can share one or more distinct descent links
(even if that link is from the same parent or grandparent) and have observable features
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considered indicative of those races. That means a person could theoretically be white,
black, and even a member of any other group that qualifies as a race.238 Thus, Gracia’s
conception of race is able to avoid the existential problems regarding mixed identity that
concern Zack.
As we have seen, race and ethnicity do share some aspects in common such as
both being predicated on historical and familial relations and no common featurerequirement for membership as well as sharing differences. Namely, there is the descent
link that acts as a necessary feature for a race, while it is only one of many possible
sufficient, but not necessary, features for an ethnos. Moreover, there are also “genetically
transmittable,” socially designated, phenotypic features of races as opposed to the
variable types of features of ethne that emerge from its historical development.
Gracia takes issue with those who strategically attempt to posit ethnic races or
racial ethne, which, as I pointed out earlier, is one of the responses to the factual and
epistemic challenges to race. He claims that this view is based on the assumption that the
ethnicity and race are now intrinsically bound together, and thus “1) one cannot speak
sensibly about race apart from ethnicity, or vice versa, and 2) one cannot classify
someone as a member of a race and not of an ethnos, or vice versa.”239
Gracia offers several reasons why we should not confuse race and ethnicity. First,
he maintains that it is important that we understand these concepts before we attempt to
use them in conjunction with one another. Secondly, there is often resistance to the
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conflation by those who do not fit its narrative. Finally, biological and social scientists do
not maintain this correlation between a racial genetics and cultural production.240
Gracia argues that the reason that there is a tendency to treat race and ethnicity in
a singular manner is because ethnicity, as he has described it, permits descent and
morphology as potential features for an ethnos in the same way that it permits other
factors such as culture or language. However, these features are contingent upon the
dictates of historical development and therefore are able to change over time. This is not
the case regarding race, however, because the presence of genetically transferable racial
identifiers is a necessary condition for a group to be considered a race. So, Gracia asserts,
in some circumstances it is possibly useful to talk about a particular ethnos in racial
terms. However, it is inappropriate to do so without a mindfulness of that ethnic group’s
historical and circumstantial contexts.241
Another basis for confusing race and ethnicity is a consequence of the view that
race and ethnicity are in a symbiotically productive relationship in which each yields
characteristics for the other. Gracia offers the following example:
“racial identification often leads to segregation, and this in turn may result in the
development of an ethnos. The segregation of “Blacks” tends to link them
together in ways that separate them from other races. This strengthens their
historical interrelations and tends to produce ethnic features. Thus, one may speak

240
241

Ibid., 35-36.
Ibid., 149.

156

of a “Black” ethnos, characterized by “Black” food, customs, values, and so
on.”242
However, Gracia goes on to say that race and ethnicity are still different in this
regard. When a person of a particular race is said to internalize or perform the ontology
of a different race, it is not race that is being referenced, as there is no mention of any
genetically transmitted features. Rather, such claims concern ethnic or cultural features,
which, of course, speak to an ethnic dimension.243
Gracia does state that ethnic features can facilitate the development of racial
features, noticing how social mores can lead to ethnic isolation, which in turn results in
phenotypic features. For, example, racial segregation in the south, may have lead to
distinct bundles of physical features (skin color range) that become racially marked as
“white” or “black.”244 However, Gracia points, out that there are several circumstantial
factors that are able to facilitate the creation of ethnic or racial features (e.g. religious
segregation, geography, economics, social mobility).245 However, this provides a greater
mandate, in Gracia’s view, to keep race and ethnicity separate categories because the
conflation of these constructs makes little sense when there are ways of understanding
them, such as the Familial-Historical View of ethnicity and the Common Bundle View of
race.246
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Now that I have examined how these theorists approach issues such as identity
and ethnicity, let us now turn to a brief sketch that shows how these philosophers frame
the concept of race in relation to the problem of racism.

Racialism, Racism, and White Supremacy
It is common in academic scholarship to centralize such problems as racism and
white supremacy without reference to the consequential role that the race construct
actually plays in these matters. However, the four philosophers of race that I have
investigated here see race as intrinsically bound to the issues of racism. This is perhaps
most evident with Kwame Anthony Appiah. His theory of racism is, in actuality, a theory
of racialism. Racialism, remember, is the belief in human races each of which share their
own distinct and exclusive biological and non-biological traits; it is the belief in racial
essences. Appiah contends that even though racialism is a false doctrine, as long as
positive moral qualities are distributed across races, each can be respected, can have its
‘separate but equal’ place” in a world of racial identification.247 He argues, however,
that racialism is presupposed by two racialist doctrines, extrinsic racism and intrinsic
racism. Extrinisic racism is the belief that races have morally relevant qualities that act as
a basis for discriminating against that race (favorably or unfavorably). These qualities can
be positive or negative. So, for example, if a person refuses to associate with a person of
a different race because they believe that each member of that race is uncreative, then
they are extrinsic racist. In the face of evidence that disproves the extrinsic racist’s belief,
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she relinquishes that belief. If they will not relinquish that belief, then she either has a
cognitive incapacity that prevents her from doing so or she is an intrinsic racist. 248
The intrinsic racist, on the other hand, believes that one’s race is an indicator of
moral status. An example of an intrinsic racist would be someone who will not associate
with whites because she considers them morally inferior. Unlike, the sincere extrinsic
racist, the intrinsic racist cannot be swayed by evidence. Appiah also argues that an
intrinsic racist extends her positive moral consideration to those with whom she shares
racial membership. Thus, race for the intrinsic racist is like family. Examples of this form
of racism would be the Ku Klux Klan, or Black Nationalism, the former being based on
“shared moral character” for exclusion and the latter representing inclusion, for the sake
of solidarity.249
There are a couple of points worthy of note about Appiah’s racialist triad. The
first, perhaps obvious, point is that, its impossible to talk about racism without
acknowledging the false belief about races. So, in effect, racism is the acting out of
racialism. A second point is that this conception racism provides a broader coverage,
when it comes to classifying acts as it encompasses both subtle and overt or extreme
forms of racism. A final point is that the racism is not necessarily asymmetrical in terms
of who is guilty of racism. So, if we apply Appiah’s doctrines to Mills’s vertical race
system, it is possible that an R3 can be intrinsically racist against R1 or R2 as much as R1
can be racist against R2 or R3. So Appiah’s view is not meant to account for the stratified
power differential of the American race system (white supremacy, distribution of
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property, etc). Rather, it is intended to show the possible racialist and racist ideological
positions available within the American race system.
In Race and Mixed Race, Naomi Zack makes use of Appiah’s distinction of
intrinsic racism to illuminate the white family kinship schema, asserting that the doctrine
is a prerequisite to her own distinctions of racism, unintentional and intentional racism.250
She states,
“[u]nintentional racism involves assumptions [on the part of whites] that blacks
(and perhaps other people of color as well) that are not included in the important
activities of one’s life. It is not necessary always to be aware of one’s own
whiteness while living in this exclusion; one simply lives in a white world and
non-whites are only occasional and important agents in that world.”251
So, this type of racism involves passive indifference of non-whites, such as
knowing blacks but not associating with them, not having blacks in your life, even not
having to know any blacks. What makes unintentional racists “racist” is that they
participate in a system in which black people are treated unfairly. Unintentional racism is
like a weaker extrinsic racism in that it does not require a strong commitment to the belief
in biological races. Their differential acts are due to their blind adherence to cultural
norms that promote such acts.252 At the same time, most racialists would likely be
unintentional racists by this view, unless they are actively attempting to prevent racism or
to include blacks in their lives.
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Intentional racism “entails a frequent or constant awareness that one is white,
accompanied by strong value-negative judgments against blacks.”253 Intentional racists
practice more overt forms of racism such as participating in hate groups or purposely
attempting to undermine equality for blacks. Operatively, it seems like a less subtle from
of intrinsic racism, only its commitment to the belief in racially inherited (presumably
cultural or moral) traits is a matter of probability. In the cases of both unintentional and
intentional racism, the operant white kinship schema presupposes the validity of the
American racial paradigm.254
So, for Appiah and Zack, it is impossible talk about the problem of racism without
first addressing the traditional concept of race, because racialism authorizes racism. If we
take into account Mills’s description of the vertical system and the metaphysical position
on race against which he has positioned himself against, it is evident that there is
agreement between Mills and Zack. Like Zack’s binary racial schema, Mills’s vertical
race system is based on assumptions of white supremacy and the idealized intersubjective
agreement by those who fall within that system further ratifies the legitimacy of the
dominant white positioning. There has always been the belief in racial realism that
undergirds this system. Thus, it is also understandable why, in response to Appiah’s
distinction between racialism (realism) and racism, Mills states, “not merely have all
racists been realists, but most realists have been racists.”255 Race and racism are
inherently bound to one another.
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In the previous section, I stated that Gracia believes that his de-essentialized
conceptions of race and ethnicity will provide a frame of reference that will help us better
understand the historical and social nuances that surround the race concept. In addition to
this stated purpose, Gracia also shares Mill’s view that the race concept will facilitate a
greater comprehension of the more nefarious consequences of race. He states,
“ Race has been the source of much oppression and abuse. To correct this requires
not only that we refer to race, but also that we have an appropriate understanding
of it. Without a concept of race, we cannot fight the ghosts that populate our
social consciousness or overturn the oppressive structures that are embedded in
our institutions…we need an appropriate and adequate understanding of race to
understand the root of much evil and conflict in human society; we cannot rely on
a faulty one.”256
Appiah appears to reluctantly agree with the point that Gracia is making here. He
believes that it may be a necessary step to maintain some conception of race, which is
why he proposed a de-essentialized racial identity as a possible substitute for race.
However, Appiah’s proposal is a cautious one because he believes collective identities
often accompany their own axioms, or what Appiah calls “scripts.” Thus, he maintains,
they have the tendency to dominate over other personal identities.257 He states, “Racial
identity can be the basis of resistance to racism; but even as we struggle against racism—
and though we have made great progress, we have further still to go—let us not let our
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racial identities subject us to new tyrannies.”258 Naomi Zack however, has historically
diverged more starkly from this point of view (Appiah and Gracia), often arguing for the
elimination of the race concept through education for these particular purposes.
Although, in her more recent work she argues that to confront racism that we must also
turn our focus toward gender as she holds that racial (and ethnic) taxonomy and
oppression has always been a consequence of white male rule.259

Philosophy of Race and Education
All of these philosophers of race exhibit distinct analytical measures to approach
the issue of race. Appiah’s analytic approach is useful for critical theorists because we
can apply his analyses to ourselves. We can how we, and other theorists, use the concept
of race in our analyses, how we contribute to its evolution, and how our own conceptions
of race correspond to what is known about race in the sciences. Naomi Zack’s
methodology provides an analytical avenue to examine a variety of existential
consequences of axiomatic structure of the race concept. Both Mills and Gracia’s social
constructivist approaches provide us with methods that allow us to create our own
heuristic models and analyses by which we can explore race.
These philosophers’ analyses yield substantial amounts of knowledge that are
needed by critical theory in education. They expose various aspects of the way race is
constituted and the way in which it can structure an individual’s identity. Charles Mills
shares much in common with critical theorists like Asante, Kincheloe, Steinberg, and
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McLaren because he is concerned with the nature and consequences of white supremacy.
His analysis showed us how race, itself, is a manifestation of white supremacy because it
ranks races hierarchically. Thus, race, for Mills is causal, not consequential, of white
supremacy.
Both Zack and Appiah’s conceptual analyses of race illuminate the problematic,
conjectural development of the race concept. They demonstrate how the concept of race
is predicated on now discredited scientific racialism and realism. In other words, race, as
we know it, is and always has been a false concept. One reason that this should be
important to critical theory in education is that the ways in which we sometimes affix
cultural traits to race are arguably contemporary manifestations of racialism. This move
on the part of critical theorists would require the assumption or imposition of shared
essentialist properties that span across a broad range individuals, families, and ethnicities.
Jorge Gracia highlights the necessity of understanding both race and ethnicity as
distinct concepts. His new proposals for these concepts enable us to disencumber race
and ethnicity when they are confused with one another, as they often are in critical and
multicultural theory. Moreover, his conceptions provide us with ways of knowing if,
when, and how race and ethnicity are connected in cases where we suspect there is
connection or overlap. Gracia’s highlighting of the significance of historical relations in
his conceptions of race and ethnicity allows us to see that race and ethnicity are in a
contingent and circumstantial flux. This is important for critical theorists in education as
it could help provide us with more effective and accurate ways to ensure that theory and
practice are indeed culturally relevant by not locking students into racialized ethne that
do not speak to their current ethnic and cultural realities. Furthermore, the contingency of
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race and ethnicity mandate that we understand their development before we send these
concepts for praxis in the classroom.
One aspect of Gracia’s Familial-Historical View of ethnicity that speaks to the
aforementioned point is that culture is a sufficient but not a necessary feature of an
ethnos. This factor should be of great important for critical theory in that it sanctions that
we are cautious when attempting to assign cultural products collectively to individuals.
For example, even if black Americans qualify as an ethnicity under the FamilialHistorical View, culture may not necessarily be the feature that binds particular
individuals to an ethnos. Thus, before we deploy strategies of black affirmation, it is
necessary that we have an understanding of the multiplicity of ways and degrees in which
students are related or relevantly invested in their ethnic membership(s).
The problem of mixed racial identities is largely ignored within critical theory in
education. This is because the persons to whom those identities would get assigned are
often eclipsed by the essentialist racial binary. The transition from the biological
paradigm of race to the ethnic (bio-ethnic) paradigm of race, has only served to further
mask this problem.260 As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, our failure, as theorists, to
recognize our own complicity in reinforcing the one-drop rule by treating blacks as a
monolithic group can endanger students. Naomi Zack’s contribution on mixed raced
identities makes it possible to understand how, in this way, we are affirming the
traditional white supremacist model of race that attempts to maintain the purity of
whiteness. Moreover, her analysis shows us consequences to the individual who fails to
be recognized within the racial binary. The nature of mixed racial identities needs to
260
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come to the front of critical discourse, because it is more often the norm than the
exception.261
Jorge Gracia’s Common Bundle View and Familial-Historical View offer a
possible solution to Zack’s analysis. These views facilitate our understanding of how an
individual can have more than one racial identity and additionally, one or more
candidates for ethnic identities of varying types (e.g. family, Creole, African American,
Pan-African). Furthermore, his de-essentialized conceptions of race and ethnicity show us
why we need to take care in assigning cultural or racial content to individuals in a
hierarchical manner (i.e. showing greater deference to one’s “blackness” or
“Africanness” over one’s “whiteness” or “Europeaness” or vice versa).
Another important contribution that these theorists make available for critical
theory in education is that they all show how race is of crucial importance when
confronting issues such as racism. Appiah’s racialist triad best highlights this point by
showing that the primary difference between the belief in races and racisms is that the
latter simply means that we act upon the knowledge that underlies the former. For
example, the belief in an actual black race encompasses the belief that there are certain
essential characteristics intrinsic to members of that race. Racism for Appiah is simply
when we allow our racialism to inform how we view and treat persons from other races,
whether that means that we consider them as part of our moral community or whether it
compels us to oppress, alienate, or avoid those from other races.
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Finally, the question of what to do given the nature of the race construct is a
discussion that is sorely needed within critical theory in education. The above-mentioned
methodologies and analyses can inform us on these matters. Furthermore, the potential
consequences of race, such as those I have highlighted in the dissertation thus far,
mandate that we do something. We cannot simply take to the field when more overtly
destructive race-related consequences occur, yet passively sit in the stands on the matter
of race. Action on the race construct is necessary because race is causally antecedent to
the aforementioned consequences.
If we are going to make legitimate attempts to mitigate the consequences of racial
hegemony for students, we need to decide if facilitating the maintenance of realism in
theoretical discourse is the best course of action. In this chapter, I have shown there are
other options available. It is possible, that we may decide that we have to take up the
eliminativist position(s) that Naomi Zack has endorsed in her works. We might need to
adopt the reluctant anti-eliminativism of K. Anthony Appiah by asserting that we
cautiously replace race with racial identity while moving toward a raceless society.
Finally, it may be necessary that we engage race with the stronger anti-eliminativist
constructivism of Charles Mills and Jorge Gracia where we create models and concepts
to help explain the nature of race, racism, and white supremacy. The debates of these and
other like-minded positions are long overdue in the field of critical theorist in education.
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Conclusion
In this Chapter, I proposed that the philosophy of race is a theoretical resource
that will allow critical theory of education to fill its “race gap.” I argued that this can
better enable critical theorists to contend with the problem of race in education. I
examined the theoretical approaches from four of the most well known philosophers
performing the metaphysics of race today. It is my hope that critical theory in education
and the philosophy of race facilitate a theoretical and strategic merger between these
areas for a philosophy of race in education. In the next chapter of this dissertation, I offer
my vision of what I believe a philosophy of race in education should entail in theory and
practice.
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CHAPTER VI
TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF RACE IN EDUCATION

Introduction: A Critical Philosophy of Race in Education
In this dissertation, I have asserted that race is a hegemonic paradigm. What
makes it hegemonic is not simply because it provides justification for persons from one
racial group to act upon another nor that it authorizes individuals within racial groups to
impose racial axioms intra-racially. It is hegemonic also in that, in American society, we
are largely complicit in its dominance over us. Moreover, as I have shown, even some
critical theorists in education who attempt to mitigate the consequences of racial
hegemony treat race as a concept that is in no need of investigation, deliberation, or
validation. In doing so, they too consent to its racial hierarchies. So, our complicity in our
own hegemony (and by “our” I mean all of those assigned to racial groups) rests largely
on what we do not understand or choose to ignore about races; there are no biological,
ethnic, and cultural races.
The racial obscurantism that casts a panoptic ethno-racial net over us makes it
difficult to see how our actual existence and experiences, as biologically and culturally
diverse persons in complex, symbiotic, conversation with one another, undermines the
notion of racial essence. The consequence is that we approach the world with breached,
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imperceptive senses and interpret our experiences and the experiences of others
accordingly.
As scholars who prioritize bringing about a just and fair environment for students,
critical theorists in education should neither subject nor commit students to racial
sovereignty. This requires that we approach race in a way that merges the visions of
theorists like Cameron McCarthy and the philosophers of race we have discussed in the
previous chapter. We must move toward a critical philosophy of race in education that
attempts to confront race as a problem as it begins to intersect with the axes of education
theory and praxis.
In this Chapter, I outline the characteristics necessary for a liberatory critical
philosophy of race in education. The first of these, I argue, should encompass a
theoretical framework that challenges the traditional concept of race while also showing
sensitivity to its social dimensions and consequences. I make a case for this framework as
I evaluate moral arguments for and against the elimination of race.
The second characteristic I contend is necessary for a critical philosophy of race
in education is that it embraces and advocates an education for autonomy as liberatory
education. I describe two of the fundamental features of this education: a skill-based and
knowledge-based education for racial liberation. I recommend that this education for
autonomy be conducted for potential theorists, pre-service teachers, and students.
The final characteristic that I recommend for a philosophy of race in education is
that it is a self-reflective endeavor. Let us begin the examination of the eliminativist and
anti-eliminativist arguments for race.
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Eliminativist and Anti-Eliminativist Arguments
A philosophy of race in education must consider how to push forward in the face
of racialist hegemony and the consequences for those touched by it. At its heart, this is a
moral and ethical issue facing critical theorists in education. So, a philosophy of race in
education should take under deep consideration the legitimate moral concerns of
proponents of racial eliminativism and anti-eliminativism. Jorge Gracia provides an
overview of the principal moral arguments that represent both sides of this debate
between these two theoretical stances. Let us first look to the arguments for continuing
the use of the race concept.
Arguments for Racial Eliminativism
According to Gracia, there are three main arguments that call for the elimination
of the race concept. The first argument asserts that racial designations tend to have
“negative connotations.” Applying racial labels to individuals risk imposing these
negative connotations upon them which can, in turn, act as justification for unequal
treatment. We should, therefore, discontinue using the race concept.262 K. Anthony
Appiah’s examination of Thomas Jefferson’s racialist beliefs about blacks shows how the
tendency to ascribe unfavorable qualities along racial lines were always a feature of the
racial paradigm, even by those once considered authorities on races. Even today, black
racial designation is still associated with diminished intelligence, hyper-sexuality, and
propensity for violence—a point aptly demonstrated by the selective presentation of
blacks in media and celebrated within pop culture.
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Furthermore, as Appiah pointed out racialism is the precondition for racism. The
only thing that separates racism from racialism proper is whether we act on our racialist
beliefs. We must also remember, however, that racism for, Appiah, was more complex
than members of one racial group treating persons of other racial groups unfairly. Racism
extends to both negative and positive moral qualities and moral status attributed to racial
groups. We often act in the interest of others with whom we share racial membership
because we assume that they are “like us” in a manner that transcends phenotypic and
experientially grounded characteristics.
In the aforementioned sense, the unequal treatment of others is subtle and
implicit. The association of positive connotations set the conditions in which we grant
moral consideration to our racial group, but not others, not because we consider them
inferior. Rather, it is because we do not consider them. We act upon other racial groups in
how we treat our own racial group. This is, perhaps, the most common and acceptable
form of racism in American society today. An overt example of this is “I’m not antiblack/anti-white, I’m pro-white/pro-black,” although I would argue that the more harmful
instances of this type of racism occur in more subtle forms. We are typically pro-white or
pro-black without even recognizing we are thinking this way. We unconsciously choose
to stay in the company and act in consideration of those with whom we are most
familiar.263 Often times, this is our racial group, because as Gracia stated, races are a type
of family. Although, the familial connections of race, are deeper than Gracia was
attempting to point out. As I argued in previous chapters, races can designate moral
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community—and in some ways that simply means the persons whom you “consider.”
Unconsciously or consciously considering our own racial groups, but not considering
others (because they are not like family) is still potentially dangerous. This form of
racism is analogous to our moral nationalism exhibited when we empathize with those
who suffer in this country while remaining indifferent to the similar or worse suffering of
others elsewhere. Our lack of awareness and absence of volition in this regard make this
type of racism more acceptable. We rarely consider it racism.
It is also important to recognize that racial designations are not symmetrical and
therefore do not affect racial groups in the same way. The white race in American society
is largely regarded as the ideal race. In the broader societal context, “white” is a relatively
raceless designation, meaning that an assignment of the label itself carries with it little to
no collectively applicable value or meaning. When white individuals lie, cheat, or
commit murder, it is not interpreted within American society as associated with their
whiteness. Black people, on the other hand (and some other raced groups), are often
assigned collective responsibility for actions or characteristics exhibited by individual
members of the racial group.
A common fear of critical theorists in education is that black students have
internalized the negative characteristics assigned to them within white supremacist
society and therefore have a lower sense of desire and self worth. I have shown in
previous chapters that the implicit intention of theorists who put diasporic strategies into
operation is to revise the black-devaluing traditional conception of race. The purpose is to
help black students overcome the consequences of asymmetric ontological assignment.
Of course, it is not considered necessary amongst theorists to affirm struggling white
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students in the classroom with racially marked content—students whose socio-cultural
circumstances may impede their success. After all, the white racial designation has no
negative ontological import. It is therefore, understandable why theorists would move
toward correcting the unevenness of ontological assignment.
However, while well intentioned, such strategies are misguided even if they
managed not to actualize diasporic conceptions of race. Group disproportionality is a
constitutive feature of race, present since its initial application to humans. In other words,
the ontological disparity between whites and blacks, figuratively speaking, came with the
instruction manual for the race concept. Thus, it is a mistake to continue to treat only the
symptoms of race, when we know that it has always carried ontological baggage. The
necessary solution is that we do away with the ontologies that accompany racial
categories. Effectively accomplishing this task requires that we eradicate the racial
paradigm in American society. To maintain the racial paradigm is to continue to assign
its fictitious and harmful ontologies to individuals and groups. Our complicity, as
theorists, in subjecting students in the classroom to this danger is therefore morally and
ethically irresponsible.
Gracia describes a second eliminativist position that concerns the allocation of
power in American society. This argument goes that racial groups are not situated equally
within this distribution. Some racial groups have superior positioning over others. By
continuing to apply racial labels to individuals, we are effectively placing them into the
racial pecking order.264 Whites in the United States are the racial group that has the most
power socially, institutionally, and politically. Even historically, non-racial groups who
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suffered social and systematic discrimination, such as Irish, Italian, and Jewish
Americans ultimately faced less hardship once accepted into the racial paradigm as
members of the white racial group.265 This trend is continuing. As political scientist
Andrew Hacker points out, “Hispanics and Asians are merging into the “white” category,
partly through intermarriage and also by personal achievement and adaptation.”266
However, for persons with known “black” ancestry, this racial mobility is not
permitted.267 Indeed, while the white racial designation has expanded to include persons
of descent not previously considered white, the black racial group has evolved over time
in such a manner that excludes those with some black ancestry from white racial
membership. For instance, through no historical accident there are no longer such
designations as Mulatto; there is just the category “black.”268 Thus, even black
individuals who share ethnicities now racially marked white, continue to be relegated to a
lower position in the racial stratification.
I have shown that critical and philosophical theorists (past and present) highlight
the unequal positioning of racial groups and the dominance of whites within that
paradigm. The question is “what are the options available to create fair and equitable
circumstances for individuals, and specifically for students in the classroom?” Diasporic
education places the unfair burden of having to overcome an undeserved set of
circumstances upon black students by, in essence, attempting to manufacture within them
a refurbished black self. Similarly, “white privilege” strategies steadfastly place the
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burden upon white students to relinquish the privileged position in the racial hierarchy.
Whether alone or in supplement, these strategies miss the big picture; as with the
assignment of moral characteristics and status, the dominant position is intrinsic to the
race system itself.
Historically, stratificatory racial positioning has always been connected to the
perceived moral status (intrinsically and characteristically) of racial groups. Even where
there is no direct consequence of moral status, the socio-economic and cultural
circumstances of blacks today are an effect of how they were morally regarded in the
past. Slavery required the belief that blacks were morally inferior to whites, as did
stripping African slaves of their religious, cultural, and social practices, and the
committing of various other egregious acts against them. To varying degrees, the position
of black people in American society today is a consequence of social engineering and
neglect, and not a matter of accident (except by their birth into the racial system). The
denial and manipulation of education for blacks, and the numerous other overt systematic
attempts to maintain white supremacy are testaments to this fact. There is little doubt that
the consequences of this subordination in education still manifest themselves throughout
American society.
We must remember that race is constructed as a hierarchy. By maintaining it, as
critical theorists, and encouraging through teachers that students continue implementing
and imposing racial categories, we only serve to galvanize teachers and students as
complicit actors in their own racial oppression. No social gain justifies our continuing to
breathe life into the race concept with awareness of its frequently demonstrated and
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historically precedented consequences, especially when we can eliminate these
consequences by purging the race construct.
The final argument for racial eliminativism that Gracia describes is “the history of
racial and ethnic naming indicates that these labels are usually imposed on dominated
groups and do not reflect the views of the dominated.”269 In the case of race, the creation
and application of its labeling has benefitted whites and acted to the detriment of blacks.
Therefore we should cease using the race concept.270 While, the previous eliminativist
arguments offer supplementary support to this argument, Naomi Zack’s analysis of the
racial schema shows how, at its very core, race was designed to maintain white purity. It
accomplishes this maintenance, in part, by treating “black blood” as inherently impure
and, as consequence, a threat to the purity of “white blood.” Historically, the laws
defining the biological parameters for white or black racial membership were subject to
white authority. One example of this is the one-drop rule discussed by Zack. Another
example are anti-miscegenation laws that remained a part of the legal fabric of this
country well into the latter half of the 20th century, that made it illegal for whites to marry
non-whites.271
Even today the structural preservation of racial categories is still subject to the
opinions of those in the white racial majority. It does not matter if a person with both
black and white ancestry regards himself as bi-racial or multi-racial. Furthermore, it is
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inconsequential if most black Americans acknowledge and accept his self-identification.
As long as white racial group is in a dominant position over blacks other racial groups,
the recognition of racial identification will remain out of the hands of black individuals in
the broader context of societal culture. It is reckless to indenture some students to the
desires of those in racially privileged positions or to assign them into pre-existing,
privileged positions by affirming racial categories. Moreover, it is not morally plausible
to maintain a racial paradigm that was not only created by the privileged group, but that
also still favors that group.
All of the previous eliminativist positions, offered by Gracia, and supported by
me, show how continuing to endorse the race construct is existentially harmful, especially
for those assigned to unfavorable categories. Moreover, preserving the concept of race
with knowledge of the aforementioned consequences while simultaneously decrying the
conditions of white hegemony, as critical theorists in education often do, is theoretically
and morally inconsistent. However, while I believe that the eliminativist arguments
provided thus far are decisive, I would like to offer another possible argument for the
eliminativist position that Gracia overlooks that a critical philosophy of race in education
should take into account.
The argument that I offer concerns the inherent obscurantism that has
accompanied the constitution and application of the race concept. Race, in the traditional
biological paradigm and even now as it continues to shift into the “ethnic paradigm,”
conceals knowledge. In Chapter 4, I argued that critical theory of education exacerbates
what the race concept already does; that is, it ignores the biological and ethno-cultural
diversity that exists in human races, especially in regards to people racially marked as
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black. I asserted that it accomplishes the denying of knowledge by elevating blackness as
the unilaterally relevant and constituent factor that makes up an individual. One way that
it does this is biologically.
Consider the fact that geneticists have found the presence of significant European
admixture in black Americans based on analysis of genetic markers associated with
different African or European populations. Evidence also shows that even the degree of
European ancestry varies from place to place within the United States, which some
scientists attribute to the migration of Americans to northern regions. Moreover, black
Americans appear to have more African ancestry than those who would be considered
black (by Americans), such as in Jamaica and many other countries situated within the
African continent (although even in those places there is a presence of European
admixture in black populations).272
With respect to the aforementioned evidence, we can infer that our current
conception of race, which regards blacks with some white ancestry as ontologically
identical to blacks with no white ancestry, buries histories. These are not just the histories
of blacks, whites, and other racial groups. It is the history of the United States. Embedded
within these histories are stories that explain how it is that persons who are thought to
descend only from peoples of Africa came to have European admixtures and how persons
thought to have only European ancestry came to have African ancestry. The current
model in education treats white history and black history as though separate and unequal.
The codification of theoretically reactive and prescriptive racial separatism supports and
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exacerbates this problem. If the critique of the white supremacist model is that it
deliberately prevents blacks from knowing and acknowledging their histories, certainly
scientific information, as I provided here, makes the case that this inhibition begins with
the invention of race.
Racial obscurantism also extends to both ethnicity and culture. Race elevates only
ethnic and cultural relations that we racially recognize as black as the relevant ethnocultural factors to understanding the black racial group, individually and collectively.
Thus, race makes it difficult to recognize the important influences that make up black
individuals. The descendents of American slaves for example, speak English, typically
practice Christianity, and eat the same foods, celebrate the same holidays, and practice
the same rituals as many white Americans. Moreover, they live in all parts of the country
and socially and intimately interact with the cultural environment of their localities and
regions. However, they are continuously referred to as a culturally distinct group.
Differences are highlighted between white and black Americans that fail to apply to the
entirety of either racial group. The cultural syncretism of African, Native American,
Asian, and European cultures and its effects on individuals situated in the United States
fails to get recognized as a consequence of race.273
This epistemic concealment that occurs as a consequence of the racial paradigm
has serious moral consequences. It forces us to deny what constitutes us as social beings,
not only insofar as it ignores the richness of our individual cultural and biological
development, but also our intricate social, cultural, and even biological connections to
one another. Furthermore, it forces us to view others through this same binary lens. As an
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example, Andrew Hacker points to how various peoples of the Caribbean acknowledge
and attempt to maintain their diverse ancestries and histories. 274 However, the American
racial paradigm encourages us to see only what is relevant to the paradigm itself when we
view others. So, the consequences are global as well.
Black Americans are not a homogenous group. We are persons of many origins,
ethnicities, and cultures assigned to a monolithic category. What happens when racially
marked people from the Caribbean come to the United States and are denied recognition
of their ethnic and cultural ties by persons in this country? What happens to the Haitian
Americans, Cuban Americans, and Jamaican Americans who are born in this country but
retain cultural elements of the cultures of previous generations? The racial paradigm
encourages them to either purge their own ethnicities and cultures or it forces them to
have to fight for acknowledgment within American society. This dilemma has serious
ramifications under racial hegemony. If the ascription of the black label means that
individuals (or groups) have to deny their ethnic relations and cultural practices, it is
understandable why they would feel compelled to distance themselves from that racial
designation or group. In addition, an ascription of a negative racial ontology is only going
to exacerbate this desire.275 Therefore, racial conditions in the United States create the
social circumstances in which individuals have to distance themselves from what is
perceived in society as their blackness, further marking “black” as the undesirable
category.
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So, the race concept not only shapes individuals but acts upon those who do not
fit neatly within its categories. Diminishing the knowledge and role of social groups in
shaping people by ignoring the actual groups themselves rests firmly at the foundations
of racial hegemony. Moreover, considering both that racialism is such a widely held
belief system and that non-white racial groups are increasingly viewed as a distinct
cultural groups, the sub-groups that fall under these racial outgroups are pitted against
one another (e.g. African Americans against Dominican Americans, Puerto Ricans
against Mexican Americans). The only way to prevent these circumstances is to free
these individuals and groups from the constraints of race. This means that we must
eliminate the race concept as a legitimate system of categorization.
Anti-Eliminativist Arguments
Now that I have examined some of the arguments against the race concept, I
would like to briefly turn the focus to some of the objections to eliminating race. While, I
have argued for the eliminativist position, I believe that these anti-eliminativist positions
are not easily dismissible and thus should be taken into account before attempting to
construct a philosophy of race in education.
Jorge Gracia provides three central concerns of the anti-eliminativist positions.
The first position asserts that “race [and ethnicity] have influenced, and still influence,
the course of human history in significant ways and have substantially affected the lives
of individual persons.”276 Thus, to eliminate these concepts would mean ignoring the
whole host of harms that have occurred as a consequence of racial and ethnic
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categorization.277 The second position against the elimination of race argues that given its
past and present impact, we cannot discard race as this would leave us with no way to
adequately address its negative consequences. Race is crucial to understanding how
racism and white supremacy operates.278 The final moral argument against racial
eliminativism is that keeping race allows us to have an appropriate frame of reference by
which we, as a society, can learn from our past to insure that we do repeat the mistakes of
race in the future. Getting rid of race increases the potential for the worsening and
repetition of destructive racial consequences.279
These three arguments are similar because they all assert that we need race to
adequately understand race and address its consequences. Indeed, the point is well taken.
There is no way to comprehend the personal, socio-cultural, and systematical oppression
of black people without referencing the essentialist American racial paradigm that treats
whites as the morally and ontologically superior group. It is also necessary to racially
label persons affected negatively affected by race in order to adequately address and
alleviate their circumstances.
On the surface, these arguments appear damaging to the eliminativist position.
However, a closer look reveals that these anti-eliminativist arguments are not really
incompatible with eliminativism. The eliminativist arguments that I have provided deal
more precisely with the existential implications of race—how racial positions situate
individuals morally, characteristically, and socio-politically in the racial hierarchy and the
epistemic burdens race puts on individuals. These eliminativist arguments maintain that
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because the race generates immoral consequences, utilizing the race concept is in itself
immoral, and as I have added, unethical in the classroom space. The moral arguments
against eliminating the race concept are a theoretically different sort of argument; they
posit race as heuristically and analytically valuable. They seek to preserve race as a
necessary tool that permits us to understand and effectively address the immorality of its
consequences. This is quite different than suggesting that we continue assigning racial
ontologies.
In our discussion in the previous chapter it was quite clear that these arguments
undergird the positions of the three anti-eliminativist philosophers of race, including
Gracia. Moreover, it is implicit in the eliminativist arguments of Naomi Zack, who uses
the race concept to expose its own falsity and demonstrate the asymmetry of its binary
schema. The goal of the aforementioned philosophers of race is to deconstruct and
disentangle race from its inherent essentialism. In this sense, their positions are
eliminativist because a de-essentialized race concept is no longer the traditional race
concept. In other words, to demonstrate the bio-metaphysical falseness of race, which
these theorists do, is not simply to argue for eliminativism as an end, it is actively
eliminating the race concept through analysis. Thus, the above-mentioned philosophers
race demonstrate that an existential racial eliminativism and an analytical antieliminativism are theoretically consistent positions. This is a point to which I will later
return.
It is important to address an assumption that Gracia mentions in addendum to the
third anti-eliminativist position that intends to respond to racial eliminativism. Gracia
states, “Refusing to accept the role of race in our experience in particular and even talk
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about it, only serves to exacerbate racism. It also misses the point that race…can be used
to correct social ills, provide meaning, and develop a beneficial sense of identity in
people.”280 This first claim seems plausible, as we cannot simply pretend that race does
not exist socially in hopes that it will go away. To pretend would allow racism to
continue without utilizing the most effective tool that we have to address it—the race
concept.
However, the second point, which posits race as a normative prospect for meaning
and identity, is more troublesome given the danger, as Appiah accurately points out, for
racial identities to become dictatorial over our other personal and social identities. In
addition, this nourishing of racial identities risks re-substantiating racial boundaries as the
perimeters for moral community. Once again, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Molefi
Asante’s political revision of race differs from the traditional notion of race insofar as it
does not apply negative characteristics to blacks as a group. However, he imposes its
refurbished Afrocentric ontology upon others as the basis for moral judgment (denying
one’s racial ontology). Furthermore, we also witnessed that Asante’s diasporic racialism
is broadly applied and imposed on the black racial group by critical theorists in education
which, I argued, is not without moral consequence.
Nevertheless, I believe that the idea of race as a source of meaning and identity
bears some import and offers a fourth potential argument for maintaining race. It is an
argument that has real world relevance as it concerns our conceptions of self and others,
and thus, is necessary for consideration by a philosophy of race in education. As I have
stated, race often acts as an ideological basis by which we conduct our lives. It works its
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way into our personal, social, political, and professional choices. For some of us whose
racial group occupies an out-group status, racial boundaries demarcate a figurative (and
sometimes literal) safety zone. We may appreciate the artistic creations of others because
they share our same racial designation. Racial labeling may mark for us a (local, regional,
or global) community from which we draw significant relational, ideological and cultural
value. The fact that race plays such a valuable role in our lives creates somewhat of a
dilemma for critical theorists. Should we dispose of race because it is a moral and
epistemic aberration or should we attempt to preserve it because of the considerable
meaning that it provides for many people?
I believe that the aforementioned dilemma is not without some precedent. After
all, there have been a number of hegemonic paradigms that throughout the course of
history have no doubt been the basis of meaningful relationships. There have been bloodbased aristocracies dividing groups into royalty, nobility, and commoners; religions that
mark some people as chosen and others as condemned; caste systems that mark people as
outcasts by virtue of the biological descent from ancestors who worked “lowly”
occupations. Race, in essence, is like all of these paradigmatic frameworks. A person’s
presumed race was used to assign him to a particular group. If he was white, they were
considered of higher moral stock than those of other raced-groups and, as I have alluded
to in this dissertation, social, cultural, and political power were and largely still is
distributed along racial lines. However, like these other oppressive paradigms, race sets
the conditions in which individuals are locked into circumstantial relationships with
similarly grouped others, and those others, at least in some cases, will act as the persons
to whom individuals are going to best be able to relate. Moreover, as both Appiah and
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Gracia highlight, ethnicity and culture can emerge as a result of the aforementioned racial
circumstances. The ends, however, do not justify the means, or at least they would not
justify them in other similarly oppressive frameworks.
Take, for example, the economic class system in the United States where there are
primarily three recognized groups: lower class, middle class, and upper class. Each of
these groups has different degrees of socio-cultural mobility, access and (coercive and
volitional) isolation contingent upon economic factors in combination with other
variables (race, ethnicity, etc). Gangster rap, for example, emerged from persons living in
environments where the consequences of violence were felt in ways unlikely to occur in
more affluent, well-protected, neighborhoods. Operas, orchestras, and academic societies
are cultural manifestations that materialize amongst those who are financially better off.
The relationships amongst people who fall under these groupings are likely to be
different as well. For instance, growing up in my hometown, being both impoverished
and black meant that there was only a small selection of neighborhoods that my family
could live in—ones that we could afford and ones that were safe for blacks to live in.
However, having limited access in this regard meant that I grew up knowing and feeling
connected to the other people who were restricted to the same circumstances--namely,
other poor, black persons. There is little doubt that the meaning derived from these
circumstances shaped not only my conception of self and others today, but also has
influenced and informs the career path that I have chosen today. In healthier racial socioeconomic circumstances than those of my childhood, a person is likely provided with less
communally compact relationships, but with a broader range of choices. As a
consequence, charting a path for herself that secures a just environment for oppressed
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people may not be a priority or recognizable choice. She may feel more connected to
people who share her economic and racial status, because they are who she recognizes as
“like her.” So, her choices in life might simply reflect the status of her more privileged
grouping. However, her affluence and relative freedom from the social constraints of race
do not make her life any less meaningful to her than my lack of wealth and freedom did
to me.
The problem is that despite the value of social class, the meaning and sense of
identity in the aforementioned cases would not exist if not for the hegemonic framework
of class. Would we argue that we should keep the class system, because its class
groupings are beneficial? Should we teach students that they should embrace lower class
status because it provides them with distinctive types of meaning and identities? The
tactics in critical theory in education seem to go in the opposite direction of this, where
theorists often condemn the oppressive class structure created by capitalism. Critical
theorists concerned with social justice would not argue for a return of aristocracy or that
we should affirm a Japanese-American student as burakumin (low caste).
Race should be no different. It is true that race has been a source of valuable
meaning for individuals. However, we must remember that as such, it is also a
fundamental basis for social, cultural, and systematic oppression. If race were not a
source of meaning and identity there would not have been the subjugation of American
Indians, African and Asian descent in this country. Meaning and identity, in this regard,
cut both ways and this will always be the case in oppressive paradigms. As theorists in
education, we must be sensitive to the meaningful role that races plays in the lives of all
students in the classroom, but that does not mean that we should ignore or affirm the
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hegemonic paradigm on which that meaning is based. To not mitigate hegemony where
we can is ethically irresponsible as theorists.
Considering all of the above arguments both for and against racial eliminativism,
I believe that a philosophy of race in education must attempt to satisfy the valid concerns
of both sides of the debate. Therefore, a philosophy of race in education must attempt to
eliminate racial hegemony and this means that we work toward the deflation and the
removal of the race concept existentially. Heuristically, however, the race concept is
necessary in order to address the circumstances of students and permit them to confront
their own racial conditions in rational and informed manners. This means that a
philosophy of race in education should assist students in recognizing that race and its
ontologies are false, while acknowledging that as a consequence of racialism it has been a
source of division, oppression, and in many cases meaning and creativity. For this
eliminativist/anti-eliminativist project to have success, it is necessary that theorists,
teachers, and students are educated to effectively engage race conceptually and
existentially. In the following section, I argue the type of education that I consider
necessary for a comprehensive philosophy of race in education.

Education for Autonomy as Liberatory
To overcome racial hegemony, race must be challenged both as a conception of
the good and as social construct. Race has three primary strengths, all of which help
maintain it. First, it is regarded or treated as self-evident and therefore goes unchallenged
by theorists, teachers, and students. Secondly, it is often such a crucial aspect to our
senses of value, self, and choice that it is self-affirming. Finally, it is socially and
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culturally accepted as biologically real and its attachment to ethnicity and culture affirm
race for people. These strengths concern race as a conceptual and ideological problem
and therefore account for its complex ground.
However, race also has its weaknesses. First, it is a scientifically discredited
concept. There are no human races. Secondly, race’s ideological trajectory, over time, has
gradually moved further from its initial ontological framework, and therefore it exhibits a
provable contingency.281 Third, race is not a conception of the good like a religion
because the fideistic commitment to race is involuntary. These weaknesses all show how
race is also an epistemological problem. We believe that it exists because we were
presented with false knowledge continually perpetuated by the society around us.
At first glance, it would appear that all it would take to exploit the weaknesses of
the race concept is to provide counter-knowledge to its epistemic assumptions. The
problem, however, is the evidence demonstrating the falsity of race has been available for
quite some time. Moreover, in the years since race’s discrediting by the sciences, there
has not been a collective race to the podium to announce its demise as biological truth.
This is in no small part due to the ideological nature of race. And while it may not be like
a religion, we often have a cult-like commitment to it and its explanatory value in our
lives. So, a philosophy of race in education that seeks to existentially eliminate the race
concept needs tools that are able to attend to both the strengths and weaknesses of race.
An education for autonomy is, I believe, necessary as a liberatory tool for this task.282 For
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success of this endeavor, an education for autonomy requires at least two indispensable
features: a skill-based component and a knowledge-based component.
Before I offer a more detailed vision of what this education may entail, it is
necessary to offer a bit of a disclaimer about my reliance on autonomy. As I have
mentioned, it is not my desire to ensnare myself in debates about the importance of
autonomy as a liberal ideal, although I value it as such. Moreover, as I have argued, the
concern by critical theorists regarding the imposing of white supremacist teaching on
black students seems to allude to something that bears resemblance to personal
autonomy, even if not stated explicitly by those theorists. Indeed, I would assert that if we
are not concerned with whether black students are able to have a part in the construction
of their own values and life plans, there is little ground on which white supremacy can be
critiqued, given that it is like any another social and cultural factor that constitutes us as
individuals.
I acknowledge, however, that as Michele Moses points out, some theorists in
education have argued that importance of autonomy in education is overstressed because
it neglects the role of groups in making up individuals.283 However, I share her view that
the development for personal autonomy is necessary to “provide students with the
capacity for deliberation about their own cultural community as well as others.”284
Moreover, this sentiment captures the goal of the education for autonomy that I am
proposing. It is important that individuals are able to rationally reflect on the conceptions
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of the good life with which their various communities indoctrinate them. The education
for autonomy that I am advocating here is intended as a liberatory tool rather than a
liberal ideal. To overthrow racial (or sexual, ethnic, and gender) hegemony, as theorists,
teachers, and students, it is important that we have the tools to liberate ourselves to avoid
being complicit in our own and others’ subjugation.
Furthermore, one of my central arguments against utilizing diasporic conceptions
of race and, indeed, race itself is that it hides the truth about what actually constitutes
individuals and groups. I have argued that the ethnic paradigm of race acknowledges and
imposes one monolithic group as relevant to an individual’s identity, instead of allowing
for the possibility of other group relations. It is my view that an education for autonomy
helps bring these other possible group connections to into the light from wherever racial
hegemony has hidden them from view.
It is also important to note my advocating of an education for autonomy is not an
endorsement of the current model of liberal education. Liberal education, in many ways,
has not lived up to its promise and its promises. It has been unsuccessful in providing
students (of all levels) with the skills that permit them to critically engage the world in a
sophisticated and adaptable manner. Moreover, it has not supplied them with a broad,
accurate, and unabridged knowledge about the world. However, it is not clear that this
malfunction is simply a result of liberal education itself. Its failure is due in part to the
limitations put on what skills and knowledge students learn and who gets to benefit from
them. Liberal education is and always has been subject to the decisions of persons in
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dominant racial groups.285 There is a reason theorists such as Gloria Ladson-Billings,
Molefi Asante, Joe Kincheloe, and Shirley Steinberg are compelled to critique the
absence of blacks and Africans in the content of education. Educational institutions, like
most social and political institutions, are sometimes platforms for hegemony. My analysis
up this point is an attempt to demonstrate this point.
However, the above mandates that theorists, teachers, and students need to have
the skills and knowledge to critically evaluate what is taught, how it is taught, why it is
taught, and the subsequent consequences of this information. If we do not have the
critical tools necessary to liberate ourselves from racial hegemony, even as it acts through
liberal education (which means liberating ourselves from the current model of liberal
education), then how are we, as theorists, going to help free others? This requires that a
philosophy of race in education endorse a model of education that is liberatory, meaning
that it is geared toward the use and production of the aforementioned tools. Let us now
look to the role that a skill-based approach plays in this an autonomy education for racial
liberation.
A Liberatory Role for Reason in a Philosophy of Race in Education
It is essential that potential theorists, teachers, and students acquire the skills that
will allow them to critically engage race as a conception of the good. The focus of this
education in the K-12 classroom would, of course, mean the development of reasoning
skills that not only help students problem solve, but also identify problems, and critically
engage those problems with other students. However, it is imperative that in this
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education that the subject of race is incorporated into the development of reasoning
skills.286 This is crucial given that students are typically indoctrinated with racialism
from youth and this racialism is constantly affirmed at all levels of society and
interaction. There is no way for students to escape the confines of race and racial
ontology if they do not have the skills to do so. An education for autonomy will make it
easier for students to recognize their own racial conditions and conditioning.
Education for autonomy as skill-based education should also be promoted in
education programs that house future theorists and teachers. I believe that philosophy
programs in the Western tradition, where rational thinking and discourse are synonymous
with doing philosophy, provide a useful template by which advanced degree and preservice teacher programs can model themselves. From the first undergraduate philosophy
course, there is a focus on the enhancement of reasoning skills, whether by practicing the
Socratic method, taking practical reasoning classes, or analyzing philosophical texts. This
critical thinking as reason component is the one mainstay throughout every course in
philosophy programs. Thus, the young philosopher’s capacity to negotiate, improve upon,
and problematize difficult subject areas is able to cultivate through the course of her
education.
The philosopher is also trained to critically evaluate new and unfamiliar areas of
knowledge, not only in texts, but also in dialogue with others. The cultivation of
analytical skills in this regard are crucial when attempting to negotiate the complex and
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murky waters of race (and ethnicity)287 Collective and dialogical analysis is important in
an education for autonomy for racial liberation because race is a social construct. Thus, it
should be engaged both critically and socially. This is an aspect that should be allowed to
develop in within education programs, in a similar manner as it develops in philosophy
programs.
Our work is applied and has a lot at stake. Therefore, a philosophy of race in
education advocates that our own field of education and its sub-disciplines attempt to
develop and nurture similar skill-sets in our future theorists and teachers. This begins
with implementing analytical components in our own courses. This way theorists and
teachers can acquire the skills denied to them elsewhere and be able to merge these
analytical skills with other forms of critical thinking often hidden from view by the racial
(and gender) paradigms in education.
Moreover, courses with analytical components will encourage students in
education programs to put those skills to use by examining and creating the applied
content of our field. For example, a philosophy of race in education course might
evaluate the works of theorists such as Ladson-Billings or Kincheloe and Steinberg, or
Jorge Gracia. As part of this critical evaluation, the course requires that students provide
critical exegeses of these theorists’ works. This will help students recognize the strengths
and weaknesses in these theoretical works. However, analytical skills will help students
correct these weakness, further develop the strengths, and help students determine when,
where, how, to whom, or whether these theories are applicable. An education for

287

Examples of this are the philosophers of race in Chapter 5 who are in constant conversation with one
another, improving upon each other’s works.

195

autonomy in this manner will assist in cultivating stronger theory and instruction to help
contend with the problem of race in our own discipline, including in our own work.
Another important benefit of analytical training in education programs is that
theorists and, especially K-12 teachers, will have more capabilities to pass on to their
students in the classroom. As I stated in the previous section, liberal education has failed
students by not providing them with the skills and curriculum necessary to critically
examine the content of their personal, social, political and global surroundings. A skillbased education for autonomy provides teachers with the means to fill in the skill and
race gaps created by liberal education, thereby providing a necessary resource(s) that
permits students to confidently engage the problem of race.
An additional reason, that analytical education is important for theorists and
teachers is that it will help nurture our ability to identify the encumbrances placed upon
theory and praxis by racial hegemony. It is, for example, important that we are able to
recognize how teachers are reifying race in the classroom or imposing ethno-racial
models on students, or acting as authoritative validators for problematic race theory. It is
also important that we apply this same analysis to our own works to help ensure that we
are not inadvertent agents of racial oppression acting upon students. We, too, are
indoctrinated by society to see race and to see race as ethnicity. This makes us see racial,
ethnic, and cultural properties that are not actually there and it also prevents us from
seeing what there is. It is my hope that a skill-based education for autonomy will help
reveal for us what the racial paradigm has concealed—the truth.
However, truth means knowledge. A liberatory education for autonomy is an
insufficient tool for theorists, teachers, and students to deal with the problem of race, if it
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is solely a skill-based education. So, let us now look at the function of knowledge in an
education for autonomy.
A Liberatory Role for Knowledge in a Philosophy of Race in
Education
The view that I am proposing requires a somewhat different approach to the
problem of race than most critical and multicultural theorists recommend inasmuch as I
do not advance the idea that knowledge is the primary component in confronting issues
facing black students. Rather, I advocate that knowledge, as part of an education for
autonomy, supplements a skill-based strategy for racial liberation. I am in agreement with
Appiah who, in regard to education for autonomy, states that it is important that we
“prepare students with the truth and the capacity to require more of it.”288 The role that I
am positing for knowledge in this project is intended to set the record straight about race
because for too long, we have allowed race to the write the record for us.
The ethnic paradigm of race is firmly embedded in multicultural education and
critical theory in education. As a consequence, theorists condemn teachers and students to
a hierarchical, axiomatic ontological system that is based upon scientifically invalidated
assumptions about humans. The analysis in this dissertation has shown that this
condemning often gets carried out by the promotion of epistemic frameworks that affirm
racial ontology. This use of knowledge is misguided because the knowledge itself is in
error.
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To free students from the constraints of racial hegemony, a philosophy of race in
education advocates that we problematize knowledge, not act from problematic
knowledge. For race, this means that we critically engage information compromised by,
or more specifically, constructed from racially hegemonic materials. We must confront
knowledge that affirms racial categories, treats racial categories as ethnic categories, and
that attempts to broadly apply content to individuals marked by racial categories.
Thus, a philosophy of race in education must do more than advocate an education
for autonomy; it must embrace it by providing its own liberatory knowledge. It should
advance knowledge that tells the truth about the race concept. We cannot approach race
as though it is real biologically, ethnically, or culturally just because it is socially real.
We must treat it as a construct. This means that we impart knowledge that shows how
racialism, the belief in human races, has shaped the lives of those who fall within racial
boundaries in harmful and sometimes even meaningful ways. Moreover, we must attempt
to illuminate, for teachers and students (through praxis), the various ways in which
racialism intersects and intermingles with other paradigms such as class, gender,
sexuality, and ethnicity.
A similar way in which knowledge will play a role in an education for autonomy
is by bringing attention to conflicting racial paradigms. For instance, the American racial
paradigm has its own distinctive characteristics, such as its one-drop rule, its asymmetric
racial ontologies, its limited number categories, and its consistent mixture of racial and
pan-ethnic categories (black, white, Asian, American Indian). As I stated in my
eliminativist arguments, this conflicts with distinctive paradigms found in Latin
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American countries.289 Emphasizing knowledge of these competing frameworks not only
demonstrates to students how race is socially constructed, but also shows how persons
hailing from places where other racial, ethno-racial, or ethnic models affect individuals
existentially when they come into contact the American paradigm of race (racism,
ethnocentrism, labeling, racial and cultural reductionism). This example shows how a
philosophy of race in education advocates for both an existential eliminativism and a
heuristic anti-eliminativism. It demonstrates how theory and praxis can address the
historical, geographical, and cultural contingency of the race concept, while still utilizing
race to address its consequences.
Multicultural approaches often interpret experiential and cultural knowledge
through the ethnic paradigm of race. A philosophy of race in education encourages the
elimination of racial obscurantism, through an education of autonomy that recognizes the
uniqueness and diversity of individual and group experience. Moreover, it collects this
knowledge from various forms, such as the narrative experiences collected through
academic, artistic, and literary work. It goes beyond this, however, by also activating the
experiential knowledge brought to the table by theorists, teachers and students as valid
sources of unsettled knowledge worthy of critical evaluation.
In addition, an education for autonomy attempts to shed light on the existential
realities of race, ethnicity, and culture through self-identification and reflection while
allowing for new ways of understanding individuals and groups. For example, a student
brings her own unique perspective into the classroom. Society might designate her as a
member of the black racial group, but she expresses how her parents, who are also
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designated black hail from very different backgrounds. She knows that her father grew up
a poor farmer from Kentucky and that his ancestors were African slaves. Her mother is a
Creole of West African, French, Portuguese, and Native American descent from the city
of New Orleans. An education for autonomy encourages the student to express and
attempt to understand the ways in which her own values and cultural practices are
amalgamations of her upbringing by her parents and growing up in San Diego,
California. Moreover, it encourages her to recognize other outside influences that play a
role in constructing her identity. The ethnic paradigm of race interprets this as the African
American or black experience, but an education for autonomy attempts to free the student
from essentialist entanglement by acknowledging her experience as distinctive to her as
an individual, and as a member of her commonly unique family, and as members of her
various other socio-cultural environments.
We get a sense, then, of how an education for autonomy attempts to provide the
conditions in which the student utilizes her own knowledge to free her from the
constraints of race. This education allows her to express her narrative as she experiences
it, not by a racial framework that is imposed up on her. However, this education does not
ignore how the racial framework shapes the student’s sense of identity in relation to her
environment or to others within it. It does not advocate that the student’s identity be
stripped from her. It does encourage, however, that her racial identity is critically
evaluated through truth and not through racialist interpretation.
The self-evident, racialist paradigm typically stops the dialogue when it is
challenged by knowledge that undermines its dominance. Education for autonomy
attempts to supply students, teachers, and theorists alike with the skills to engage,
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negotiate, problematize, and make sense of and apply the knowledge learned where
related to the race concept. So, an education for autonomy is where skill and knowledge
and community come together and allows that conversation about race to continue in a
critical and sophisticated manner.

Toward a Philosophy of Race of Education
The final aspect that I consider necessary for a critical philosophy of race in
education is that it is self-reflective. In other words, in cannot simply act as a philosophy
of race in education, it must also perform as a philosophy of race of education. This
necessitates that it conducts metaphysical analyses of the race concept as it is utilized in
theory and praxis and throughout the broad discipline of education, including the
philosophy of race in education itself. It is important that as a discipline a philosophy of
race in education is always evolving and self-correcting and always sensitive to itself as a
part of an institution situated in a society where the commitment to racialism is one of the
most dominant, stubborn, long lasting, and widely-held conceptions of the good.
Furthermore, a self-reflective philosophy of race in education must broaden its
knowledge base to include information and strategies outside of the field of education. It
cannot simply create epistemic, strategic, and theoretical dialogue with disciplines that
overtly share the same social and political goals. It must also draw from the variety of
broad and valuable resources available to it both in and outside of the Academy. It must
try to be informed by the theory emerging from social and biological sciences, Women’s
Studies, Philosophy, Law, Queer Studies, and Black Studies. Furthermore, it cannot cut
itself off from the real world if it seeks to help the students who live within it. It must
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attempt to know how people really think on the ground, in everyday life, in the multitude
of unique circumstances in which they reside. It must attempt make sure that its theories
and the praxis that it informs corresponds with actual life. To do this will keep the field of
education honest and relevant, to make sure that its theory does not overshoot the
circumstances of the actual world while trying to bring about a just future world.

Conclusion: Toward A Philosophy of Race For Education
In this Chapter, I argued that critical theory in education should create its own
philosophy of race in education. I recommended an existential eliminativist and analytical
anti-eliminativist hybrid project that advocates a skill and knowledge-based education for
autonomy. I argued for this approach for a philosophy of race for education because it
can assist students, teachers, and theorists to best recognize and challenge race as an
inherited conception of the good and free the epistemic constraints that it puts on our
conceptions of self and others.
Racial hegemony has plagued this country since its inception and degraded its
racial minorities. However, everyone has suffered as a consequence of race. It deprives us
of knowing and learning about our differences and similarities and places barriers
between the variety of possible human relations, identities, and meaning that we have not
been able to forge with one another. It is my hope that a philosophy of race in education
can help reverse this damage to bring about a just social environment in which
individuals and groups are able to flourish—in the absence of race.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I examined the nature of the reified conception of race as it
relates to theory taking place in the field of education, specifically in the field of critical
theory education. My analysis began in Chapter Two, where I showed that race is so
pervasive that even as critical theorists in education, we often put forward analyses and
strategies, intended to reverse the consequences of racial hegemony, but that ultimately
reaffirm the essentialist notion of race that has been a mainstay in American society for
centuries. The presuppositions that undergird the approaches of such scholars as Molefi
Kete Asante, Gloria Ladson-Billings, Peter McLaren, Joe Kincheloe and Shirley
Steinberg frequently present the black racial group as a monolithic human entity. I
demonstrate this point by highlighting ways in which ethnic and cultural properties were
attributed across the racial groups. For instance, the primary remedy used to relieve the
social and racial circumstances for black students was the normative application of
African content for the purpose of black affirmation, as was the case with LadsonBillings, Asante, and Kincheloe and Steinberg.
In Chapter Three, I presented a historical analysis of the problem of racial
reification in critical theory in education. I examined some of the key scholars and events
that helped shaped the education of black people in this country. The important figures
and theorists of my examination included Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. DuBois and
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Carter Woodson. DuBois and Woodson offered diasporic racial strategies for liberal
education intended for the aim of bettering the circumstances the black racial group. The
vision of these two philosophers of education inspired the events that eventually led to
the creation of Black Studies programs in higher education. My analysis concluded that
philosophies and events that emerged from this history, especially the acceptance of
Black Studies in the American academy, provided the grounding by which critical
theorists in education conceptualized the black racial group biologically, ethnically, and
culturally. I argued, however, that the critical theorists in education of my analysis
converted the normative conceptions of race from the history of black education into
substantive conceptions of the black racial group.
Chapter Four was an analysis of the consequences of critical theorists in education
implementing diasporic strategies attached to an unproblematized reified race concept. In
this analysis I took a closer look at the race concept in American society. I explored how
as an axiomatic paradigm, race creates expectations and requirements for the
performance racial ontology. Given the nature of race, I concluded that if critical theorists
in education operationalize diasporic conceptions of race in the classroom, then they risk
tightening racial constraints on black students, consequently inhibiting their personal
autonomy.
In Chapter Five, I argued that the harms to students mandate that critical theorists
in education attempt to circumvent the problem of race. I suggested that we draw from
the theoretical, strategic, and epistemic arsenals of the philosophy of race. I offered an
analysis of four of the most well-known and respected philosophers of race. They are
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Naomi Zack, Charles Mills, and Jorge Gracia. My analysis of
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these philosophers’ theories illustrated how the philosophy of race can reveal the inherent
oppressive and essentialist nature of the race construct. Further, I offered
recommendations to show how the philosophy of race can provide critical theorists in
education with useful tools that will allow us to make sense of race and better inform
theory and praxis.
Finally, I recommended the development of a philosophy of race in education that
seeks to bring an end to the racial hegemony for students by moving toward the
existential elimination of the race concept. The philosophy of race that I suggested
promotes an education for autonomy as a tool for racial liberation. This education is
intended to provide the analytical skills and corrective knowledge that will cultivate in
theorists, teachers, and students, the capacity to engage race as a hegemonic conception
of the good. I further argued that it is necessary that a philosophy of race in education is
willing to analytically engage the broad field of education in the academy to ensure that
as a discipline we are not complicit conduits for racial hegemony. This is the project that
I have attempted to carry out in this dissertation--a metaphysical analysis of race in the
discipline of critical theory in education.
As theorists in education, we are, in many ways, the first and last line of defense
against racial hegemony for students in the classroom. It is our theories that teachers
utilize to inform their interactions with students. Thus, it is important that our theories not
oppress students by condemning and locking them into ethno-racial constraints as a
consequence of our positing and authorizing racialist conceptions of identity. The
analysis that I provided in this dissertation is intended to show how we sometimes fail in
this regard. However, its purpose is also to act as a demonstration, as one philosophy of
205

race in education, to help us understand how and why we sometimes fall short and also to
help us understand the necessity for preventing its occurrence—the need to pick
ourselves back up.
As the last line of defense, theory in education attempts to inform the classroom
in such a way that it protects students from the consequences of racial hegemony. We are
situated in a society where race permeates through every aspect of our culture(s) and
institutions. As critical theorists, it is important that we ensure that students are protected
from racial hegemony through effective education. That means that we need to make
certain that they are provided with tools that can help safeguard them from the oppressive
venues of hegemony in society, including us, as critical theorists and our impositions on
them when we fail to act with caution in our theories. The philosophy of education that I
am advocating is intended to offer students of all levels a stronger and tighter last line of
defense.
It is my hope that both the analysis and normative arguments in the metaphysics
of race that I conduct in this dissertation have implications beyond my immediate
scholarly confines. It is my wish that my work inspires others to conduct their own
philosophical analyses. The field of education can only benefit from a critical philosophy
of race in education to provide a means to challenge racial hegemony where it begins,
from the race construct itself.
A philosophy of race in education, working in conjunction with theorists such as
Gloria Ladson-Billings, can develop culturally relevant strategies for education that draw
out and address the concerns of the substantial number of cultural groups that are
currently hidden or ignored as a consequence of the ethnic paradigm of race. A
206

philosophy of race in education can work closely with feminist theorists in education to
attempt to make sense of the complex interactions that occur at the conceptual and
consequential intersections of race and gender and to develop strategies that encompass
other ways of knowing and learning. It can work with qualitative and quantitative
research theorists to attempt to develop strategies for gaining precise research on how the
racial essentialism, racial obscurantism, and racial axioms adversely affects students and
teachers within the classroom.
Furthermore, a philosophy of race in education can also have implications on
educational policy. While there is an effort by policymakers to mitigate the consequences
of race in education, very little takes place attempting to diminish the concept of race. A
philosophy of race in education can provide important analyses, arguments, and research
that make a case for the need to implement broad-scaled strategies that move toward the
elimination of race while also attending to its consequences. Indeed, a philosophy of race
in education, if successful, can change the way in which we approach race and ethnicity
insofar as it attempts to make lucid what the racial paradigm has made unintelligible.
The most important possible implication of the work that I offered here is that its
reverberations reach beyond the classroom space to the social and global world that has
been imprisoned by the American racial paradigm. We must remember the classroom is a
microcosm of the society that surrounds it. That means that what takes place within its
walls does not end once students and teachers exit the room. My analysis and
recommendations for a philosophy of race in education, if successful, provide a means by
which individuals (and groups) may eventually find liberation from racial hegemony and
are able to forge a world for themselves without reference to false ontologies. In this
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sense, they activate themselves as persons better able to develop their own conceptions of
the good life, with one less constraint on their freedom and choices. As they interact with
the world, hopefully persons will see that world’s doors suddenly open to new
possibilities that were once ideologically shut.
Before I joined the field of education, I was a graduate student in philosophy.
Being a black person in Western academic philosophy is akin to being an anomaly. You
are the elephant in the room that everybody sees, but that nobody wants to be caught
noticing for fear that you might want to talk about it. When I came to the field of
education I became African American and that is all anyone seemed to notice. In both
cases, my racial designation told my instructors and colleagues everything they needed to
know about me. Yet, in this dissertation I have merged the best of the two fields that I
hold dear to create a philosophy of race in education. I hope that the work the I offer here
will mean that one day someone who used to share my racial designation is able to walk
into her philosophy or philosophy education class, sit down, open her books, and smile
because there are is no elephant in the room and she has a story of her own that she can’t
wait to tell.
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